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INTRODUCION
As one of the guarantees provided in the Bill of Rights, the Fifth
Z Amendment's Compensation Clause' restricts government's
otherwise largely plenary power2 over privately-held property rights.
While the Compensation Clause does not directly limit government's
ability to change, modify, or even eliminate existing privately-held
property rights, in certain instances it circumscribes government's
ability to force individual property owners to bear the cost of such
government-imposed changes. Specifically, for those government-
imposed property redistributions4 found to be "takings" within the
meaning of the Compensation Clause, the Fifth Amendment requires
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1. The Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, also known as the Takings
Clause, provides: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. In addition to the Compensation Clause, courts have utilized other constitu-
tional limitations to restrict government's authority over privately-held property. For
holdings based on substantive due process, see Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183 (1928); Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904). For holdings based
on freedom of speech, see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
1505 (1993); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); Schad v. Borough of
Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). For a holding based on freedom of religion, see
First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). For a
holding based on privacy, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
3. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
4. Like Professors Epstein and Levmore, and the early Court, I define "taking"
broadly to include any intentional government action that redistributes a pre-existing
property right. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 57-104 (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]; Saul
Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CoNN. L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1990);
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1892, 1903 (1992) ("To use the common metaphor, the early Court protected
each 'strand' in the bundle of ownership rights individually."). Whenever the govern-
ment intentionally changes, limits, or modifies any one of the bundle of property
rights that the law has previously recognized as belonging to the property holder, the
government has redistributed property and the compensation question arises. Given
this definition of "taking," taxation programs, environmental regulations, workplace
safety rules, as well as more traditional land-use regulations, would all implicate the
protection the Compensation Clause affords private property. Not all such redistribu-
tions, however, would require compensation; the task is one of separating those redis-
tributions that warrant just compensation from those that do not.
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federal and state governments5 to compensate the property holder for
the taking,6 and thereby shifts the cost of the taking from the property
owner to the government and taxpayers generally. If, on the other
hand, the change does not amount to a "taking," the Fifth Amend-
ment will not require compensation, and will permit government to
force the individual property owners to bear the burden of the cost of
the government-imposed rights change.7
In deciding whether to label any given government-imposed rights
change a "taking," courts applying the Compensation Clause face one
central question: who should bear the cost of the government's ac-
tion? 8 While a number of commentators, myself included, have sug-
gested tests for resolving this question,9 this Article will focus on the
5. While the Fifth Amendment does not apply directly to the states, see Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833), the Court has applied the compensation
requirement to the states as part of the Due Process language of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. State of Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896);
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399, 412 (1894); Kaukauna Water
Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254, 276 (1891).
6. Alternatively, the government can rescind its action once a court has deter-
mined that the action amounts to a taking. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 n.17 (1992). However, even if the government rescinds
its action, the government must provide just compensation to cover the period during
which the taking was in effect. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 319, 321 (1987); see also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2901 n.17.
7. Even if the Fifth Amendment, or the corresponding state constitutional provi-
sion, does not require compensation, a government may nevertheless choose to pro-
vide compensation for political reasons. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936) (recognizing state authority to provide extensive subsidies to farmers in return
for limits on agricultural production); see also Donald G. Hagman, Compensable Reg-
ulations, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEouTrs 256, 266-67 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J.
Misczynski eds., 1978); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., A Comment on Economic Analysis
and Just Compensation, 12 IrrN'L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 141 (1992). That the govern-
ment should, on occasion, choose to provide compensation beyond that constitution-
ally required does not suggest, however, that enforcement of the constitutional
provision is unnecessary, any more than Congress's enactment of Title VII or the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 suggests that enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause is
unnecessary.
8. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The determination
that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the
public at large, rather than the single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of
state power in the public interest."); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
416 (1922) ("[T]he question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes desired
should fall.").
9. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1954-55, 1965 (find a taking if government action
deprives the very few of an existing property right for the benefit of the very many);
see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1215, 1223-24
(1967) (find a taking only if demoralization costs in the absence of compensation ex-
ceed settlement costs); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,
62-63 (1964) (find a taking if government is acting as enterpise, but not if govern-
ment is acting as arbitrator) [hereinafter Sax, Police Power]; Robert J. Kratovil &
Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain-Policy & Concept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596, 609
(1954) (find a taking when private losses outweigh public benefit); Margaret J. Radin,
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so-called "harm-benefit" line as a means of separating those govern-
ment actions requiring compensation from those that do not. As an
answer to the central question of takings jurisprudence, the harm-ben-
efit line suggests that the person who caused the problem should bear
the cost of remedying it. As a result, if an individual exercises his or
her property rights in a manner that is harmful, he or she should be
responsible for remedying that harm. If government acts to prevent 10
that harm by prohibiting a certain land-use, courts should not require
compensation. But for the government action, the individual would
have caused the feared harm. Therefore, forcing him or her to bear
the cost of remedying or preventing the harm is just. On the other
hand, if the individual has not caused the problem, he or she should
not be responsible for remedying it. If government attempts to force
the individual to solve such a problem, through a police power regula-
tion or otherwise, then government is attempting to press private
property into public service, and courts should require compensation.
While the harm-benefit line has an impressive pedigree," it requires
a court to discern whether any given government action should prop-
erly be characterized as preventing a harm or extracting a benefit.12
Distinguishing harm prevention from benefit extraction has proven a
central difficulty with the test. In the absence of some accepted stan-
dard of proper conduct, a court or legislature can describe any partic-
ular government-imposed rights change equally well as either harm
prevention or benefit extraction.' 3 Despite this difficulty, the intuitive
attraction of the harm-benefit line remains. It seems to provide a rela-
tively clear, and superficially attractive, answer to the question of who
should bear the cost of the rights change.
Although the Supreme Court has on occasion tried to distance itself
from the harm-benefit line, and even to repudiate it altogether, 14 the
harm-benefit distinction has continued to play an important role in
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1002-06 (1982) (find a taking when
government interferes with a healthy relationship between person and physical
property).
10. As a general standard, the government action must be substantially related to
preventing the harm. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
(1987).
11. See Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667-69 (1878); ERNST FREUND,
THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904); see also EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 111-
15; Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 650, 666-67 (1958); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Tak-
ing Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1633-38 (1988).
12. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1933-34, 1960-61; Michelman, supra note 9, at
1199-1201; Sax, supra note 9, at 48-49.
13. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897-98 (1992);
Lunney, supra note 4, at 1933-34.
14. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-98; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978).
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the Court's takings jurisprudence. 5 Indeed, in its most recent takings
decision, Dolan v. City of Tigard,'6 the Court adopted a rule implicitly
reflecting the principle of responsibility that the harm-benefit line em-
bodies: government may condition a land-use permit so as to limit or
remedy a harm to which the permitted activity would otherwise con-
tribute, but the condition may require the landowner to solve only
that portion of the harm that his or her permitted activity was reason-
ably likely to cause.' 7 Moreover, even in those cases in which the
Court has expressly repudiated the harm-benefit line, the Court has
implicitly, and perhaps unconsciously, framed the issues in terms of
harm prevention and benefit extraction. 8
For whatever reason-perhaps because it seems a natural way of
viewing the situation, perhaps because it embodies a seemingly just
principle of responsibility, or perhaps because it is a convenient way
to narrow the literal language' 9 of -the Compensation Clause-the
harm-benefit line has continued to play an important role in separat-
ing property rights redistributions that require compensation from
those that do not. 0 Yet, the notion of causation that the harm-benefit
15. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-
93 (1987). Even those commentators who would significantly expand the scope of the
compensation requirement usually retain an exception that would deny compensation
in those cases in which the taking was the only way to prevent a harmful exercise of
property rights. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 199; Levmore, supra note 4,
at 305-19; see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L.J. 149, 169 (1971) [hereinafter Sax, Public Rights].
16. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
17. See id. at 2319 (adopting rough proportionality test).
18. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95 ("On the other side of the balance, affirma-
tively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave
the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use...
carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some
form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."); see also id.
at 2895 (noting the "equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and
appropriation").
19. If the words "private property" in the Just Compensation Clause refer not to
the physical thing owned, but to the legal relationships associated with the thing's
ownership, as they do, United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78
(1945), and if the word "taken" encompasses not only "acquisition" of property by
the government, but also destruction of property, as it does, id., then every time gov-
ernment acts to limit, modify, or eliminate an existing property right, it has literally
taken property. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
27-28 (1977).
20. See Kmiec, supra note 11, at 1632-33; Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause:
In Search of Underlying Principles; Part II-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of
Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 60, 85-93 (1990). I recog-
nize that Professor Peterson considers her "punish or prevent wrongdoing" principle
to be different from a "prevention of harm" rationale. See Peterson, supra, at 106-10.
However, her conclusion on this issue is the result of her odd definition of "harm."
The courts have never defined "harm" for these purposes in terms of the ordinary
observer's view of harm. Instead, "harm" as used in the harm-benefit line has always
encompassed an implicit consideration of whether one party's actions interfere with
another's legal rights. See infra text accompanying notes 47-95.
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line reflects is false. The line implicitly suggests that the misuse of the
property rights at issue is the sole cause of the harm. Because the use
of property rights caused the harm, government can, without provid-
ing compensation, limit or even eliminate those property rights to pre-
vent the harm that would otherwise result.21
However, even if a property holder is threatening to exercise her
property rights in a manner causing cognizable "harm,"22 there is
never a case in which the only way to prevent the threatened harm is
to prohibit the undesirable exercise of the property rights at issue.2 3
By providing for the forced sale of each and every privately-held
property right, the Compensation Clause ensures that government
may always prevent a threatened harm by purchasing the property
rights at issue.24 Because government or even other private individu-
als could have preemptively purchased the property rights and
thereby prevented the threatened harm, their failure to act is also a
factual cause of the threatened harm.25 Because both parties are but-
for causes of the harm, one cannot determine who should be responsi-
ble for remedying or preventing the harm based upon a purely factual
determination of causation.
The issue, then, is not which of them caused the harm as a factual
matter, but which of them should bear the cost of remedying the harm
they jointly caused.26 Yet, because the harm-benefit line embodies a
21. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that land-use restrictions do not require compen-
sation if "there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted
by the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy").
22. Not all things that an ordinary observer might consider harmful constitute
"harm" within the meaning of the harm-benefit line. See supra note 20; see also infra
text accompanying notes 47-95.
23. Thus, those commentators who have suggested that government may limit
property rights without compensation when that is the only way to achieve the gov-
ernment's social goals have provided tests that are unworkable. See, e.g., Sax, supra
note 15, at 169; cf. Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REv.
1333, 1345 (1991) (compensation should be required only if "the government's aims
could have been achieved in many ways but the means chosen place[s] losses" on a
distinct minority).
24. This is not to say that the Compensation Clause requires government to
purchase the property rights, rather than prohibit their exercise, in every case, or even
in most cases. Cf Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (Compensation Clause
does not "compel the government to regulate by purchase"). Rather, the point is that
the alternative of purchasing the rights is present in every case.
25. Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) ("The
traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be
made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and
what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are
dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict
harm on A.").
26. In his second article on the takings issue, Professor Sax describes the takings
issue as one of joint causation as well. See Sax, supra note 15, at 152-55. However,
that article is focused on Professor Coase's traditional joint-causation model in which
the presence of two inconsistent land uses jointly cause the problem. My joint causa-
19951
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principle of responsibility based solely on identifying the factual cause
of a problem, the harm-benefit line cannot assign responsibility as be-
tween two parties who jointly cause any given harm.
This analysis suggests that the harm-benefit line reflects a pre-
Coasean27 view of causation, and as a result, cannot adequately ad-
dress the question of who should pay, which lies at the center of the
takings debate. However, before we reject the line for reflecting a
pre-Coasean view of causation, its continuing influence suggests the
possibility of an as-yet unarticulated rationale that would support the
line in a post-Coasean world. In an attempt to discover such a ration-
ale, this Article will examine the parallel expression of responsibility
found in tort law's "misfeasance-nonfeasance" line.28
Also known as the "failure to rescue" doctrine, tort law's misfea-
sance-nonfeasance line posits the general rule that a person is liable
for acting negligently, but is not, absent special circumstances, liable
for failing to act, even if that failure is negligent. 29 Tort law's misfea-
sance-nonfeasance line appears to share a common focus with the
harm-benefit line of takings jurisprudence. Both assign responsibility
for the harm to the acting party. Due to this common focus, justifica-
tions for tort law's misfeasance-nonfeasance line may also provide
support for the harm-benefit line in takings jurisprudence.
A critical examination of the reasons offered in support of tort law's
misfeasance-nonfeasance line reveals, however, that the reasons that
support it do not support takings jurisprudence's harm-benefit line.
tion concern is not limited to the two landowners directly involved, as it adds as a
causal factor anyone who could have acted to prevent the problem, but did not.
27. The phrase "pre-Coasean" denotes a view of causation that fails to incorporate
or consider Professor Coase's joint causation analysis. As an example to illustrate the
difference between a pre- and post-Coasean view of causation, we can consider Pro-
fessor Coase's example of a polluting factory which emits smoke that has harmful
effects on those occupying neighboring properties. See Coase, supra, note 25 at 1-2.
Under a pre-Coasean view of causation, an observer would say that the factory
caused the harm and should be responsible for remedying it. See id. Under a post-
Coasean view, the observer would recognize that the harmful effects of the smoke arejointly caused, by the factory emitting the smoke, and by the presence of the neigh-
bors in a place where they will be adversely affected by the smoke. See id. at 2.
28. Others have looked to tort law to gain understanding of the takings issue. See
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 35-56; Levmore, supra note 23; James E. Krier,
The Regulation Machine, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. Rav. 1 (1982).
29. See, e.g., Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219, 219 (D. Mass. 1951) ("It is
well settled common law that a mere bystander incurs no liability where he fails to
take any action, however negligently or even intentionally, to rescue another in dis-
tress."); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1897) ("Suppose A, standing
close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe on the track and a car approaching. He
can easily rescue the child with entire safety to himself, and the instincts of humanity
require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless
savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the child's injury, or
indictable under the statute for its death."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314 (1965); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 718-
19 (2d ed. 1986); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 56, at 375-76 (5th ed. 1984).
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To the extent it can be justified,3° tort law's misfeasance-nonfeasance
line appears to be justified almost entirely on jurisprudential grounds.
A universal duty to rescue would be too difficult to enforce consist-
ently and correctly because of difficulties in identifying who could
have and should have, but did not, rescue.31 The very fact that the
individual failed to act creates three distinct jurisprudential difficul-
ties: (1) it makes the individual difficult to identify initially; (2) it
makes his or her behavior hard to distinguish from the many others
who could have acted, but did not; and (3) it makes judging the pro-
priety of her behavior difficult. These jurisprudential concerns also
explain our common-sense tendency to focus on actors, rather than
people who fail to act, in identifying who should be held responsible
for a particular undesirable result. By acting, an individual draws our
attention, distinguishes himself or herself from everyone else, and in-
vites more ready scrutiny of the propriety of his or ,her actions.
These jurisprudential concerns would also arise were we to require,
in the takings context, concerned individuals to purchase property
rights preemptively to prevent another's misuse of those rights.
Again, identifying those individuals who could have acted, but did not,
would prove difficult. Moreover, even if we could identify one or two
such "potential preventers," we would have trouble readily distin-
guishing their omissions from those of the many others who could
have acted, but did not. We would also have trouble determining
whether any given potential preventer could have prevented the harm
at a lower cost and should therefore properly bear the cost of prevent-
ing the harm. Therefore, the jurisprudential concerns that support
tort law's misfeasance-nonfeasance line also justify distinguishing be-
tween the culpability of the property owner who caused the harm by
acting, and the culpability of the potential preventer who caused the
harm by failing to act.32
30. Some commentators have suggested thattort law's action-inaction line cannot
be justified and have argued for its abolition. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's
Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Steven J. Heyman,
Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1994); Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980). While I do not necessarily
agree with the positions taken by these commentators, as I believe jurisprudential
reasons alone justify the action-inaction line, I will not critique their arguments in this
Article. If they are correct and no reasons adequately support the action-inaction
line, then presumably the rationales offered to support the action-inaction line would
also not justify retaining the harm-benefit line in takings jurisprudence. It is possible,
of course, that some of the theories these commentators use to critique the failure to
rescue doctrine might support a very different scope to the compensation requirement
than the one I will advocate in this Article. But, as these commentators have not, as
yet, attempted to apply their analysis directly to the takings issue, I will not presume
to suggest how they would apply their theories to the issue. Instead, I will leave that
discussion for another day.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 339-53.
32. The process of identifying who should bear the responsibility for a particular
result and of providing a convincing explanation for that result are both costs associ-
1995] 439
440 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
However, the choice in takings jurisprudence is not between impos-
ing the cost of the desired rights change on either the property holder
or a random bystander, but between imposing the cost on the prop-
erty holder or the regulating government. In choosing between the
property holder and the regulating government as the party to bear
the cost of the rights change, the jurisprudential concerns reflected in
tort law's misfeasance-nonfeasance line do not apply.33 The regulat-
ing government can be readily identified, and the duty to act can be
consistently and correctly enforced against the regulating government.
As a result, the jurisprudential concerns that support tort law's misfea-
sance-nonfeasance line do not support a preference for finding the
individual property rights holder, rather than the regulating govern-
ment, responsible for bearing the cost of the rights change.
Given that neither the traditional causation rationale offered to
support the harm-benefit line, nor the justifications that support tort
law's misfeasance-nonfeasance line can support application of takings
jurisprudence's harm-benefit line, the harm-benefit line should play
no role in identifying compensable takings. Assigning responsibility
for an undesirable result in tort law or in everyday life, which ensures
a means by which we can readily and persuasively identify a responsi-
ble party, may justify our natural and unconscious preference for fo-
cusing on those who act, rather than on those who fail to act. It
cannot, however, justify such a preference in takings jurisprudence be-
cause we can readily identify an alternative responsible party, the reg-
ulating government. Because of the ease of identifying an alternative
responsible party, the only real question should be whether society
can achieve any given desired rights change less expensively through a
forced sale and purchase of the rights, or by imposing an uncompen-
sated restriction on the property rights at issue.3 4
Abandoning the harm-benefit line will not prove easy, however.
Given its pervasive influence on the formal doctrine and, more impor-
tantly, on our unconscious framing of the issues, abandoning the
harm-benefit line will require a fundamental change in our approach
to the takings issue. Instead of asking about the character of the gov-
ernment action, or about a particular individual's role in creating the
harm, courts should focus on whether government has: (i) changed or
restricted property rights that are (ii) of significant value only to a
ated with preventing or remedying a problem. To the extent that these costs are
lower for a person who acts than they are for a person who fails to act, then if either
person could otherwise prevent or remedy the problem at the same cost, we should,
under a least-cost avoider rule, assign responsibility to the acting party, rather than to
the party who failed to act.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 366-96.
34. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31, 134-37 (1970) (artic-
ulating the least cost avoider rule); cf Coase, supra note 25, at 30-39 (suggesting that
we should assign responsibility for solving the harm to party who could do so at the
least cost).
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very few to benefit the very many. If such singling out has occurred,
then a court should find the government action to be a taking and give
the government the option of either rescinding its action or paying just
compensation.35 If such singling out has not occurred, then a court
should allow the government to impose the rights change without
compensating the adversely affected property holders.
I. THE HARM-BENEFIT LINE: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION,
AND RATIONALE
In evaluating the harm-benefit line, this Article will begin with a
brief review of the origins and evolution of the doctrine, culminating
with an examination of three cases that attempt to define the role the
line should play in defining the scope of government power over pri-
vately-held property rights today.
A. Origins: The Police Power and the Fourteenth Amendment
Most courts and commentators today trace the advent of the harm-
benefit line to Justice Harlan's 1887 opinion in Mugler v. Kansas.36 In
adjudicating a constitutional challenge to a Kansas prohibition statute,
the Mugler Court established two propositions that have provided the
foundations for the harm-benefit line. First, the Court declared that
police power regulations "[are] not-and, consistently with the exist-
ence and safety of organized society, cannot be-burdened with the
condition that the State must compensate" individual owners for the
pecuniary losses they may sustain as a result of such regulations.37
Building upon this position, the Court in later opinions would declare
that "the enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a legitimate
regulation established under the police power is not a taking of prop-
erty without compensation . . . in the sense of the Fourteenth
Amendment. '38
35. Even if the government rescinds the action, the Compensation Clause may
require compensation for the period during which the taking is in effect. See supra
note 6.
36. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 488-89 (1987) (relying on pre-1897 cases, such as Mugler, to define
scope of Takings Clause); Sax, supra note 9, at 38. Relying on the Mugler and other
pre-1897 decisions as takings cases seems at least a little bit odd, given that these very
same courts and commentators invariably identify Justice Harlan's 1897 opinion in
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), as the point at
which the Court incorporated the Compensation Clause into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 481 n.10; Sax, supra note 9,
at 36 n.2.
37. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
38. Chicago & A.R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915). See Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558-59 (1914); New Orleans Gas Light
Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 252, 254-55 (1897).
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Second, the Court reasoned that the Kansas statute was a noncom-
pensable police power regulation, rather than a compensable taking,
because it merely prohibited a use of property that the legislature had
determined "to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community."39 Unlike the government action in Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co.,4° the Kansas statute did not require Mugler's property "to be
devoted to the use of the public."' 41 That is, it did "not disturb the
owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor
restrict his right to dispose of it."' 2 In contrast to the government
action in Pumpelly, which took "unoffending property.., away from
an innocent owner," the Kansas statute only abated a nuisance.43 As
a result, the Kansas statute was a noncompensable police power regu-
lation, while the physical invasion in Pumpelly was a compensable
taking.'
From these two propositions came the basic elements of the harm-
benefit line., Legitimate police power regulations do not require com-
pensation, while takings pursuant to the power of eminent domain do
require compensation. Moreover, government action that simply pro-
hibits an undesirable use of property is a legitimate police power regu-
lation, and as a result, any pecuniary loss resulting from such
regulation will not require compensation." If, on the other hand, a
39. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668.
40. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). In Pumpelly, the state built a dam, and the
water backed up and flooded part of Pumpelly's land. Id. at 171.
41. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668.
42. Id. at 669. The statute did change what uses would be considered lawful. Nev-
ertheless, adopting the reasoning from earlier Contract Clause cases, the Court as-
serted that, by making a previously lawful use unlawful, the State of Kansas came
under no obligation to property holders adversely affected by the change because the
state had never promised these property holders that the law on this issue would
remain the same. Id. The Court's response is, at best, inadequate as the Compensa-
tion Clause itself places limits on the government's ability to change property rights.
As a result, limits on government action under the Compensation Clause, unlike
those imposed by the Contract Clause, require no additional or specific promise from
the government. See also infra text accompanying notes 203-209.
43. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (cutting down of diseased
cedar trees not a taking); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (uniform set-back
requirements are not a taking); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
387-88, 390 (1926) (separating industrial land-uses from residential, and multi-family
residential from single family residential, not a taking); Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub.,
Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921) (requiring railroad to build and pay for over- and
underpasses at street crossings not a taking); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S.
300 (1920) (prohibiting the use of natural gas in the manufacture of carbon black not
a taking); Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1919) (requiring individuals
owning land adjacent to city reservoir's watershed to remove or burn "tree-tops,
boughs, laps, and other" waste from timbering operations not a taking); Thomas Cu-
sack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1917) (prohibiting billboards is not
a taking); Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 491-96 (1916)
(prohibiting the production of dense smoke in residential areas not a taking);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibiting brick manufacture not a
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government is not simply prohibiting an undesirable use, but is instead
effectively requiring private property to be devoted to a public use,
the government must rescind its actions or provide just compensation
to those whose property has been taken 6.4  The harm-benefit line de-
veloped as a shorthand way of referring to this underlying doctrine: if
the government is preventing a harm, no compensation is required; if
the government is extracting a benefit, compensation will be
required.47
B. Early Application: Defining Cognizable "Harm" and the
Limits of the Police Power
Taken literally, Justice Harlan's language in Mugler would seem to
suggest that pecuniary losses caused by a police power regulation, no
matter how serious, are not compensable absent appropriation or
taking); Chicago & A.R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915) (requiring railroad to
share cost of grade improvements not a taking); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1914) (prohibiting operation of stable not a taking); Eberle v. Michigan, 232
U.S. 700 (1915) (prohibiting the manufacture of liquor not a taking); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914) (limiting time during which a
switching yard within a city can be used and requiring railroad to change track grade
to match street grade not a taking); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis,
232 U.S. 430 (1914) (requiring railroad to build and pay for bridge over a recreational
canal added by the city not a taking); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San
Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910) (prohibiting operation of unlicensed cemetery not a
taking); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (imposing height restrictions on build-
ings not a taking); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) (requiring garbage to be
turned over to designated collecting agent not a taking); California Reduction Co. v.
Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905) (same); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133, 139-49 (1894) (act authorizing seizure and destruction of nets maintained in vio-
lation of the fish and game laws of the state not a taking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887); see also Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667-70 (1878) (finding
that government action did not violate Contracts Clause because government implic-
itly retained power to prohibit manure treating plant if necessary to preserve public
health, safety, or morals); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1878) (finding
that government action did not violate Contracts Clause because government implic-
itly retained power to prohibit manufacture and sale of alcohol if necessary to pre-
serve public health, safety, or morals).
46. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935);
Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491
(1915); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 590-91 (1915); Missouri
Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474 (1913); Washington ex reL Oregon R.R. & Navigation Co. v.
Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510 (1912); Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911); Missouri Pac. Ry.
v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212
U.S. 132 (1909); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684 (1899); Missouri Pac.
Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
47. See Freund, supra note 11, at 546-47 ("It may be said that the state takes prop-
erty by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power
because it is harmful .... From this results the difference between the power of emi-
nent domain and the police power, that the former recognizes a right to compensa-
tion, while the latter on principle does not.").
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physical invasion by the government.48 Yet, despite the language's lit-
eral reach, the Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury consistently imposed limits on both the scope of the police power
and on the sort of "harm" that would permit an uncompensated
change in an individual's property rights.49
For instance, the police power authorized state action whenever the
legislature believed action was reasonably necessary "to advance the
safety, happiness, and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its
general welfare."50 Yet, the police power did not authorize govern-
ment regulation of "purely private" rights, even if necessary to
achieve a legitimate police power objective.5' As a result, despite an
exceedingly broad definition of the permissible means and ends en-
compassed by the police power,52 a regulation that affected purely pri-
vate rights would not survive a takings challenge.53 The Court also
did not intend the "harm" prevention language of Mugler to encom-
pass every government action that prevented an undesired or unpleas-
ant result. Because the harm prevention rationale originated in the
principle sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas,54 "harm" within the
48. Certain later cases seem to adopt such a literal interpretation of Justice
Harlan's language. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 488-91 & nn.18 & 20 (1987); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68
(1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978).
49. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416-17 (1896); see also Lunney, supra note 4, at
1896-1920, 1934 n.193.
50. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 139 (January 1837 Term).
51. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133-34 (1877); German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406 (1914); see also Lunney, supra note 4, at 1906-09.
52. See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 139-40 (January 1837 Term)
(Police power encompasses "every law.., which concern[s] the welfare of the whole
people of a state, or any individual within it; whether it related to their rights or their
duties; whether it respected them as men, or as citizens of the state in their public or
private relations; whether it related to the rights of persons or of property, of the
whole people of a state or of any individual within it .... "); see also Thomas Cusack
Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (The Court "will interfere with the
action of [the local legislative] authority only when it is plain and palpable that it has
no real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or to the general
welfare."); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561,
592 (1906) ("We hold that the police power of a State embraces regulations designed
to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations
designed to promote the public health, public morals or the public safety.").
53. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133-34 (1877); see Great N. Ry. v. Minnesota ex
rel. State R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n, 238 U.S. 340, 346 (1915); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 598 (1915); Washington ex reL Oregon R.R. & Naviga-
tion Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510 (1912); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196,
207-08 (1910); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132
(1909).
54. Translated literally, the phrase means: use your own property so as not to in-
jure that of another. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 492 n.22 (1987). The clause is more properly translated: "so as not to injure the
rights of another." See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 254
(1917).
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meaning of the harm-benefit line referred not to injury to another, or
harm in its ordinary sense, but injury to another's legal rights.55
These two issues, the scope of the police power and the nature of
the harm required to satisfy the harm-benefit line, were not unrelated.
Rather, the question whether a property right was "purely private,"
and hence beyond the reach of a state's police power, turned on
whether the existence or exercise of a private right interfered with, or
frustrated, the rights of another.56 If the exercise or existence of a
privately-held right interfered with, or frustrated, another's rights,
then it caused "harm" within the meaning of the harm-benefit line. In
addition, given interference with another's rights, the Court would not
consider the privately-held right "purely private." 57 As a result, the
government could act to change, limit, or even eliminate altogether
such a property right under the police power without implicating the
compensation requirement.5 8
The interaction of the police power and harm issues is evident in the
Court's earliest takings cases-the railroad rate regulation cases.59
The following hypothetical illustrates the constitutional principles re-
flected in these cases.60 Two different states are considering the enact-
55. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF POLICE
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1886) ("[T]he police power of the government, as
understood in the constitutional laws of the United States, is simply the power of the
government to establish provisions for the enforcement of the common as well as civil
law maxim, 'Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.' ").
56. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1909-19.
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1908); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894).
58. See Miller, 276 U.S. at 280 ("And where the public interest is involved prefer-
ment of that interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of
its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the po-
lice power which affects property.").
59. The Court first struck a state statute under the Fourteenth Amendment for
depriving an individual of property without due process of law in a railroad rate regu-
lation case. See Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 438 (1890).
While the Court struck the statute principally on procedural due process grounds, id.,
the Court soon thereafter struck a number of railroad rate regulation statutes on the
ground that they failed to provide a just compensation for the public use of the rail-
road's private property. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898) ("The corpora-
tion may not be required to use its property for the benefit of the public without
receiving just compensation for the services rendered by it."); Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 412 (1894) ("And yet justice demands that every one
should receive some compensation for the use of his money or property .... ."); see
also Covington & Lex. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1896)("A statute which, by its necessary operation, compels a turnpike company, when
charging only such tolls as are just to the public, to submit to such further reduction of
rates as will prevent it from keeping its road in proper repair and from earning any
dividends whatever for stockholders, is as obnoxious to the Constitution of the United
States as would be a similar statute relating to the business of a railroad
corporation.").
60. I have based the hypothetical in part on the facts in Northern Pacific Railway
v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 (1915).
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ment of similar railroad rate regulation statutes. Each state considers
its respective statutes essential to ensure that a fledgling coal mining
industry, of critical importance to the welfare of each state and its
citizens, can survive. Before each statute's enactment, the respective
railroad companies in the two states had each exercised its property
right to determine what it would charge others to use its property, and
was charging ten dollars per ton to transport the coal to its respective
market. In each case, the state enacts a rate regulation statute man-
dating a maximum charge of five dollars per ton for transporting the
coal. Both railroads challenge the statutes as a deprivation of private
property without just compensation.
From these facts, it would appear that both statutes are substantially
related to the state's welfare, as both will ensure the survival of a coal
mining industry of central importance to each state's economy. As a
result, the rate reduction appears to fall within the literal scope of the
police power. In addition, both statutes prevent harm, in the ordinary
sense of the word, by preventing the railroads from charging the
higher, pre-regulation rate for their services, and by preventing the
financial collapse of an important sector of each state's economy.61 If
we interpret Mugler literally, both rate regulations appear to be legiti-
mate police power regulations that merely prohibit an undesirable use
of property; that is, the charging of undesirably high rates by a rail-
road. Therefore, under a literal interpretation of Mugler, both regula-
tions should be constitutional.
Yet, under the Court's early jurisprudence, the statutes' police
power justification and purported harm prevention, rationale would
save the statutes from constitutional challenge only if the states set the
regulated rate at a level that would enable the railroads to earn a rea-
sonable return on their investments.62 So long as the regulated rates
enabled the railroads to earn a reasonable return on their investments,
the regulations would not amount to takings, and any pecuniary loss
the railroads experienced as a result of the rate regulations would be
noncompensable.63 If, however, the regulated rates prevented the
61. Indeed, if both railroads were transporting the same tonnage of coal, then
both the harm prevented by the rate regulation and the burden imposed on the two
railroads would be identical.
62. Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 590-91 (1915)
(striking rate regulation because rates failed to provide a remunerative return) and
Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546 (same) and Reagan, 154 U.S. at 412 (same) with St. Louis &
S.F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1895) (evidence failed to establish that rate was
unreasonable; rate regulation sustained) and Chicago & G.T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143
U.S. 339, 345-46 (1892) (same).
63. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133-34 (1877); see also Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921) ("It may be assumed that the interpretation of 'reasonable'
[as defining the level at which apartment rents are to be set]will deprive [the apart-
ment building owner] in part at least of the power of profiting by the sudden influx of
people to Washington caused by the needs of Government and the war, and thus of a
right usually incident to fortunately situated property .... "); Edgar A. Levy Leasing
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railroads from earning reasonable returns, the Court would find the
rate reductions to be unconstitutional takings of private property, and
the railroads would be entitled to have the rate reductions rescinded. 6'
Thus, in the hypothetical under discussion, if one of the railroads
needed a haulage rate of seven dollars per ton of coal to earn a rea-
sonable return, while the other railroad required a rate of only five
dollars per ton to earn such a return, the rate regulation would be an
unconstitutional taking as to the first railroad, but not as to the
second.
The Court's decision to treat the two cases differently suggests that
it did not read Mugler literally, nor should we. Even if a state action
falls within the literal scope of the police power, and prevents what an
ordinary observer65 would consider serious harm, it may nevertheless
amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of private property.66 In
drawing this line between permissible and unconstitutional rate regu-
lation, the Court began by examining whether the railroad had set its
rates at a level that interfered with, or frustrated, rights held by an-
other. Such an interference would fall within the literal terms of sic
utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas and would justify an uncompensated
restriction of the railroad's rates. As a general rule, in determining
whether such an interference had occurred, the Court would consider
potential interference with two distinct categories of rights that might
be held by another.67
First, the Court would look for an interference with the property
rights of adjoining landowners. The Court did not find such an inter-
ference in the railroad rate regulation cases. Courts have simply not
considered the right to control the rates of a neighboring railway to be
Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (right to charge negotiated rent "property" within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256
U.S. 170 (1921) (same).64. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 590-91 (1915) (striking
rate regulation because rates failed to provide a remunerative return); Smyth, 169
U.S. at 546 (same); Reagan, 154 U.S. at 412 (same); see also West Ohio Gas Co. v.
Public Utilities Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 75 (1935) (regulated rate that enabled utility to
earn 4.53% rate of return on rate base struck as confiscatory); State of Missouri ex reL
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 288 (1923) (regu-
lated rate that may have enabled telephone company to earn 5.33% rate of return
struck as confiscatory); Ohio Utilities Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 267 U.S. 359,
361 (1925) (regulated rate that enabled utility to earn 5% rate of return struck as
confiscatory).
65. Professor Bruce Ackerman coined this term, and uses it to describe "an ana-
lyst who (a) elaborates the concepts of nonlegal conversation so as to illuminate (b)
the relationship between disputed legal rules and the structure of social expectations
he understands to prevail in dominant institutional practice." Ackerman, supra note
19, at 15-21, 88-167.
66. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935)
(forcibly evicting individuals from their farm not harm within the meaning of the
harm-benefit line); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (collapsing a
neighbor's home and land not harm within the meaning of the harm-benefit line).
67. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1909-19.
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one of the sticks an individual obtains by purchasing a tract of nearby
land. As a result, even if the unregulated railroad rates made certain
uses of the neighboring lands unprofitable, those rates did not inter-
fere with, or frustrate, the legal rights of the neighboring landowners
as landowners.68
Second, despite the absence of such a conflict in private rights, the
Court would nevertheless find an interference with another's rights if
an individual had exercised her property rights in a manner that inter-
fered with a right held by the public generally. In the railroad rate
regulation cases, the Court found such an interference whenever the
railroad had set its rates at a level greater than the level necessary to
ensure the railroad a reasonable return on its investment. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court essentially determined that the nature of
railroads created a right on behalf of the public to demand travel at a
reasonable rate. 69 As the Court explained it, "a railroad is a public
highway," a "corporation . .'. created for public purposes" and "per-
form[ing] a function of the State."7 0 To facilitate its operation, the
state has granted the railroad the "authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain and to charge tolls.., primarily for the benefit of the
public."71 Given this background, the Court recognized a right held
by the public at large to demand travel on railroads at a reasonable
price.7" Once the Court recognized the public's rights to rail travel at
a reasonable rate, action by the railroad to set its rates above a rea-
sonable level would interfere with, or frustrate, the public's right to
reasonably priced rail travel.73 Allowing the railroad to charge such a
rate would not only cause harm, in the ordinary sense of the word, by
forcing the public to pay a higher price for rail travel, but would also
injure the public's rights by frustrating the public's legal right to rea-
sonably priced rail travel. Given such an injury to the public's rights,
the state could act under the police power to protect those rights by
prohibiting the railroad from charging an unreasonable rate.74
68. Compare Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114
So.2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (no common law right to light; blocking such light
cannot constitute a nuisance because it does not interfere with landowner's legal
rights), cert. denied, 117 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1960) with Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182(Wis. 1982) (blocking light will constitute a nuisance if the harm outweighs the benefit
of the conduct, regardless of existence of underlying common law right).
69. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
70. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1898).
71. Id. at 544-47; Covington & Lex. Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578,
596-97 (1896).
72. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 544-45.
73. Id. at 544 ("But the rights of the public would be ignored if rates for the trans-
portation of persons or property on a railroad are exacted without reference to the
fair value of the property used for the public or the fair value of the services ren-
dered."); Covington & Lex. Turnpike Rd Co., 164 U.S. at 596 (in determining a just
rate, "[t]he rights of the public are not to be ignored"). .
74. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 545-46 ("A corporation maintaining a public highway,
although it owns the property it employs for accomplishing public objects, must be
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On the other hand, the Court also ruled that the nature of the rail-
road did not extend so far as to create a public right to have the rail-
road carry passengers and freight at an unremunerative rate.75 In
essence, the public did not have a right to subsidized 76 travel. Rather,
the public only had a right to travel at a reasonable rate. As a result,
once the railroad had dropped its rates to a reasonable level, the state
had no authority to force the railroad to reduce its rates any further.77
A reasonable rate might cost the public more than the regulated rate
that the state sought to impose. A reasonable rate might even destroy
a fledgling coal mining industry essential to the state's economy that
the regulated rate would have preserved. Nevertheless, the reason-
able rate would not interfere with, or frustrate, the rail travel rights
held by the public. As a result, such consequences of the railroad's set
rate, even if detrimental to the public welfare of the state, would not
have constituted cognizable harm within the meaning of the harm-
benefit line, and would not have justified further rate reductions
under the police power in the absence of just compensation.
As the railroad rate regulation cases illustrate, cognizable harm
within the meaning of the harm-benefit line did not encompass every
action that an ordinary observer might consider harmful; even if sub-
stantial discomfort, economic loss, or inconvenience would not, alone,
held to have accepted its rights, privileges and franchises subject to the condition that
the government creating it, or the government within whose limits it conducts its busi-
ness, may by legislation protect the people against unreasonable charges for the serv-
ices rendered by it."); Covingtion & Lex. Turnpike Rd. Co., 164 U.S. at 596-97 ("The
legislature has the authority, in every case, .,. . to proceed upon the ground that the
public may not rightfully be required to submit to unreasonable exactions for the use
of a public highway established and maintained under legislative authority.").
75. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79, 85 (1924) ("The
usual permissive charter of a railroad company does not give rise to any obligation on
the part of the company to operate its road at a loss."); Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546 ("But it
is equally true that the corporation performing such public services . . . have rights
that may not be invaded by legislative enactment in disregard of the fundamental
guarantees for the protection of property ... [and] may not be required to use its
property for the benefit of the public without receiving just compensation for the
services rendered by it.").
76. By labelling an unremunerative rate, "subsidization," the Court implicitly
adopted a remunerative rate as the reasonable rate, which is consistent with optimal
pricing theories economists were developing for natural monopolies at the time.
However, the choice of such a rate as the neutral baseline for the railroad's duties is
not value free.
77. See Smyth, 169 U.S. at'546. Nor can the State compel a railroad to continue
operating "when that use can be kept up only at a loss." Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920). The Court elaborated further in Railroad
Comm'n v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79, stating:
if at any time it develops with reasonable certainty that future operation
must be at a loss, the company may discontinue operation and get what it
can out of the property by dismantling the road. To compel it to go on at a
loss or to give up the salvage value would be to take its property without the
just compensation which is a part of due process of law.
Id. at 85.
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amount to cognizable harm. To constitute cognizable harm, the exist-
ence or exercise of the property right at issue must interfere with, or
frustrate, another's rights.7" Once we understand that the early Court,
in applying the harm-benefit line, was determining whether the exist-
ence or exercise of a particular property right had interfered with, or
frustrated, another's rights, rather than determining whether the right
had caused harm in the ordinary sense of the word, cases that appear
to reach differing results become entirely consistent.
For instance, the early Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon79 appears to reach a quite different conclusion8 0 from its deci-
sions in Reinman v. City of Little Rock 8 Hadacheck v. Sebastian,s2
and Miller v. Schoene.83 In each case, an adjacent, or subjacent, land-
owner used its land in a manner that caused serious discomfort, incon-
venience, and economic loss to neighboring landowners. In each case,
the government prohibited the land use to avoid the harm that the
land use would otherwise create. In each case, the prohibition im-
posed a more or less serious pecuniary loss on a specific landowner.
And, in each case, the affected landowner sued, asserting that the gov-
ernment's action constituted a taking. Despite these similarities, the
Court found a taking in Pennsylvania Coal, but not in the other three
cases.
84
While the modern Court has attempted to reconcile these four cases
by suggesting that the magnitude of the harm prevented, or the extent
of the pecuniary loss imposed, differed s5 the material difference be-
tween the cases was that the Mahons had expressly relinquished their
legal rights respecting the undesirable neighboring land use, while the
neighboring landowners in Reinman, Hadacheck, and Miller had not. 6
78. For that reason, I believe conflict-in-rights is a better description than harm
prevention for what the Court was looking for before it would permit uncompensated
restriction of a privately-held right. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1909-19 & n.193.
79. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
80. Because of the apparent conflict, petitioner in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), made the implicit assertion that Penn-
sylvania Coal had overruled Hadacheck and Reinman. Id. at 490.
81. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
82. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
83. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
84. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 416 (prohibition on mining of
support coal a taking) with Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-80 (prohibition on growing of rust-
bearing cedar trees not a taking) and Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410-11 (prohibition of
brick manufacturing not a taking) and Reinman, 237 U.S. at 176-77 (prohibition on
operation of stable not a taking).
85. For example, both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia have suggested that the
Court reached a different decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. because it involved a
denial of all economic use of "certain coal," while each of the other cases left the
property owner with some remaining economic use for the relevant property. See
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 & n.13 (1992); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-502 (1987).
86. See Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414 ("It is our opinion that the act
cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power, so far as it affects the mining
HARM-BENEFIT LINE
Because the Mahons had expressly authorized the mining of the sup-
port coal from under their land, the Mahons held their property sub-
ject to Pennsylvania Coal's right to remove the underlying support
coal.87 As a result, while the Mahons and the State of Pennsylvania
may not have liked Pennsylvania Coal's actions, and those actions
may have caused substantial discomfort, economic loss, and inconven-
ience to the Mahons and others, those actions did not interfere with,
or frustrate, the Mahons' legal rights in their land and home.8" In the
absence of any interference with, or frustration of, the Mahons' legal
rights, Pennsylvania Coal's decision to exercise its right to mine the
support coal did not cause the Mahons cognizable harm within the
meaning of the harm-benefit line. In the absence of such cognizable
harm, Pennsylvania Coal's right to mine the support coal remained
"purely private," and hence beyond the reach of the state's police
power.89
In contrast, the neighboring landowners in Reinman, Hadacheck,
and Miller had not expressly' agreed to make their rights subject to
an objectionable land use next door. As a result, Reinman's stable,
Hadacheck's brickyard, and Miller's red cedar trees caused harm to
their neighbors not only in the ordinary sense of the word, but also in
the legal sense, by interfering with, or frustrating, the neighboring
landowners' right to use their land.91 Reinman, Hadacheck, and
of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been
reserved.") (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 413.
88. Given that the Mahons' rights in their land were subject to Pennsylvania
Coal's right to remove the support coal, this is a truism.
89. Thus, in justifying its conclusion that the Kohler Act amounted to a taking, the
Pennsylvania Coal Court explained:
The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by eminent domain
are those that it has paid for. If in any case its representatives have been so
short sighted as to acquire only surface rights without the right of support,
we see no more authority for supplying the latter without compensation than
there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refusing to pay for
it because the public wanted it very much.
260 U.S. at 415. The Court continued, "[s]o far as private persons or communities
have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the
fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights
than they bought." Id. at 416.
90. Hadacheck asserted that because he was first-in-time, the residents moving
adjacent to his brickyard were aware of the smells, dust, and smoke associated it, and
therefore implicitly agreed to hold their property rights subject to Hadacheck's right
to continue to operate his brickyard. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915). While this
"coming to the nuisance" defense probably would have prevailed under private law
nuisance principles applicable in California at that time, the Court rejected it. Id at
409-10. A contrary result, the Court suggested, "would preclude development and fix
a city forever in its primitive conditions." Id. at 410.
.91. In Miller, the rust from the cedar trees interfered with neighboring landown-
ers' right to use their land to grow apples. Miller, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928). In
Hadacheck, the fumes, gases, smoke, soot, and steam from the brickyard interfered
with the neighboring landowners' rights to use their land as residences. Hadacheck,
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Miller, by using their land in a manner that interfered with their
neighbors' property rights, had caused cognizable harm within the
meaning of the harm-benefit line. Such harm justified bringing Rein-
man's, Hadacheck's, and Miller's relevant property rights into the
public sphere, and made those rights subject to an uncompensated ex-
ercise of the state's police power. 92
Once one comprehends that harm within the meaning of the harm-
benefit line refers to the exercise of a right in a manner that interferes
with, or frustrates, another's rights, one can readily understand 93 how
the early Court could view the differing outcomes in these four cases
as consistent, as it plainly did.94 In all four cases, the prohibited land
use may have threatened harm in the ordinary sense of the word, but
the land use in Pennsylvania Coal did not interfere with, or frustrate,
legal rights held by another, while the land use in the other three cases
did. As a result, the government action in Pennsylvania Coal did not
address a cognizable harm, and could not, therefore, withstand consti-
tutional challenge in the absence of compensation. The government
action in the other three cases, however, was addressed to cognizable
harm, and could therefore withstand constitutional challenge as valid
police power measures, even in the absence of compensation.
Thus, in the early cases, the Court separated compensable govern-
ment action from noncompensable government action by examining
whether the government acted to prevent an individual's property
rights from interfering with, or frustrating, another's rights.9" If such
harm occurred, or was threatened,96 then the government could
change, limit, or even eliminate entirely the property right at issue
without providing compensation. 97 If, however, such an interference
or conflict with another right had not occurred, then the government
could not change, limit, or eliminate the property right in the absence
239 U.S. at 408. In Reinman, the offensive odor and health hazard created by the
stables interfered with the neighboring landowners' right to use their land as shops,
hotels, and residences. Reinman, 237 U.S. 171, 178 (1915).
92. See Miller, 276 U.S. at 279 (incompatible nature of uses forced state to choose
"between the preservation of one class of property and that of the other");
Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 411 ("clearly within the police power of the state"); Reinman,
237 U.S. at 176 (same).
93. We may not agree with the Court, but that is a separate issue.
94. The Court decided Hadacheck and Reinman in 1915, and Miller in 1928 unani-
mously, and Justice Brandeis was the lone dissenter in the Court's 1922 decision,
Pennsylvania Coal. See also Lunney, supra note 4, at 1928-31 & nn.174-76.
95. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1906-19.
96. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
97. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) ("And where the pub-
lic interest is involved preferment of that interest over the property interest of the
individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing character-
istics of every exercise of the police power which affects property.").
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of just compensation, however great the public interest warranting
such a change.98
C. Interlude: Nebbia, Private Property and Public Rights
By defining harm as an interference with, or frustration of, an-
other's legal rights, the early Court may appear to have provided a
workable and neutral baseline for separating harm prevention from
benefit extraction. If the existence or exercise of any given property
right interfered with, or frustrated, the rights of another, then govern-
ment action to prevent such an interference would prevent harm. On
the other hand, in the absence of such an interference or conflict, gov-
ernment action to change, limit, or eliminate a privately held right
would necessarily extract a benefit.99 However, to determine whether
harm, so defined, had occurred, the early Court necessarily had to
identify the rights held by another.
In cases such as Miller, in which an individual's use of his or her
land prevented another from making a lawful use of his or her land,
the interference with the other's rights was relatively plain. No one
questioned the neighbors' legal entitlement to use their land to grow
apple trees, nor did anyone dispute the destructive effect Miller's
cedar trees would have on his neighbors' apple orchards. Accepting
these two underlying considerations, the state could not avoid choos-
ing between the neighbors' right to use their land to grow apple trees,
or Miller's right to use his land to grow cedar trees. As the Court
explained, "[ilt would have been none the less a choice if, instead of
enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permit-
ted serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go on
unchecked. '""°° On the other side of the coin, cases such as Penn-
sylvania Coal, in which the neighbors are complaining about a land
use that they had expressly agreed to allow, provide an equally clear
example of situations in which the land use at issue had not interfered
with another's rights.
Yet, not all the cases presented such clear-cut questions. Even in
those cases adjusting the relative land use rights of neighboring land-
owners, determining whether a conflict in those rights existed that
would justify state intervention was not always easy. If a court apply-
ing the common law of private nuisance would have permitted a given
98. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935);
Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585,
595 (1915).
99. Cf Lunney, supra note 4, at 1922-23 ("Because every right was either public or
private, defining the circumstances in which a right would become public implied that
in all other circumstances a right would remain private.").
100. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
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land use to continue,101 could a state nevertheless prohibit the land
use in the absence of compensation, or would the common law's im-
plicit allocation of rights and entitlements bind the legislature? Alter-
natively, even if a court would likely have found a given land use to be
an actionable nuisance, could the legislature decide that the land use
was a nuisance, and thereby deprive the landowner of the opportunity
to have the issue tried? While the Court faced and resolved these
issues, usually in a manner that favored broader legislative power, °2
its justifications for granting the legislature the authority to label a
particular land use a "nuisance" without a trial, and even if the pro-
hibited land use would not have been a nuisance under the common
law, were not particularly compelling, nor were they altogether consis-
tent with its reasons for refusing to require compensation in other
cases.
103
101. The land-use might not amount to a common law nuisance either because the
complaining neighbors had come to the nuisance, or because they could not establish
a substantial interference with their property rights that was both intentional and
unreasonable.
102. Compare Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 505 (Dec. Term 1870)
(legislature cannot simply declare an activity to be a nuisance if it is not a nuisance)
with Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887) (legislature can simply decree an
activity that is causing cognizable harm to be a nuisance). See also Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418,,438-40 (1890) (if legislature attempts to preclude
judicial review of the reasonableness of a rate regulation, such action constitutes a
deprivation of property without due process of law).
103. For example, if Hadacheck began his brick manufacturing operations in a
place where "he did not expect or believe, nor did other owners of property in the
vicinity expect or believe, that the territory would" become residential, see
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915), the common law's "coming to the
nuisance" defense would preclude these later-in-time neighbors from successfully as-
serting a common law nuisance action against Hadacheck. In essence, by providing a
"coming to the nuisance" defense, the common law implicitly assigned Hadacheck the
legal right to continue making bricks, and made the rights of the later-in-time neigh-
bors subject to Hadacheck's continuing operations. Because the common law made
the neighboring landowners' property rights subject to Hadacheck's continuing opera-
tions, his operations, while they may have produced unpleasant sights, sounds, and
odors, did not interfere with the neighbor's legal rights. As a result, while it is the
common law, rather than an express agreement, that made the complaining neigh-
bor's legal rights subject to the objected-to land-use, the common law's implicit as-
signment of rights would seem to suggest that Hadacheck's land-use, like
Pennsylvania Coal's, did not create cognizable harm, and should not have been sub-ject to regulation under the police power in the absence of just compensation. The
Court, however, rejected such an approach. In response to Hadacheck's claim that
the vested, or preexisting, nature of his operations established his right to compensa-
tion, the Court responded by asserting that government would be unable to afford
such a broad interpretation of the compensation requirement. Id. at 410.
Yet, if this response was adequate to avoid the compensation requirement in a case
involving an implicit assignment of rights, then it would seem an equally compelling
response to Pennsylvania Coal's compensation claims. After all, requiring compensa-
tion for Hadacheck seems no more or less likely to block "progress" than would re-
quiring compensation for Pennsylvania Coal. But when the State of Pennsylvania
asserted such an argument in Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Court rejected its plea by
noting that "[t]he protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes
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While the Court's resolution of the harm issue in cases involving a
government adjustment of the relative land use rights of neighboring
landowners was therefore sometimes troubling, far more troubling
was its resolution of those cases in which the existence or exercise of a
property right interfered, not with the right of a neighboring land-
owner, but with a right held by the public at large.1°4 For example, the
Court did not resolve the railroad rate regulation cases by examining
whether the unregulated rates interfered with the property rights of a
neighboring landowner. Instead, the Court determined that if a rail-
road, in exercising its property rights, set an unreasonably high rate,
there would be an interference with the general public's right to rea-
sonably priced rail travel.
But where did the public's right to reasonably priced rail travel
come from, and what were its limits? More importantly, if the legisla-
ture decided to expand the public's rights by enacting legislation that
gave the public the right to "subsidized" rail travel, should the Court
deny the legislature the authority to recognize, and provide for, a pub-
lic need for such subsidized travel? Admittedly, such "subsidized"
travel might "kill a goose that lays golden eggs, ' 05 and would set a
rate inconsistent with the optimal pricing structure natural monopoly
economics might suggest.10 6 Yet, neither of those concerns otherwise
justified limits on the legislature's authority. "If all that can be said of
legislation is that it is unwise, or unnecessarily oppressive ... , [the
adversely affected property owners'] appeal must be to the legislature,
or to the ballot-box, not to the judiciary.' 0 7
Nevertheless, through the 1930s, the Court limited the legislature's
authority to redistribute property in these public rights cases to those
instances in which the Court determined that the privately-held right
at issue had become "clothed with a public interest." ' To identify
which privately-held rights had become clothed with a public interest,
the Court attempted to define a corresponding set of rights held by
the general public with respect to certain land uses and businesses. 0 9
Once the Court had defined these publicly-held rights, a privately-
held right would become clothed with a public interest if the existence
or exercise of that right interfered with, or frustrated, one of the pub-
licly-held rights. Such an interference amounted to cognizable harm,
that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use
without compensation." Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
104. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1914-19.
105. Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394, 410 (1921).
106. For a discussion of optimal pricing schemes and natural monopoly, see RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 275-76 (4th ed. 1992).
107. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686 (1888); see Erie R.R., 254 U.S. at 410.
108. Lunney, supra note 4, at 1915.
109. Id.
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and would make the privately-held right subject to uncompensated
police power regulation. 110
Yet, as some may already have realized, this definition of cognizable
harm, as an interference with a publicly-held right, did not resolve the
issue, but merely pushed the dispute back one step. Resolution of any
given case would turn on whether the Court decided to recognize any
given public interest as something the public not only wanted, but had
a legal right to demand. Thus, government could, without providing
compensation, prohibit private action that threatened the health,
safety, or morals of another citizen because the Court recognized the
public interest in preserving the health, safety, and morals of its citi-
zens as something that the public had a legal right to demand."' If
the Court had not so recognized the state's interest, then the state
could not have prohibited such private action in the absence of com-
pensation.112 Resolving the compensation question, then, became a
matter of separating those public interests that the Court would recog-
nize as public rights, from those public interests it would not so
recognize.
In addressing this underlying question of whether the Court should
consider the public interest, in any given case, as rising to the level of
a public right, the Court focused on a variety of circumstances associ-
ated with the privately-held right.' 3 While the early Court could not
110. Thus, in the railroad rate regulations, the Court established and defined the
public's right to reasonably priced rail travel. Once the Court had established that
right, any attempt by the railroads to set an unreasonable rate for rail travel would
frustrate the public's rights, and would justify state action to protect the public's
rights. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1898); Covington & Lex. Turnpike Rd.
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 596 (1896).
111. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 (1887).
112. In the absence of a public right, the private exercise of rights to threaten the
health, safety, or morals of a state's citizens might cause harm in the ordinary sense of
the word, but it would not interfere with, or frustrate, any right held by the public.
113. These circumstances included what role, if any, government played in estab-
lishing the privately-held right, and the obligations expressly or implicitly assumed by
the private right's holder. See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. at 544-47. In Chas.
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), the Court at-
tempted to summarize the considerations that would justify clothing a privately-held
right with the public interest:
Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying some public
regulation may be divided into three classes:
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of privi-
leges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of ren-
dering a public service demanded by any member of the public. Such are the
railroads, other common carriers and public utilities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public interest attach-
ing to which, recognized from earliest times, has survived the period of arbi-
trary laws by Parliament or colonial legislatures for regulating all trades and
callings. Such are those of the keepers of inns, cabs and grist mills.
(3) Businesses which, though not public at their inception, may be fairly said
to have risen to such and have become subject in consequence to some gov-
ernment regulation.
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always agree whether the public interest, in any given case, justified
uncompensated regulation of privately-held property, 114 the early
Court consistently ruled that the strong demands of the public interest
alone were not sufficient; 115 "something more special than this, some-
thing of more definite consequence" was required." 6 Simply because
the public really wanted, or even needed in some sense, a specific re-
distribution of private property would not, on its own, justify the state
in redistributing the property without just compensation.
With the Great Depression, however, the legislative and executive
branches of government came under increasing pressure to act to alle-
viate economic losses and stabilize the economy.1 7 Government re-
sponded to these demands through a variety of measures, including
Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
114. See, e.g., Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (concluding by a 5-1-3 vote
that price regulation of employment agencies is beyond the scope of the police
power), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Tyson & Brother-
United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (concluding by a 5-
1-3 vote that price regulation of ticket agencies is beyond the scope of police power),
overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Village of Euclid v. Amber Re-
alty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding by a 5-4 vote state power to enact zoning
regulations); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding by a 5-4 vote temporary
rent controls); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (upholding by a 5-1-3 vote state
authority to regulate railroad employee wages); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,
233 U.S. 389 (1914) (upholding by a 6-3 vote state authority to regulate fire insurance
rates); Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391 (1894) (upholding by a 5-4
vote state power to regulate grain warehouse rates in the absence of any showing that
warehouse occupied a monopoly position).
115. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602
(1935); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Great N. Ry. Co. v.
Minnesota ex rel. State R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n, 238 U.S. 340, 346 (1915) ("The
demands upon a carrier which lawfully may be made are limited by its duty ...
116. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406 (1914).
117. There is a vast body of literature associated with the end of the so-called Loch-
ner era in the mid-1930s. For a sample, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
48-49 (1991); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 188-208 (Phoenix ed. 1967); JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168
DAYS (1938); RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE WAGNER ACT CASES (1964); EDWARD S.
CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN IN-
STRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 121-28 (1938); EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 39-79 (1941); ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME
COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 85-113, 123-25 (1958); Michael E. Parrish, The Great
Depression, the New Deal, and the American Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723, 728-
35 (1984); Michael E. Parrish, The Hughes Court, the Great Depression, and the His-
torians, 4 HISTORIAN 286 (1978). Most of the points I make in the text are not in
dispute, except as to the relative impact of external events and internal doctrinal
changes on the Court's rejection between 1937 and 1943 of the Lochner-era approach
to the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 233 (1994) (emphasizing internal doctrinal changes as basis
for rejection of Lochner-era approach) with Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Con-
stitutional Change, 80 VA. L. REV. 277, 284-88 (1994) (suggesting that external events
played a role as well). For the cases in which the Court rejected the Lochner-era
approach, see Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). As I am not attempting to address whether
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extensive controls on privately-held rights, controls that the Court had
previously considered beyond the reach of public authority in the ab-
sence of just compensation. 118 The willingness of the executive and
legislative branches to enact measures limiting such private rights,
combined with their insistence that such limitations were essential
both to redress the current economic crisis and to prevent a recur-
rence of such a crisis in the future, led to a series of direct conflicts
between the judiciary and the coordinate branches concerning the
proper scope of government authority.119 These conflicts placed con-
siderable pressure on the Court's internal compromises and agree-
ments that, though fragile at times, 2 ° had enabled the Court to reach
some consensus concerning those circumstances in which a public in-
terest became a public right.
As the pressures from the Depression and the other two branches
mounted, the Court began to admit that, insulated as it was, it might
not be institutionally well-positioned to second-guess the legislature's
determination regarding what action was necessary to ameliorate, and
eventually end, the economic turmoil of the Great Depression.' 2' Re-
sponding to the mounting pressure, and perhaps to its own self-
doubts, the Court, in cases such as Nebbia v. New York, 2 2 and United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,123 began to allow the legislature
greater leeway to control and limit property and economic rights
when the legislature, in its reasonable discretion, considered the limi-
tation desirable. 24 While modern commentators typically consider
both Nebbia and Carolene Products to involve deprivations of liberty,
rather than deprivations of property, two propositions from these
cases would provide the foundation for the Court's subsequent takings
jurisprudence.
First, in terms of takings doctrine, the Nebbia Court rejected the
notion that the Court should define a limited set of circumstances in
external pressure or internal pressure led the Court to reject the Lochner-era ap-
proach, I will cite only to one or two sources for each point.
118. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 117, at 48-49; Cushman, supra note 117, at 252.
119. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 117, at 48-49; Cushman, supra note 117, at 234.
120. Even in the heyday of Lochnerism, the Justices could rarely agree as to which
privately-held rights it should consider clothed with a public interest. See Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking maximum hours statute as an improper depri-
vation of liberty by 5-4 vote); see also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BE-
SIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE
114-46 (1993); Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 22
HARV. L. REV. 495 (1908).
121. Perhaps it would be more proper to say that the Court began to pay more
attention to the principles of deference to the legislature it had always articulated.
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 529 (1934) (suggesting that the Court had
always resolved Due Process claims by examining whether government action was
arbitrary).
122. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
123. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
124. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 151-52; Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 524.
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which the public interest would become a public right. 12 5 Under the
pre-Nebbia doctrine, the first inquiry was whether the government ac-
tion addressed a right clothed in the public interest. If the govern-
ment action did, then the only question was whether the government
had acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. If, on the other hand, a govern-
ment action addressed a purely private right-a right not clothed in
the public interest-then the action was an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of private property. The Nebbia Court rejected this doctrinal ap-
proach, holding that it would consider any right to be clothed in the
public interest as long as control of the right was "for adequate rea-
son" necessary "for the public good."'1 26 Under Nebbia, the govern-
ment would deprive an individual of property without due process
only in cases in which the government acted arbitrarily or unreasona-
bly.127 In essence, Nebbia gave the public a legal right to pursue the
common good.
With this assertion that the public had a legal right to its desires, the
Nebbia Court not only authorized state regulation of the retail price of
milk, the property or liberty right at issue in the case, 28 it also radi-
cally expanded the ability of government to limit property rights with-
out providing compensation. If, under the harm-benefit line,
cognizable harm refers to an interference with or frustration of an-
other's right, including publicly-held rights, and the public has a right
to pursue the common good, then any privately-held right whose exer-
cise or existence interferes with or frustrates attainment of the public
good would necessarily injure the public's rights. By interfering with
the public's right to advance the common good, the privately-held
right would be causing cognizable harm within the meaning of the
harm-benefit line, and government could therefore change, limit, or
even eliminate the privately-held right under the police power without
compensation. 29
125. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 538-39.
128. See id. at 515, 523 (discussing scope of government authority over both prop-
erty and freedom of contract).
129. For post-Nebbia cases adopting a vastly expanded definition of harm preven-
tion, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978)
(development ban to prevent destruction of historic architecture is harm prevention,
not benefit extraction); Candlestick Props., Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev.
Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Manor Dev. Corp. v. Conservation
Comm'n, 433 A.2d 999 (Conn. 1980); Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envtl.
Protection, 362 A.2d 948 (Conn. 1975); Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d
1374 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Gover-
nor of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); TIrnpike
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972); Claridge v. New Hamp-
shire Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984); Carter v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 314 S.E.2d 327 (S.C. 1984); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis.
1972) (complete development ban to preserve wetlands is harm prevention, not bene-
fit extraction); see also Sax, supra note 15, at 155-61 (articulating and seeking to jus-
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The potential reach of such an interpretation of the harm preven-
tion rationale is enormous. For example, convenient transportation,
convenient mail service, and an adequate national defense all un-
doubtedly promote the common good. In a variety of circumstances,
privately-held rights might prevent government from satisfying these
needs. A particular landowner might seek to use his or her land in a
manner other than as a freeway, post office, or air force base, even
though use of the land in one of these capacities was necessary to
advance the common good. Given these facts, the landowner would
be exercising his or her rights in a manner that interfered with the
public's right to provide for the common good, and would be causing
cognizable harm to the rights of another. If the Court took Nebbia's
announced principle literally, the Court should presumably allow gov-
ernment to change, limit, or eliminate the privately-held rights with-
out providing compensation to prevent the harm to the public's
welfare that would otherwise ensue. Under such a broad interpreta-
tion of harm prevention, even government action that resulted in
physical invasion or acquisition of title, if reasonably necessary to
serve the common good, could qualify as a harm-preventing police
power regulation, and would therefore avoid the compensation re-
quirement. 130 Taken literally, Nebbia would give the legislature com-
plete discretion to determine when a deprivation of private property
warranted an award of compensation.
Of course, the modern Court has generally not permitted govern-
ment acquisition or physical invasion of private property without com-
pensation even when the action was necessary to advance the general
welfare,' 3 ' and has therefore not accepted the furthest implications of
Nebbia.131 Nevertheless, by rendering the underlying basis of the
early Court's harm-benefit line meaningless, Nebbia requires some al-
tify the recognition of public rights in the environment that would allow
uncompensated prohibitions of spill-over creating land-uses).
130. While such a suggestion may seem outlandish to some, the Court has accepted
such an argument with respect to the federal navigation servitude. Because of the
public's compelling need to provide for adequate navigation on the nation's water-
ways, the federal government may physically invade privately-held land without pro-
viding compensation. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S.
799, 809-10 (1950); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924); United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1917); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217,
225 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468-70 (1903).
131. See Loretto v. Teleprompter, Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-41
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (conditioning of building per-
mit on homeowners' grant of easement across their land is a taking, unless justified by
a harm caused by the permitted activity); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1011 (1984) (deprivation of right of exclusivity with respect to preexisting trade secret
is a taking).
132. If it had, then the Takings Clause would essentially be gone, and only substan-
tive due process would serve as a check on government control of private property.
See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1923-24 & n.133; cf. Krier, supra note 28, at 7.
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ternative definition of cognizable harm if a harm-prevention rationale
is to provide any assistance in separating compensable restrictions on
privately-held property from noncompensable restrictions.
Second, the Court in Nebbia and Carolene Products also provided a
policy justification for its decision to retreat from enforcing the pro-
tections that the Constitution might appear to extend to property and
economic rights. 33 Both cases emphasized the need for judicial defer-
ence to legislative judgments concerning the need for, or desirability
of, redistributions of property. In Nebbia, the Court noted as a juris-
prudential matter that the legislature, composed of the elected repre-
sentatives of the people, was the proper branch to identify which
limitations on property rights were necessary to advance the public
welfare. 134 The legislature, rather than the courts, should set social
policy. As the Nebbia Court explained:
[s]o far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to
its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such
policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it.1 35
In Carolene Products, the Court continued to emphasize the need
for judicial deference to the legislative branch on economic issues.
The Court justified such deference by suggesting that the political pro-
cess itself would adequately protect property and economic rights
from inappropriate government action, making Court review of the
legislative decisions with respect to such interests largely unneces-
sary.' 36 As long as those who would be adversely affected by a pro-
posed property redistribution had a reasonable opportunity to present
their concerns to the legislature, the legislature would likely balance
the burdens and benefits associated with the redistribution fairly, and
place the cost on those best able, from a societal perspective, to afford
133. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151-52 (1938).
134. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934); Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421, 423-25 (1952).
135. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
136. The Court was careful to distinguish government action adversely affecting the
political process, such as limitations on the right to vote or on free speech, and gov-
ernment action affecting "discrete and insular minorities." Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. at 152 n.4. Such actions might be caused by an underlying flaw in the political
process, and, as a result, the Court could not rely on the political process alone to
prevent inappropriate legislative action on these issues. Id. Note that the Court also
excepted from its general rational basis standard, "legislation [which] appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments." Id. Presumably, government action that implicated the Compen-
sation Clause would require a "narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality." Id.
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it.'3 7 The Carolene Products Court suggested that (1) the legislature
could be trusted to redistribute property fairly, and (2) because courts
are, in any event, ill-equipped to second-guess the legislature's deter-
mination as to whom should bear the burden of such a redistribution,
the Court should allow the legislature virtually complete discretion to
decide when a government-imposed property redistribution war-
ranted compensation.' 38
These two propositions, one doctrinal and one jurisprudential, to-
gether would reshape the way in which the Court viewed the harm-
benefit line, and redefine the extent to which government may
change, limit, or even eliminate privately-held property rights in the
absence of just compensation. The first proposition, that the public
has a right to pursue the common good, has led the current Court to
question whether the harm-benefit line retains any underlying mean-
ing, or, alternatively, has simply become a convenient way of phrasing
the Court's conclusion. 139 At the same time, the second proposition,
that we can trust the legislature to redistribute property fairly, and the
varying extent to which it has proven persuasive to particular Justices
at particular times, has led the present Court to develop two quite
different definitions of what constitutes cognizable harm, and to de-
velop two correspondingly different definitions of the scope of gov-
ernment's authority over private property in the absence of just
compensation.
D. Modern Applications: Expanding the Police Power and
Redefining Harm
The Court's analysis in three cases, Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 4 ° Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,4 ' and
Dolan v. City of Tigard,142 illustrates the Court's struggle to define
what role, if any, the harm-benefit line should play today. In each
case, government acted to prohibit or condition a land use that would
otherwise have caused harm in the ordinary sense of the word. In
Penn Central, the City of New York acted to prohibit Penn Central
from using its property rights associated with the Grand Central Ter-
minal in a manner inconsistent with the terminal's historic architec-
ture. In Lucas, the State of South Carolina acted to prohibit
petitioner David Lucas from using his land in a manner that might
137. See id. at 151-52. There, the Court suggested that only in those cases where an
underlying flaw is present in the political process, should courts scrutinize legislative
action more carefully. Id. at 152 n.4.
138. See id. at 151-52; see also Day-Brite Lighting, 342 U.S. at 423 ("[The Court
does] not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide
whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.").
139. See infra text accompanying notes 140-84.
140. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
141. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
142. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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have exacerbated coastal erosion and threatened the native flora and
fauna, as well as the economic health of the region. In Dolan, the City
of Tigard granted Florence Dolan a permit to expand her hardware
store and pave her parking lot, but sought to condition the land-use
permit so that her actions would not worsen traffic congestion or in-
crease the flooding risks associated with an adjacent creek.
In none of these cases would the prohibited activity have interfered
with the rights of neighboring landowners in a way that would have
been actionable under private nuisance law, nor would they have in-
terfered with, or frustrated, in any cognizable way, the neighboring
landowners' legal rights in their land, as the prohibited land uses had
in Reinman, Hadacheck, and Miller.14 3 As a result, in deciding each
case, the Court had to confront the void left by Nebbia and determine
whether the government action required compensation, given that the
action was reasonably intended to prevent the individual landowner
from exercising its, his, or her property rights in a way that would have
frustrated the government's attempt to advance the common good.1'"
1. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
In writing for the majority in Penn Central, Justice Brennan simply
denied that the harm-benefit line had ever required anything more
than a showing that the government action was "reasonably related to
the implementation of a policy.., expected to produce a widespread
public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property."'145 So
long as government action was "designed to promote the public wel-
fare," neither "diminution in property value, standing alone," nor a
substantially uneven distribution of benefits and burdens, would es-
tablish a taking.'46
While the Court based its analysis almost entirely on half-true, and
otherwise misleading, interpretations of the Court's early takings ju-
risprudence, 147 its conclusion that government can act to prevent pri-
vate property rights from frustrating government's pursuit of the
common good closely parallels the conclusion the Nebbia Court had
reached forty-four years earlier. Moreover, the Court's implicit sug-
gestion that the legislature can generally be trusted to adjust fairly the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good,'148 and its later express statement that it was ill-positioned to
143. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
145. Penn Central, 438 U.S at 133-34 n.30.
146. Id. at 131, 133-34.
147. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1927-32.
148. The Court draws a contrast between government action that "can be charac-
terized as a physical invasion by government," and government action "adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 124. The Court suggests that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found" in
the first situation than in the second, id., adopting Professor Sax's suggestion that we
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second-guess the city's determination of the value of preserving his-
toric architecture, 49 seem to echo the themes of deference to the leg-
islature so powerfully articulated in both Nebbia and Carolene
Products.
The Penn Central Court, however, recognized that if it adopted such
a broad definition of harm, without providing some exceptions, it
would leave the legislature with essentially complete discretion as to
when compensation should be provided for disaffected property own-
ers, and would thereby render the Just Compensation Clause preca-
tory.150 To avoid that result, the Penn Central Court suggested in dicta
several exceptional circumstances in which government action would
amount to a taking even though it substantially advanced the public
welfare. Specifically, the Court suggested that government action,
even though it substantially advanced the public welfare,' 5 would
constitute a taking if the action either: (a) entailed a physical inva-
sion,152 (b) denied a property owner all "reasonable beneficial use" of
the physical property affected by the government action,' 53 or (c) ef-
fectively acquired property for a uniquely governmental function.' 54
If we recognize "benefit extraction" as simply a label applied to
those government actions requiring compensation, then these "excep-
tional circumstances" categories of government action would consti-
tute the only instances of cognizable benefit extraction. Only in these
instances is government effectively requiring the individual to dedi-
cate his or her property to public use. Only in these instances, there-
fore, will the Court require compensation. In all other cases,
government is merely prohibiting the individual from exercising his or
her property rights in a manner that the people's elected representa-
tives have determined to be harmful.
Yet "harm" and "benefit" are not simply legal labels, applied after
the fact to the Court's previously determined conclusion. 55 Harm
can trust the government to distribute benefits and burdens fairly when it is acting as
arbitrator, but not when it is acting as enterprise. See Sax, supra note 9, at 62-63.
149. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-35 ("Unless we are to reject the judgment of the
New York City Council that the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York
citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality of life in
the city as a whole-which we are unwilling to do-we cannot conclude that the own-
ers of the Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the Landmarks Law.").
150. At least one commentator has suggested that James Madison intended the
Compensation Clause to be largely precatory. See William Michael Treanor, Note,
The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708, 710-12 (1985).
151. As the Penn Central Court recognized, "[i]t is, of course, implicit.., that a use
restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to
the effectuation of a substantial public purpose." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
152. Id. at 124.
153. Id. at 138.
154. Id. at 135.
155. For example, in 1987, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, found that a Pennsylvania
statute intended to prevent the subsidence of significant parts of Pennsylvania was not
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prevention and benefit extraction have not only a legal meaning, but
also an ordinary meaning that exerts a powerful pull on our subcon-
scious and implicates our underlying sense of propriety and responsi-
bility. As a result, the Penn Central majority was careful, even while
downplaying the need for the prohibited use to be "noxious , ' 1 56 to
emphasize the value and importance of preserving historic architec-
ture, and to suggest the harmful, even wrongful, nature of Penn Cen-
tral's attempt to destroy such architecture. l 7 The dissent, too, felt the
harm-benefit line's pull. It emphasized the affirmative duties15 8 the
Landmark Law places on Penn Central, and suggested that the
Landmark Law required Penn Central to give up its development
plans for the affected land" 9 and preserve the building's historic char-
acter "for the benefit of sightseeing New Yorkers and tourists. ' 160 At
some level, both the majority and dissent recognized that if their char-
acterization of the government's action in terms of harm prevention
or benefit extraction prevailed, 61 they would have a significant edge
in dictating the Court's resolution of the takings issue.
a taking, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), and
by the same margin, concluded that the action of the California Coastal Commission's
attempt to prevent private landowners from interfering with the public's access to
public beachfront parks, was a taking. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987). Justice White was the sole member of the Court who joined both majority
opinions, and yet, he never explained why he saw the two cases as different. My own
thought is that the harm, in the ordinary sense of the word, in the Pennsylvania case
seemed both more real and more serious than the harm in the California case, justify-
ing state action without compensation in Pennsylvania, but not in California.
156. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 n.30.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[A]ppelees have placed an affirmative
duty on Penn Central to maintain the Terminal in its present state and in 'good
repair.' ").
159. Id. at 147 ("Here, however, a multimillion dollar loss has been imposed on
appellants.").
160. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The city of New York, because of its
unadorned admiration for the design, has decided that the owners of the building
must preserve it unchanged for the benefit of sightseeing New Yorkers and tourists.").
161. Such characterization wars also took place in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission. Compare Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) ("Had California simply re-
quired the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the pub-
lic on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach... we have no
doubt there would have been a taking.") with id. at 843-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("In this case, California has employed its police power in order to condition develop-
ment upon preservation of public access to the oceans and tidelands.").
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2. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Like Irving162 and Loretto163 before it, the Court's decision in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council"6 took one of the "exceptional cir-
cumstances" Justice Brennan had suggested in Penn Central and ap-
plied it.165  Specifically, the Lucas Court took Justice Brennan's
suggestion that the Court would find a taking in those cases in which
government action deprived a property owner of all reasonably bene-
ficial use of his or her property,1 66 even if the action was necessary to
effect a substantial public purpose.167 As in Irving and Loretto, the
Lucas majority's decision to not merely recite one of the Penn Central
factors, but to find a taking based on it, drew a heated dissent.168 As
the dissenting Justices argued, enforcing the Compensation Clause
162. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (elimination of the rights of descent and
devise is a taking when not necessary to achieve the government's objective).
163. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (even if
necessary to advance a substantial government objective, government action that re-
quires permanent physical invasion is a taking); see also Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1011 (1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); cf. Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (government action that may entail permanent pres-
ence of individuals on another's land not a taking because individuals were originally
invited onto the other's land).
164. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
165. In Irving, the Court found a taking because the government action was not
substantially related to achieving the government's objective. Irving, 481 U.S. at 718.
In Loretto, the Court found a taking because the government action, while substan-
tially related to advancing the public welfare, entailed a physical invasion (or depriva-
tion of the right of exclusive occupancy). Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433-41.
166. By substituting the word "property" for the word "land," which had appeared
in the Court's previous recitations of the denial of all economically viable use test, the
Lucas Court reopened the question of the proper denominator for calculating the
extent of the diminution. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. The Court suggested that
courts should determine the proper denominator by examining "the owner's reason-
able expectations [as] shaped by the State's law of property." Id. As Justice Kennedy
noted, however, in his concurrence, such an approach runs the risk of circularity; "for
if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper
exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it is."
Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28, 136-38 & n.36
(1978); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96
(1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
168. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court
launches a missile to kill a mouse."), at 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Loretto,
458 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, Brennan, White, JJ., dissenting). While the Court's deci-
sion in Irving did not draw a dissent, six members of the Court who joined the major-
ity opinion concurred specially to address what effect, if any, its decision had on the
validity of Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Compare Irving, 481 U.S. at 718
(Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring specially) (Court's decision had no ef-
fect on Allard ruling) with id. at 719 (Scalia, Rehnquist, Powell, JJ., concurring spe-
cially) (Court's decision effectively overruled Allard ruling). Two other Justices
concurred in the Court's conclusion that the government action was unconstitutional,
but reached that result on Procedural Due Process grounds. Id. at 730-31 ("The Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment required Congress to afford reasonable no-
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even in such "extraordinary circumstance[s]' 169 is inconsistent with
the Court's theme of judicial deference to the legislature on property
rights issues in Nebbia and Carolene Products.'71
As in Penn Central, the Lucas Court attempted to address what
role, if any, the harm-benefit line should play in separating compensa-
ble government redistributions of property from noncompensable re-
distributions, and like the Penn Central Court, seemed to be of two
minds concerning the line. Consciously, the Lucas Court expressly re-
jected the harm-benefit line as a useful test for separating compensa-
ble government action from noncompensable. "[T]he distinction
between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often
in the eye of the beholder.' 171 Yet, at the same time, the Court incor-
porated the harm-benefit line into its analysis in at least two ways.1
72
First, the Court justified its per se rule by reiterating the difference
between government action that prevented a harm, and government
action that extracted a benefit.
Surely, at least in the extraordinary circumstances where no produc-
tive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less
realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is sim-
ply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life," in a man-
ner that secures an "average reciprocity of advantage" to everyone
concerned ....
On the other side of the balance, affirmatively supporting a com-
pensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave the
owner of land without economically beneficial or productive op-
tions for its use-typically, as here, by requiring land to be left sub-
stantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened risk that
tice and opportunity for compliance to Indians that § 207 would prevent fractional
interests in land from descending by intestate or testate succession.").
169. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
170. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2906, 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), at 2921-22 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 455-56 (Blackmun, Brennan, White,
JJ., dissenting).
171. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897; see also id. at 2898-99 ("When it is understood that
'prevention of harmful use' was merely our early formulation of the police power
justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in
value; and that the distinction between regulation that 'prevents harmful use' and that
which 'confers benefits' is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-
free basis; it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone
to distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which require compensation-from regulatory
deprivations that do not require compensation."). Of course, the problem is not re-
ally one of how best to describe a government action, but that Nebbia's definition of
harm encompasses every circumstance where privately-held property rights interfered
with, or frustrated, the government's ability to advance the public welfare.
172. In addition to the two ways discussed in the text, the Court is also careful to
describe the "normal" character of Lucas's desired land-use. Because he was doing
no more than what his neighbors had already done, his actions should not be consid-
ered harmful when the similar actions of his neighbors were not. Id. at 2901.
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private property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.17
The Court went on to compare such a complete, or near-complete, 74
use prohibition to the creation of a wildlife park through formal con-
demnation and noted that "'the benefits flowing to the public from
the preservation of open space' " would be the same whether the gov-
ernment formally acquired the land or simply prohibited its develop-
ment. 175 Moreover, in concluding this part of its opinion, the Court
described the government action as requiring Lucas to "sacrifice" his
property "in the name of the common good,"'176 justifying the Court's
conclusion that "he ha[d] suffered a taking."' 77
Second, in addition to justifying its per se rule almost exclusively in
terms of benefit extraction, the Court went on to create an exception
to its rule when the government acts to prevent, or remedy, serious
harm. Specifically, the Court ruled that government action will not
constitute a taking, even if it deprives an owner of all economically
viable use of his or her real 178 property, if the same result "could have
been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners ... under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complemen-
tary power to abate public nuisances that affect the public generally,
173. Id. at 2894-95 (emphasis added).
174. The South Carolina Beachfront Management Act allowed Lucas to construct a
wooden walkway and a small wooden deck, Id. at 2889 n.2, and presumably would
allow Lucas to use his land for nondevelopmental uses, such as "fishing or camping."
Id. at 2919 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2895 (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981)). Cf. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 261 (1980) ("The State of California has determined that the development of
local open-space plans will discourage the 'premature and unnecessary conversion of
open-space land to urban uses.' The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises
of the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill-effects of
urbanization.") (footnotes and citation omitted).
176. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
177. Id.
178. The Court distinguished government regulations that affect personal property
"by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control over commercial deal-
ings." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. Providing a different degree of protection for real
and personal property is both inconsistent with the literal words of the Just Compen-
sation Clause, which extends its protection to "private property," not "land" or "chat-
tels real," and is also inconsistent with the results the Court actually reached in
applying the takings clause from 1960 to 1984. During that time period, the Court
struck as takings three measures that affected personal property, while striking only
two that affected real property. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984) (government action affecting trade secret rights is a taking); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (government action that af-
fected right of exclusive occupancy for space on roof of apartment building is a
taking); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (govern-
ment action that transferred incident of ownership associated with monetary fund is a
taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (government action that
affected right of exclusive occupancy of marina is a taking); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (government action that destroyed value of materialmen's
liens is a taking).
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or otherwise."179 The category "otherwise," the Court noted, would
encompass state destruction of real property "in cases of actual neces-
sity, to prevent the spreading of fire, or to forestall other grave threats
to the lives and property of others."' 8 °
Thus, the Lucas opinion suggests a two-tier definition of harm. For
government action addressed to sufficiently serious harm, harm that
would amount to an actionable common-law nuisance or present a
"grave threat to the lives and property of others,"'' the Compensa-
tion Clause will permit the government to take, or even destroy, pri-
vate property without compensation if that action is reasonably
necessary to address the potential harm.182 For government action
that does not address such serious harm, but only seeks to advance the
public welfare more generally, the Compensation Clause will permit
the government to impose substantial restrictions on private property
if that action is reasonably necessary to advance the common good.
However, no matter how important the public interest, if the govern-
ment action does not address a serious harm, government action may
not cause a physical invasion, a denial of all economically beneficial
use, or an acquisition of property for a uniquely governmental func-
tion in the absence of compensation.'83
3. Dolan v. City of Tigard
In both Penn Central and Lucas, the Court attempted to distance
itself from the harm-benefit line, yet found itself inevitably returning
to the line as an appropriate means of describing how far government
can go before the Court will require compensation. In Dolan v. City
of Tigard,'81 the Court expressed no qualms over adopting the princi-
ple of responsibility reflected in the harm-benefit line. In Dolan, Flo-
rence Dolan sought a building permit from the City of Tigard to
expand her hardware store and pave her parking lot. The expansion
of Dolan's hardware store would increase traffic congestion in the
area, while the paving of her parking lot would increase the potential
179. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
180. Id. at 2900 n.16; see also Levmore, supra note 23, at 1335-40 (suggesting that
there is and ought to be a symmetry between what the government can accomplish
without paying compensation under the police power and what the government or
other individuals can accomplish without paying compensation under tort law).
181. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n.16 (citing Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1880)).
182. In cases of such potentially serious harm, the Court may even allow a perma-
nent physical invasion of an individual's land. Cf. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260
U.S. 22 (1922) (holding a city's authorization of the construction of common firewalls
extending six inches onto neighboring property not to be a taking because land own-
ership never included right to prevent physical invasion to construct common
firewall).
183. In footnote 8, the Lucas Court hinted at additional categories in which govern-
ment action advancing the public interest generally would constitute a taking. Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
184. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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for flooding of nearby Fanno Creek. Before it would grant Dolan the
building permit she needed to undertake her desired renovations, the
city imposed two conditions, requiring that she (1) dedicate her land
within the 100-year floodplain to the city as a greenway, and (2) dedi-
cate an additional fifteen feet of her land to the city for use as a bicy-
cle/pedestrian trail.'" 5 The city intended both of these conditions to
address the dangers of traffic congestion and increased flooding to
which Dolan's proposed expansion would contribute.'86
In reviewing the conditions, the Court noted that the police power
would justify government limitations on property rights reasonably
necessary to prevent or minimize traffic congestion or the risk of
flooding.'87 But neither traffic congestion nor an increased, but still
indefinite, threat of flooding, would warrant "simply requiring [Do-
lan] to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek to public use.' '1 88
The city may use Dolan's desire for a building permit to induce Dolan
to dedicate the desired land to the city by making such dedication a
condition of receiving the building permit. Imposing such a condition
will satisfy constitutional standards, however, only if the condition
addresses a harm that the permitted activity is reasonably likely to
cause.' 89 Moreover, the condition must be roughly proportional
"both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."'' 90
Thus, when a landowner seeks a building or other land-use permit,
government may condition its grant of the permit in ways designed to
address the problems to which the permitted land use will contribute.
However, the Constitution will allow government to so condition a
land-use permit only to the extent necessary to address the harm rea-
sonably associated with the permitted land use: that is the harm the
185. 1& at 2314.
186. While the Court found a sufficient nexus between the dedication of land
within the 100 year floodplain and the risk of increased flooding created by Dolan's
paving of her parking lot, Id. at 2318, my personal experience with flooding suggests
that the nexus between the two is slight. While paving the lot will lead to faster and
increased run-off into Fanno Creek, it will not likely lead to additional flooding imme-
diately adjacent to the parking lot. Rather, the additional run-off will flow down the
Creek until it hits a bottle-neck. At that point, the additional run-off may increase the
risk of flooding, either by causing the Creek to flood where it had not flooded histori-
cally, or by making the flooding more severe where it had flooded historically. But
the greenway adjacent to the hardware store does not address the potential harm
from such downstream flooding. Only if the likely bottle-neck happens to be immedi-
ately downstream of the hardware store and its parking lot would the dedication of a
greenway adjacent to the hardware store mitigate, or even address, the additional
flooding risk created by paving Dolan's parking lot.
187. Id. at 2321.
188. Id. at 2321-22.
189. See id. at 2318; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
837-38 (1987).
190. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
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land use causes; that is the harm the government may require the
landowner to remedy.
II. ANALYZING THE HARM-BENEFIT LINE: RATIONALES,
JUSTIFICATIONS, AND EXCUSES
Despite the difficulties that Nebbia's expansive definition of harm
presented, the harm-benefit line has continued to play an important
role in takings jurisprudence. While the Court has come to accept
generally Nebbia's expansive definition of government authority, and
its underlying justification of deference to the legislature on issues in-
volving the redistribution of private property, it has separated "seri-
ous" harm, or harm that rises to the level of a common-law nuisance
or poses an immediate threat to life or property, from "less serious"
harm, or other threats to the public welfare. For property rights, the
existence or exercise of which threatens serious harm, the Court fol-
lows the standard formulation of the harm-benefit line: government
action that prohibits such harm is not compensable even if it entails a
complete- destruction of the property at issue. For property rights, the
existence or exercise of which threatens less serious harm, the Court
allows the legislature nearly complete discretion to decide whether to
provide compensation for any given redistribution of property. The
Court has limited the legislature's discretion by stepping in and en-
forcing the constitutional right to compensation only when the gov-
ernment action entails physical invasion, a denial of all economically
beneficial use, or acquisition of property for uniquely governmental
functions.
Perhaps more important than its continuing influence on formal
takings doctrine, however, is the harm-benefit line's continuing intui-
tive attraction. Even when the Court has tried to reject the line ex-
pressly, it inevitably seems to return to the line as a natural way of
describing the duties government may properly impose on individual
property owners. While the members of the Court may disagree on
the extent to which government may prohibit a "harmful" land use
without incurring responsibility for compensation, the sense that
someone who causes a problem ought to be responsible for remedying
it remains a powerful, and widely-shared, principle.
The following sections explore the various rationales that courts
have offered in support of the harm-benefit line, beginning with an
examination of factual causation as justification for the harm-benefit
line. In evaluating the adequacy of these rationales, we should also
examine the related question of how the law can distinguish govern-
ment action that prevents harm from government action that extracts
a benefit. Presumably, if we can identify the reason why courts should
allow the government to take property without compensation to pre-
vent harm, that understanding should explain why any particular gov-
ernment action either requires or does not require compensation, and
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would permit us to attach the appropriate label, either "benefit-ex-
traction" or "harm-prevention." As a corollary, if one of the prof-
fered rationales does not provide a means to distinguish harm-
prevention from benefit-extraction, that failure suggests that the ra-
tionale cannot justify the harm-benefit line.
A. Factual Causation as Rationale for the Harm-Benefit Line
Probably the most common and universally accepted rationale for
the harm-benefit line lies in the principle that one who causes a prob-
lem should be responsible for remedying it.191 Under this principle,
when government acts to prohibit the exercise of, or to eliminate, a
potentially harmful property right, such action should not require
compensation because it places the burden of remedying the harm on
the individual who, but for the government action, would have caused
the harm.
Applying this principle, the pre-Nebbia Court approved uncompen-
sated government action that compelled railroads to provide grade
crossings, fence their rail-lines, and provide drainage through their
embankments. 192 In each case, the Court explained that the railroad,
being the factual cause of the problem, could be held responsible and
forced to bear the cost of remedying the problem. 93 The Court's'de-
cision in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway v. State of Illinois ex
rel. Drainage Commissioners194 illustrates the central role that factual
causation played in defining the extent to which government could
burden particular individuals with the cost of preventing particular
harms.
191. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407,
409 (1987) (explaining that causation establishes relational link between defendant's
conduct and plaintiff's injury in tort law, which justifies compensation as a component
of corrective justice).
192. See Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394, 410 (1921); Chi-
cago & A.R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 77 (1915); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois
ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592-94 (1906); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226, 255 (1897); Minneapolis & S.L. Ry. v. Emmons, 149 U.S. 364, 367
(1893).
193. See Erie R.R. v. Board of Public Utility Comm'rs, 254 U.S. at 410 ("[T]he
State... has a constitutional right to insist that [places to which the public is invited]
shall not be made dangerous to the public, whatever may be the cost to the parties
introducing the danger.") (emphasis added); Chicago & A.R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238
U.S. at 77 (regulation did not require compensation because "[t]he present regulation
is for the prevention of damage attributable to the railroad embankment itself"); Chi-
cago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. at 592-94; Chicago, B.
& Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. at 255 (expense of gate crossings "necessarily result
from the maintenance of a public highway"; as a result, state can force railroad to
bear cost of providing such crossings); Minneapolis & S.L. Ry. v. Emmons, 149 U.S. at
367 (State can force railroads to bear the expense of fencing their lines because "[t]he
operating of railroads without fences and cattle guards undoubtedly increases the
danger which attends the operation of all railroads.").
194. 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
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In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway, the state sought to widen
an existing natural river to improve the drainage of certain upstream
lands. The railroad had constructed a bridge across the river that
could not coexist with the planned widening of the river. For the state
to proceed with its drainage plans, someone had to remove the ex-
isting railroad bridge, widen and deepen the river's natural channel,
and build a new railroad bridge across the widened channel. To widen
and deepen the natural channel, someone would have to remove
materials, such as stones and timbers, that had been placed in the wa-
terway by the railroad in building its existing bridge, as well as addi-
tional natural soils. The state directed the railroad to undertake these
activities. When the railroad refused, the state sought a writ of man-
damus to compel "the railway company to forthwith enlarge, deepen
and widen the waterway." 195
The Court broke the various expenses associated with improving
the river's drainage into three categories. First, the Court held that
the state could require the railroad to bear the cost of removing the
existing bridge and the materials that the railroad had placed in the
river bed to support the existing bridge. By placing "the obstructions
• . . in the way of enlarging, deepening and widening of the chan-
nel," '196 the railroad had caused the need to remove these materials,
and should properly bear responsibility for removing them. Second,
the Court held that the state could require the railroad to bear the
cost of installing the new bridge.197 "[U]nless [the railroad] abandons
or surrenders its right to cross the creek," the Court explained, the
railroad's need to cross the river created the need for a new bridge. 198
As a result, the state could properly force the railroad to bear respon-
sibility for this expense. Third, because the railroad had not created
the need for improved drainage of the upstream lands, the state could
not force the railroad to bear the expense of widening or deepening
the channel, aside from requiring the railroad to remove the obstacles
that it had placed in the channel.'99 In essence, the state could require
the railroad to redress that portion, and only that portion, of the
drainage problem the railroad had caused.
More recent cases, particularly the conditional permit cases, con-
firm that courts are assigning responsibility for remedying a particular
harm to a particular property owner based on factual causation. For
example, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the State of Cal-
ifornia sought a lateral easement from the Nollans in return for a
195. Id. at 568 (statement of prior history).
196. Id at 594. Justices Holmes, White, and McKenna disagreed on this point. Id.
at 595 (Holmes, J., concurring) ("But the public must pay for the widening or deepen-
ing, and I think that it does not matter whether what it has to remove is the original
earth or some other substance lawfully put in the place of the original earth.").
197. Id. at 594-95.
198. Id at 595.
199. Id.
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building permit."' ° However, the Nollan Court denied the state the
authority to impose such a condition on the Nollan's building permit.
Because the Nollan's planned renovations did not create the need for
the lateral easement, the state could not require them to bear the ex-
pense of remedying it.z"' On the other hand, in Dolan v. City of
Tigard,2 °2 Florence Dolan had, through her land use, contributed to
the problems the city was trying to address. Because she played an
active role in causing the problems, the city could require her to bear
a part of the expense of remedying the problems. In assigning Dolan
a share of these expenses, the City could constitutionally require Do-
lan to bear only that portion of the expense roughly proportional to
her active contribution to the problem. 203
Before exploring whether factual causation can justify the harm-
benefit line, the following sections consider other rationales courts
have offered in support of the line.
B. "Formal""°4 Rationales for the Harm-Benefit Line
In Mugler v. Kansas,z05 Justice Harlan articulated three formal pro-
positions that he believed justified a refusal to provide compensation
when the legislature prohibited a use of property that it had deter-
mined to be prejudicial to the public interest. First, Justice Harlan
expressed the view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not impose
any constraint upon the states' "exercise of their powers for the pro-
tection of the safety, health, or morals of the community. 2 0 6 In as-
serting such a proposition, Justice Harlan relied on a series of
Contracts Clause cases, °7 and on those cases, such as Barbier v. Con-
nolly,2 °8 in which the Court first interpreted the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 9
Neither of these bases will support continued application of the
harm-benefit line today. Under the Court's Contracts Clause juris-
200. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
201. Id. at 838-42. The Nollans' willingness to enforce their right of exclusive occu-
pancy did cause the lateral access problem, but the Court ruled that this harm was
insufficiently serious to warrant state action in the absence of compensation which
would deprive the Nollans of this right. See id. at 831-32.
202. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
203. Id. at 2319-20.
204. By labeling these rationales "formal" in a post-formalism world, I mean,
obviously, to denigrate their ability to justify application of the harm-benefit line.
These rationales are, in a sense, nothing more than conclusions, which in the absence
of some underlying support, become mere excuses for application of the harm-benefit
line.
205. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
206. Id. at 664.
207. See id. at 664-65, 666-67 (relying on Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,
111 U.S. 746, 751 (1884), New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650,
675 (1885), and Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878)).
208. 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
209. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 663.
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prudence, the state was free to destroy preexisting rights of contract
unless it had expressly agreed to limit its power in that regard.210 Ap-
plying the same reasoning, Justice Harlan suggested that the State of
Kansas could destroy preexisting private property rights because it
had never agreed to limit its power over such property.21' Yet, unlike
the Contracts Clause, the Compensation Clause does not require any
such express undertaking by the state; in its own right, the Compensa-
tion Clause imposes an obligation on the state to provide compensa-
tion when the state takes preexisting private property rights.212
Moreover, while the narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment as
principally directed at slavery and equality for the freed slave may
have been more consistent with the original intent of the drafters,213
the Court has long since abandoned such a narrow view. 2 14 Beginning
with the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause, the Court has
incorporated most of the protections the Bill of Rights affords individ-
uals against government power into the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.215 Together, these incorporated protections
place substantial constraints on the state's power to protect "the
safety, health, and morals of the community." 16
210. As a general rule, the Court inevitably found that the State, as a legal matter,
had not used language sufficiently clear for the Court to conclude that the State had
expressly agreed to limit its police powers, even in those cases where an ordinary
observer would find the terms of the contract perfectly clear. See Railroad Comm'n
Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 339-40 (1886) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (State had expressly agreed
to grant chartered railroads right to decide appropriate charges for their services).
211. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
212. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (noting the " 'self-execut-
ing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation' ") (quoting
6 P. NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972)); see also Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921) ("[TJhe legislative power of a State can only be
exerted in subordination to the fundamental principles of right and justice which the
guaranty of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to preserve.").
213. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-68, 72-73 (1872);
Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101-03, 105-06 (1877); see also Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 80 n.9, 84-86 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Compare
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (incorporation not consistent with
original understanding) with William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative His-
tory," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1954) (incorporation is consistent with original understanding).
214. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
215. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147-48.
216. Even in areas that implicate the central aspects of the police power, such as
the State's authority to control crime, the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substan-
tial constraints on the State's actions. Thus, the Court has read the Fourteenth
Amendment to require cities to make a place in their community for pornographic
film exhibition, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)
(Fourteenth Amendment "requires only that Renton refrain from effectively denying
respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the
city"), and to control the manner in which police interact with criminal suspects. See,
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Second, Justice Harlan suggested that a prohibition of injurious use
does not require just compensation because the government has not
acquired an interest in the affected land.217 As a factual assertion, this
is untrue. When the state prohibits a previously lawful use of land, the
state acquires a legal right to control the affected land's use that it did
not have before, and to that extent obtains an interest in the land. 18
But, even if we accept the factual proposition that the government did
not acquire an interest in the land by prohibiting an injurious use, the
Court has, in later cases, decisively rejected the view that the govern-
ment must acquire an interest in the land before its actions will re-
quire compensation. 1 9
Third, Justice Harlan suggested that, because "all property in this
country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it
shall not be injurious to the community, 2 2 ° no individuals can hold as
property a legal right that, in its existence or exercise, injures the
rights of another.2 2 ' As a result, government action that prohibits a
landowner from using his or her land in a manner that injures an-
other's rights has not taken a property right properly belonging to the
landowner. In essence, the landowner never held the legal right to
injure another's rights in the first place.22 2
e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (defining "stop and frisk" requirements that
control whether state may convict a criminal suspect based upon evidence discovered
during frisk of suspect).
217. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-72.
218. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913) (imposing a duty on one person
always creates a correlative "right" for another).
219. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) ("In its
primary meaning, the term 'taken' would seem to signify something more than de-
struction, for it might well be claimed that one does not take what he destroys .... The
courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of
a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking."); United States v. Dickin-
son, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1004-05 (1984).
220. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665.
221. Id.
222. In some cases, a court may properly assert that the property owner never had
a legal right in the first place. When the state acts to evict a trespasser, or to enforce a
preexisting regulation through fines, or otherwise, such action is generally not a tak-
ing because it has not changed the nature of the individual's preexisting legal entitle-
ments. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006-07 (1984) (when data
submitted under law that authorizes its use or disclosure by EPA, such use or disclo-
sure is not a taking); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 84
(1907) (railroad began operations subject to duty to carry public school pupils at half-
fare; enforcement of such preexisting duty is not a taking); see also Margaret J. Radin,
Diagnosing the Takings Problem, in COMPENSATORY JusTicE 248, 250 (John W.
Chapman ed., 1991). But see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-
34 n.2 (1987) ("Nor are the Nollans' rights altered because they acquired the land well
after the Commission had begun to implement its policy. So long as the Commission
could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating
them, the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full property
rights in conveying the lot."); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
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While this proposition has remained a popular one,223 when courts
offer it as support for refusing to provide compensation under the
harm-benefit line, the proposition is both factually untrue and juris-
prudentially unsound. While their actions may have been harmful in
some sense, until the government acted to change their legal rights,
Hadacheck, Reinman, and Miller held the legal right to use their land
in the manner to which their neighbors objected.224 Indeed, if they
had not held such a legal right, government action changing their legal
rights would have been unnecessary. Even Justice Harlan, in Mugler,
appeared to recognize that the state's prohibition statute changed
Mugler's previously existing property rights.225 Before Kansas en-
acted its prohibition statute, Mugler could legally use his real property
to manufacture alcoholic beverages; after the statute's enactment, he
could not. Thus, to assert that these individuals never held a legal
right in the first place, and that the state action did not, therefore,
change their legal rights at all would be factually untrue.226
U.S. 419 (1982) (allowing Loretto to challenge installation of roof-top cable box as a
taking even though the box was in place before she purchased the apartment
building).
223. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20
(1987) ("The special status of this type of state action can also be understood on the
simple theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a
nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts
its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity."); see also Michelman, supra note 9, at
1235-37; Sax, Public Rights, supra note 15, at 155-61.
224. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) ("There was a prohibi-
tion of a business, lawful in itself, there as here."); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30 (1978) ("We observe that the uses at issue in
Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly lawful in themselves."); Sax, Police
Power, supra note 9, at 50.
225. Cf. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669 ("It is true, that, when the defendants in these
cases purchased or erected their breweries, the laws of the State did not forbid the
manufacture of intoxicating liquors.").
226. The railroads, too, in the absence of state action to impose regulated rates,
would have held the legal right to determine their own rates. Even if the railroads
had set a rate above the reasonable rate, no passenger would have the legal right to
demand travel unless he paid the agreed rate. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156-
57 (1921) (recognizing that in the absence of state action, no person could dwell in
apartment unless she paid the agreed rent); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privi-
lege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3, 8 (1894), reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 117 (1921). Professor Carol Rose apparently
believes the fiction, however. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as
Propriety, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 223, 224 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991). She
relies on the work of Harry N. Scheiber to argue that the common law did not recog-
nize a legal right to charge a monopolistic price. Id. However, while some parts of
Professor Scheiber's work can be read to support such a proposition, Scheiber's work,
as a whole, supports the notion that the railroad did have a preexisting legal right, but
that such right was subject to uncompensated government control because it was "af-
fected with a public interest." See Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent
Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMER. HIST. 329, 357-60 (1971) (affectation with a public interest used to define the
scope of the police power).
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Even though factually untrue, the notion that a harm-causing prop-
erty right is not property at all may, nevertheless, prove to be a conve-
nient legal fiction. Yet, as a fiction, it cannot justify itself, nor can it
define its own limits. If we take the proposition that a potentially
harm-causing property right is "not property" as literally true, and
adopt Nebbia's broad definition of harm, then any property right, the
existence or exercise of which interfered with the attainment of the
common good would not exist in the first place. As a result, the gov-
ernment could destroy, or even acquire for itself, such "not property"
without implicating the Constitution's Compensation Clause. 2 7 The
Court has refused, however, to adopt such a position. This rejection
establishes that the "not property" rationale is simply a fiction, a con-
venient rationalization for a decision not to require compensation. As
a result, the "not property" rationale cannot, on its own, explain why
the Court should or should not provide compensation in any given
case, and cannot therefore support the harm-benefit line.
C. Substantive Rationales for the Harm-Benefit Line
Aside from the cause-based principle of responsibility that under-
lies the line, courts have articulated four substantive rationales for al-
lowing government to prohibit, without compensation, a harmful use
of property. These are that: (i) such prohibition secures an average
reciprocity of advantage; (ii) government inevitably must choose be-
tween incompatible uses, and as a result, neither choice should require
compensation; (iii) a property owner has no reasonable expectation
that he or she will be allowed to use her property in a harmful man-
ner; and (iv) if government had to "purchase" potentially harm-caus-
ing property rights, it could not afford to do so. However, neither
individually nor collectively do these rationales support the current
takings doctrine, nor do they support the harm-benefit line given the
present exceedingly broad definition of harm.
1. Prohibiting Harm Does Not Ensure an Average
Reciprocity of Advantage
On a number of occasions, certain members of the Court have sug-
gested that government action that prevents harm does not require
compensation because such action secures an "average reciprocity of
advantage." ' In evaluating "average reciprocity of advantage" as a
227. See text accompanying notes 125-32 supra; see also Lunney, supra note 4, at
1923-24.
228. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491 (1987)("The Court's hesitance to find a taking when the State merely restrains uses of prop-
erty that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with the notion of average
'reciprocity of advantage' that Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal."); see
also Paul Burrows, Getting a Stranglehold with the Eminent Domain Clause, 9 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 129, 144 (1989) (suggesting that government can take any property
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justification for the harm-benefit line, we should consider two differ-
ent meanings associated with the phrase. Neither, however, can jus-
tify reliance on the harm-benefit line to identify compensable takings.
First, for the pre-Nebbia Court, an average reciprocity of advantage
arose when government effectively exchanged an existing property
right for another of roughly proportional value. Such an exchange
might occur expressly, as in the switch from the tort system to the
workers' compensation system,229 or implicitly by placing an
equivalent restriction on the rights of adjacent property owners.23°
The classic example of an implicit exchange would be reasonable
building setbacks applied uniformly to a series of residential lots in the
same neighborhood. After the government imposed such setbacks,
each landowner would have lost the right to cover his or her entire lot
with a building, but each landowner would have benefitted from the
same restriction placed on his or her neighbors' land.231 However, for
a uniform restriction on similarly situated property to create an aver-
age reciprocity of advantage, the benefits associated with the restric-
tion must lie disproportionately with the restricted property owners as
compared to those not subjected to the property restriction.232 Only
by providing the affected property owners a disproportionate benefit
could a uniform restriction amount to an implicit exchange of one
it wants without providing compensation because existence of government is princi-
pally responsible for value associated with property).
229. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
230. See Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporate Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932) (modifica-
tion of Rule of Capture upheld as securing average reciprocity of advantage); Gorieb
v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (set-back requirements on individual lots upheld on same
basis); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. at 201-07 (1917) (switch from tort
system to worker's compensation system as means to provide recovery for injured
employees upheld on same basis).
231. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603.
232. For example, the early Court dealt twice with Pennsylvania statutes that re-
quired coal companies to leave certain coal unmined. In the first case, Plymouth Coal
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914), the Court upheld the statute against a tak-
ings challenge. However, in the second, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), the Court struck down the statute as a taking. In reaching its decision, the
Pennsylvania Coal Court distinguished Plymouth Coal on the grounds that the state
statute at issue therein had "secured an average reciprocity of advantage," while the
Kohler Act at issue in Pennsylvania Coal had not. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at
415. The statute at issue in Plymouth Coal, the Court explained, required a strip of
coal to be left unmined in order to provide for the safety of the coal companies' own
employees. Id. ("But that was a requirement for the safety of employees invited into
the mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized
as a justification of various laws."). As a result, the parties burdened by the state
action, the coal companies, were also, through increased safety for their employees,
the principal beneficiaries of the rights change. In contrast, the statute in Penn-
sylvania Coal required a strip of coal to be left unmined in order to benefit the owners
of the surface estate. Id. Because the coal companies were not the principal benefi-
ciaries of the Kohler Act, that statute did not secure an "average reciprocity of
advantage."
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right for another, and thereby secure an average reciprocity of
advantage.
For example, in Plymouth Coal, the government required all coal
companies to leave a strip of coal in place along their property lines
when they abandoned a coal mine if such a strip might be necessary to
prevent water from the abandoned mine from flooding an adjacent
mine.233 By its terms, the statute burdened individuals who own,
mine, and thereafter abandon a coal mine. The state placed this bur-
den on the mine owners to reduce the risk of mine flooding. While
both the burdened mine owners and the public will likely benefit from
the statute, the statute principally benefitted the mine owners. By re-
ducing the risk of mine flooding, the statute protects the property of
the coal companies234 and the lives and safety of their employees.2 35
The increased coal reserves and increased mine safety that the statute
generated may lead to lower prices for coal, a benefit that the public
generally can enjoy. Because of this public benefit, we cannot say that
the burdened mine owners were the sole beneficiaries of the statute.
Nevertheless, we can assert that the burdened mine owners received
the principal and direct benefit of the statute, and that whatever bene-
fits the public received were secondary in that they followed from the
benefits enjoyed by the burdened mine owners. In this situation, in
which the parties burdened by the government action were also the
principal beneficiaries of the action, 36 the Court would find an aver-
age reciprocity of advantage and uphold the statute. The dispropor-
tionate benefit provided by the measure would implicitly compensate
the affected property owners for their otherwise disproportionate
burden.237
Whatever the merits of allowing such implicit compensation to pro-
vide the "just compensation" required by the Compensation Clause,
they are entirely independent of the harm-benefit line. If government
wants to replace a tort-based system for compensating injured em-
ployees with a workers' compensation system, there is no need to re-
quire a showing that the tort-based system is "harm-causing" before
the government can, without running afoul of the Compensation
Clause, make the switch. As long as the exchange is just, in terms of
the relative values of the exchanged rights, receiving the new right
233. Plymouth Coal, 232 U.S. at 541.
234. Although it is possible to remove coal after a mine is flooded, to do so is much
more expensive. Protecting a mine from flooding, therefore, protects the ability of a
coal company to remove the available coal.
235. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
236. Moreover, because most mine owners owned several mines in various stages
of depletion, mine owners might be burdened with respect to some of their mines, not
affected with respect to others, and benefitted with respect to a third group. As long
as the benefits and burdens reasonably balance out, the statute will achieve an aver-
age reciprocity of advantage. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203-05
(1917).
237. See id.; see also EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 204-10.
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adequately compensates the affected individuals for the taking of the
old right.238 Consequently, the mandate of the Compensation Clause,
to provide just compensation for such a taking, has already been satis-
fied.239 Given that compensation has been provided, whether the gov-
ernment action is properly characterized as harm-preventing or
benefit-extracting is beside the point. Thus, average reciprocity of ad-
vantage, as the early Court defined that phrase, cannot support the
harm-benefit line as a means to identify compensable takings.
Certain members of the Court have espoused a second definition of
"average reciprocity of advantage" in recent years. While purporting
to rely upon the early Court's average reciprocity of advantage juris-
prudence,24 ° these Justices have defined average reciprocity of advan-
tage quite differently. Under this second definition, government
action that prevents harm inevitably secures an average reciprocity of
advantage. 241 As Justice Stevens explained, "[w]hile each of us is bur-
dened somewhat by such [harm-preventing] restrictions, we, in turn,
benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others. 242
These benefits, in Justice Stevens' view, more than compensate the
property owner for the disproportionate burden government may im-
pose in any given case. Thus, while the early Court asked whether the
particular government action at issue returned a disproportionate
benefit to the otherwise disproportionately burdened property own-
ers, Justices sharing this second view of average reciprocity of advan-
tage consider the "advantage" the burdened property owner receives
from "living and doing business in a civilized community" 243 adequate
recompense for any given disproportionate burden government may
decide to impose.
Yet, this second definition of "average reciprocity of advantage"
also cannot justify using the harm-benefit line to identify compensable
takings. Like the notion that a harm-causing property right is not
property at all, the expanded notion of average reciprocity of advan-
238. See New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 203-04.
239. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 195-215.
240. In articulating the principle that government action which secures an "average
reciprocity of advantage" is not a taking, Justice Stevens has suggested that he is rely-
ing on "the notion of 'reciprocity of advantage'" articulated by Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal, but his interpretation of that phrase differs from that of Justice
Holmes. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491
(1987). For him, the possibility that the coal companies "benefit greatly from the
restrictions that are placed on others" was enough to secure an average reciprocity of
advantage, and to save government action from constitutional challenge. Id. at 491-
93. For Justice Holmes, and the Pennsylvania Coal Court, it was not.
241. Id. at 491 & n.21; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 134-35 (1978) (because state action benefits "all New York citizens and all struc-
tures," Penn Central received sufficient benefits from ordinance to justify finding or-
dinance constitutional).
242. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 491.
243. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 394, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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tage, among its other faults,244 has no discernable limits. If we can
comfortably assume that Hadacheck's or Penn Central's losses were
reasonably likely to even out through the vagaries of "civilized" life,
we should be equally comfortable assuming that the losses the govern-
ment imposed on Kaiser Aetna, Lucas, and Loretto would also even
out. The burdens are, perhaps, significant and disproportionate in
each case, yet they are almost certainly outweighed by the benefits of
living in a civilized society. Similarly, if land must be taken for a post
office, a military base, or a highway, the loss imposed upon the land-
owner by such government actions is still unlikely to exceed the bene-
fits of civilized society. Moreover, while any such landowner might be
disproportionately burdened in a particular case, he or she would ben-
efit from similar burdens that government would impose on other
property owners.245
If we take seriously this second definition of average reciprocity of
advantage, which I do not, then we should not rely on the harm-bene-
fit line to identify compensable takings. Instead, we should adopt the
full implications of Nebbia, and allow government complete discretion
to redistribute or eliminate property as it sees fit.
2. The Incompatible Use Paradox
In Miller v. Schoene,246 the State of Virginia enacted a statute au-
thorizing the state entomologist to cut down red cedar trees that were:
(i) located within two miles of any apple orchard, and (ii) found to be
244. Under the first definition, the government action effectively exchanges one
right for another of equal value, and thereby leaves the financial situation of the af-
fected property owners relatively unchanged. They have, in essence, suffered no dis-
proportionate financial loss. Under the second definition, on the other hand, the
absence of any corresponding disproportionate benefit means that the disproportion-
ately burdened property owners will remain disproportionately burdened as com-
pared to other property owners. While they, like other property owners, will receive
many benefits from living in a civilized community, these benefits shared in common
with other property owners cannot restore the burdened property owners to the rela-
tive economic status they enjoyed before the government deprivation. See Jules Cole-
man, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 423 (1982) (if
action is wrongful, actor must restore other party to pre-action wealth distribution);
see also Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 427, 437-41 (1992) (modifying annulment theory of corrective justice to explain
why a particular individual must repair specific wrongful losses, but retaining annul-
ment theory standard of compensation) [hereinafter A Mixed Conception]. Although
the Just Compensation Clause does not require "a system of delusive exactness" in
the matching of benefits and burdens, "when the chance of the cost exceeding the
benefit grows large and the amount of the not improbable excess is great," the Just
Compensation Clause will impose a limit. See Martin v. District of Columbia, 205
U.S. 135, 139 (1907).
245. Cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 491-93, 498 (compensation
for loss of twenty-seven million tons of coal provided through similar restrictions on
other harmful land-uses).
246. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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hosts to cedar rust.247 The Court upheld the statute against a takings
challenge because the prohibited land use threatened cognizable harm
within the meaning of the pre-Nebbia cases. In doing so, the Court
articulated what might be called the "incompatible use" paradox as a
justification for the harm-benefit line.
Specifically, the cedar rust associated with the host cedar trees
would destroy any apple trees within a two-mile radius; as a result, the
host cedar trees and the neighboring apple trees could not coexist.
One or the other land use could not continue. This incompatibility
forced the state to choose between the two uses. It could either act to
prohibit the growing of the host cedar trees, or it could fail to act and
thereby doom the neighboring apple trees.2 48 But it could not avoid
the choice.249  Because "the choice is unavoidable," the Court
reasoned that making a reasonable choice should not warrant
compensation.25 °
Yet, the suggested paradox is false.25' It omits the possibility of
resolving the incompatible uses through government's power of emi-
nent domain.25 2 Government need not inevitably choose to recognize
only one of two incompatible property rights because it can vindicate
247. Id. at 277-78.
248. This, at least, is how the Court phrased the choice. The neighboring apple tree
growers could, of course, try to buy out Miller's cedar trees, but collective action
problems in organizing the apple tree growers to purchase Miller's right might pre-
clude such a market transaction. See James M. Buchanan, Politics, Property, and the
Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene, 15 J.L. & ECON. 439,
443-48 (1972).
249. As the Court explained, "[i]t would have been none the less a choice if, instead
of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious
injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go on unchecked." Miller, 276 U.S.
at 279.
250. Id. at 280. Professor Sax articulates a similar justification for refusing to com-
pensate when government prohibits a use of land that has spill-over effects. See Sax,
supra note 15, at 155-61.
251. A more sophisticated argument in favor of the Court's position is that one of
the choices, a failure by government to act, would certainly not require compensation,
even though it resulted in the destruction of the apple trees. In the absence of state
action, the Compensation Clause would not be implicated. As a result, if government
failed to act, it would not be liable for the neighbors' de facto loss of their right to
grow apple trees. Given that one of the available choices will not warrant compensa-
tion, one might argue that we should treat the other possible choice symmetrically,
and not require compensation should government choose to destroy the cedar trees. I
mention the argument at this point merely to bring it to the reader's attention; be-
cause of time and space limitations, I will not be able to consider it further in this
Article. For a discussion of some of the issues such an argument might entail, see
Levmore, supra note 4, at 291-93. See also Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or
Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (1984).
252. Correcting for the market failure that might otherwise result from collective
action problems is one of the central justifications for the power of eminent domain.
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 9, at 1174-76. As a result, even if Professor
Buchanan is correct in stating that market failure justifies government intervention in
Miller v. Schoene, that does not explain why uncompensated government intervention
was justified.
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both the neighbors' right to grow apple trees and Miller's right to
grow cedar trees by purchasing Miller's right. Because the availability
of a forced sale and purchase through the power of eminent domain
vitiates the supposed choice between the two incompatible rights, the
inability of two property rights to coexist does not justify govern-
ment's uncompensated elimination of one of those rights.
3. Expectations and Harmful Uses
As a third substantive rationale for the harm-benefit line, courts
sometimes suggest that no individual would expect government to al-
low him or her to exercise his or her property rights in a manner that
would be harmful to society.z53 Because the individual does not ex-
pect government to allow such harmful uses, government action to
prohibit such use would not cause the individual to feel that he or she
has lost something. As a result, a failure to compensate the individual
for his or her "formal" loss would not cause significant "demoraliza-
tion,' 254 or lead the individual to oppose desirable governmental
action.255
For this rationale to justify the harm-benefit line, actual expecta-
tions concerning allowable conduct must differ from the lawfulness of
the conduct. If expectations concerning permissible land uses invaria-
bly conform to the law, an examination of expectations will reveal
only the law. A landowner whose expectations conformed to the law
would necessarily expect that he or she could use his or her land in
253. See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 545-46 (1898) ("A corporation main-
taining a public highway, although it owns the property it employs for accomplishing
public objects, must be held to have accepted its rights, privileges, and franchises sub-
ject to the condition that the government creating it, or the government within whose
limits it conducts its business, may by legislation protect the people against unreason-
able charges for services rendered by it. It cannot be assumed that any railroad cor-
poration, accepting franchises, rights and privileges at the hands of the public, ever
supposed that it acquired, or that it was intended to grant to it, the power to construct
and maintain a public highway simply for its own benefit, without regard to the rights
of the public.").
254. Professor Michelman coined the phrase "demoralization costs" to describe the
costs associated with an uncompensated government action. See Michelman, supra
note 9, at 1214. He defined "demoralization costs" as "the total of (1) the dollar value
necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifi-
cally from the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capital-
ized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or
social unrest caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers,
and other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected
to similar treatment on some occasion)." Id. He has suggested that the purpose of
the Compensation Clause is to prevent affected property owners, and those around
them, from feeling excessive demoralization as a result of uncompensated govern-
ment action. See id.
255. I have suggested in a previous article that the purpose of the Compensation
Clause is to reassure those who may be adversely affected by government action that
they will receive compensation for their losses, and as a result, need not oppose desir-
able governmental action. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1953-55.
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any lawful manner, but could not use his or her land in any unlawful
manner. Moreover, such a landowner would also expect that govern-
ment could substantially restrict, without compensation, previously
lawful land uses, because government has the legal authority to do so
under the Court's present interpretation of the Compensation Clause.
For such a landowner, an examination of his or her expectations
would manage only to tell us what the law is, not what it should be.
To avoid such circularity, expectations must differ from, and be in-
dependent of, the legal rules themselves.256
Yet, the Court has not attempted to separate an individual's expec-
tations concerning permissible and impermissible uses from the law.
Instead, when the Court has attempted to define an individual's ex-
pectations, it has inevitably equated the individual's expectations with
the individual's rights as defined by applicable law. In Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co.,257 for example, the Court needed to define Monsanto's
expectations concerning the possible disclosure and use of data it had
submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency. The Court de-
fined those expectations by equating them to Monsanto's legal rights
in the data under applicable federal law.258 Similarly, in determining
the "property interest" against which courts should measure a prop-
erty owner's loss, the Lucas Court suggested that courts should ex-
amine "how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by
the State's law of property. '259 Moreover, the Court has reinforced
this equation of expectations with legal rights by providing protection
only for reasonable expectations. 260 "[A] mere unilateral expectation
or an abstract need is not a property interest entitled to protection,,261
[under the Compensation Clause]. Only those expectations that
"ha[ve] the law back of [them]" will count as property within the
meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 62
Relying on "reasonable" expectations is problematic, however, not
only because it tends to become circular, but also because the sense of
deprivation experienced by the affected individual, and that individ-
256. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
257. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
258. Id. at 1006-11.
259. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
260. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113
S. Ct. 2264, 2291 (1993) (deprivation of expectations if "reasonable" and "investment-
backed" may establish a compensable taking); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7; Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 714 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986);
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107 (1985); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129 (1985); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1006-09; Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).
261. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
262. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 178.
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ual's willingness to fight the government's action, will turn largely on
the individual's actual expectations. As a result, actual expectations,
not reasonable expectations, should be the Court's principal focus in
examining expectations.263
Defined properly, "reasonable" expectations may serve as a secon-
dary factor in determining whether the Court should require compen-
sation. If the Court defined "reasonable" expectations by looking at
the average or typical expectations a landowner would hold under the
circumstances, then "reasonable" expectations might address two is-
sues relevant to the compensation issue. First, "reasonable" expecta-
tions, defined as average or typical expectations, would serve as a
perjury check on the affected property owner's testimony concerning
his or her actual expectations. Second, "reasonable" expectations, so
defined, would also suggest the likely demoralization costs that those
who had witnessed the uncompensated government imposition would
experience, and would indicate the likelihood that the affected land-
owner would be able to organize effective opposition to the govern-
ment's action.
As the Court defines them, "reasonable" expectations are not, how-
ever, a realistic reflection of the affected property owner's actual ex-
pectations, nor of the typical expectations an ordinary property holder
would likely have under similar circumstances. 26 Instead, the Court
has defined "reasonable" expectations according to its own beliefs
concerning what the property owner's expectations should have
been.265 Given the arguments one can hear, and that the Court has
263. Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 42 (1960) (acquisition by govern-
ment of ships made attached materialmen's liens worthless; the Court found a taking
to protect workers' actual expectations with respect to the liens). Compare
Michelman, supra note 9, at 1215-17 (use demoralization costs "ordinarily cognizant
and sensitive members of society" would experience to determine whether efficiency
requires compensation) with id. at 1223 (use demoralization costs "disappointed
claimant" would experience to determine whether fairness requires compensation).
264. For example, the Court treated the transferable development rights ("TDRs")
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City as fufilling Penn Central's ex-
pectations concerning its air rights. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 136-37 (1978). Yet, those TDRs remain unused, and unusable, today, more than
twenty-five years after the City first acted to deprive Penn Central of the right to
develop the air space over the Terminal. See 383 Madison Assocs. v. City of New
York, 598 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (upholding City's refusal to approve a
proposed transfer of Penn Central's development rights to a proposed structure at 383
Madison Avenue), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1830 (1994); see also David W. Dunlap,
Grand Central Owner Seeks Broader Use of Air Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at J1
(tracing history of Penn Central's battle with the City over the TDRs).
265. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1023 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Compare Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2292 (1993) ("Concrete Pipe's
reliance on ERISA's original limitation of contingent liability to 30% of net worth is
misplaced, there being no reasonable basis to expect that the legislative ceiling would
never be lifted.") (footnotes omitted) with id at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I
agree that a withdrawing employer can be held responsible for its statutory 'share' of
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accepted, concerning which actual, even typical, expectations are
nonetheless not "reasonable," '266 one cannot help but conclude that
"reasonable" expectations as the Court defines them are a painfully
unrealistic reflection of ordinary expectations and values.267
To date, the Court has tended to equate expectations with legal
rights, and to determine "reasonable" expectations according to the
Court's sense of what the affected property owner's expectations
should have been, rather than what those expectations likely were. If
actual expectations differ from legal rights, and if the Court were to
examine the actual expectations of the affected property owner realis-
tically, such an examination might provide some guidance on whether
unfunded vested benefits if the employer should have anticipated the prospect of
withdrawal liability when it joined the plan.").
266. One of my colleagues, for example, has suggested that Lucas had no reason-
able expectation that he would be allowed to build on his land given how often the
lots had been flooded over the last sixty years. With hindsight, and a predisposition to
scapegoat Lucas as environmentally unsensitive, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2905 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing Lucas as
"a contractor, manager, and part owner" of the development in an attempt to distin-
guish Lucas from the average lot purchaser), the State's imposition of the develop-
ment ban might seem inevitable. However, saying that Lucas had no "reasonable"
expectation that the State would allow him to build on his lots is painfully unrealistic
as a statement of Lucas's actual expectations at the time he purchased the lot, or even
as a statement of the average person's likely expectations had she been in Lucas's
situation. Not only was development of the lots legal in 1986, when Lucas purchased
the lots, id. at 2889, but homes had already been built on the neighboring lots. Id.
Lucas obtained bank financing when he purchased the lots, using the lots as collateral.
Such bank financing would necessarily require an appraisal of the lots, and the bank's
conclusion that the lots would provide adequate collateral for the mortgage would
tend to convince Lucas that his expectations were not unreasonable. Lucas, however,
went further and specifically consulted with a firm that specialized in coastal erosion,
and obtained the firm's assurance that the lots were appropriate for his planned de-
velopment. Finally, Lucas paid, or agreed to pay, nearly a million dollars for the two
lots. To suggest that he would commit himself to pay such a price, without an expec-
tation that he could use the land in a manner that would justify that price, would be
absurd.
267. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1008-09 ("In an industry that
long has been the focus of great public concern and significant governmental regula-
tion, the possibility was substantial that the Federal Government, which had thus far
taken no position on disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data concerning
pesticides, upon focusing on the issue, would find disclosure to be in the public inter-
est."); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496-
502 (1987) (no reasonable expectation that companies would be allowed to mine sup-
port coal when right to mine such coal interfered with promoting common good);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1980) (no reasonable expectation that
individual would be allowed to retain right to develop land when that right became
inconsistent with public's need for open-space); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67
(1979) (no reasonable expectation that individual would be allowed to retain right to
sell physical property when right to sell became inconsistent with public's need to
preserve bird species); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-33
(1978) (no reasonable expectation that corporation would be allowed to develop air
space over Terminal when such development was inconsistent with historic architec-
ture of Terminal).
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the Court should require compensation.268 But the Court has failed to
consider what expectations a landowner might hold independent of
the law, and has limited "reasonable" expectations to those expecta-
tions a majority of the Court happen to share.269 As a result, the "ex-
pectancy" rationale for the harm-benefit line has become: No
"reasonable" person would expect government to compensate when it
prohibits a harmful, though previously lawful, land use.27° Such a ra-
tionale cannot, however, justify application of the harm-benefit line.
By substituting the Court's determination of what the property
owner's expectations should have been, for an examination of what
those expectations likely were, the statement becomes a legal conclu-
sion, and, as such, cannot justify itself.
4. The Unduly Burdensome Expense of "Regulat[ing]
by Purchase"'27
1
As a fourth substantive justification for the harm-benefit line,
courts have at times suggested that government could not effectively
protect the public interest in prohibiting a harmful use of land if it had
to provide compensation.272 As Justice McKenna explained when the
Court refused to require compensation for the deprivation Hadacheck
experienced when the government closed his brickyard:
To [require compensation for the closing of the brickyard] would
preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive condi-
tions. There must be progress, and if in its march private interests
are in the way they must yield to the good of the community.27 3
268. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 19, at 151-56. However, if a former property
owner goes to the expense of discussing her deprivation with an attorney and bringing
suit against the government challenging its actions, an examination of actual expecta-
tions would undoubtedly reveal her sense of deprivation.
269. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1022-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
270. See also Ackerman, supra note 19, at 151 (no compensation required if gov-
ernment acts to prevent landowner from "using [her land] in ways a well-socialized
person should recognize as unduly harmful").
271. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
272. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also John J. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation
and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Contro-
versies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1032 (1975); Sax, supra note 15, at 160 ("The pre-
vailing view of compensation law has a considerable practical effect on resource
allocation, since the prospect of having to pay compensation is a constraint on govern-
ment regulation of private property."); cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992) ("And the functional basis for permitting the government,
by regulation, to affect property values without compensation-that 'Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the general law'-does not apply to the
relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all eco-
nomically beneficial use.") (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922)).
273. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
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If we unpack this statement, we find that it rests on three underlying
assertions: (1) prohibiting harmful land use is desirable; (2) if the
Court required just compensation for such prohibitions, the govern-
ment could not afford to pay the compensation; and (3) enforcing the
compensation requirement in these circumstances would prevent gov-
ernment from prohibiting the undesirable land use because it could
not afford to pay compensation. As a result, a requirement of com-
pensation when government acts to prohibit harmful land use would
limit government's ability to promote the public welfare.
Yet, taken at face value, such reasoning would again prove too
much. If the rationale is simply protecting government's purse so that
government can improve our lives, such a rationale would seem to
apply equally well to cases of "benefit extraction." Government ac-
tion that provides new freeways, a convenient mail service, or an ade-
quate national defense is also desirable. In many cases, society may
gain far more from such government action than it would from gov-
ernment action to prohibit "harmful" uses of land. Moreover, requir-
ing compensation even in such classic cases of "benefit extraction"
may strain government's purse as much, or more, as would a require-
ment of compensation in cases of "harm prevention., 274 Because gov-
ernment could not afford to provide compensation in every instance
of benefit extraction, enforcing the compensation requirement in
cases of benefit extraction would limit government's ability to under-
take desirable action. Thus, enforcing the compensation requirement
in cases of benefit extraction would also limit government's ability to
improve our lives. As a practical matter, the potential for con-
straining desirable governmental action appears equally serious,
whether government intends the action in question to prevent harm or
extract a benefit. As a result, a need to protect the public purse can-
not justify the harm-benefit line.
In addition, in a representative legislature dominated by interest
group, as opposed to majoritarian, politics, 27 the fear that expanding
the scope of the compensation requirement will block desirable gov-
ernmental action is misplaced. 276 As I have explained in more detail
elsewhere,277 the compensation requirement, if properly interpreted
and consistently applied, can act as a promise to property owners that
government will provide compensation if it decides that it must re-
274. For example, federal highway construction costs rose from 0.0781% of federal
spending in 1954 to 3.74% of federal spending in 1965 without bankrupting the fed-
eral government. See Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1965 421 (1966); Statis-
tical Abstract of the United States: 1954 401 (1955).
275. For an explanation of the differences between majoritarian and interest group
politics, see Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 404-10 (1977). See also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensa-
tion for Takings: How Much is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 721, 750-56 (1993).
276. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1956-59.
277. See id. at 1954-63.
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strict their property rights to advance the public welfare. Such a
promise will, as long as the monetary award of compensation provides
a "full and just" equivalent for the property taken, 78 substantially pla-
cate the property owners and eliminate their opposition to the govern-
ment action. Taxpayers who will bear the additional cost may oppose
the government action, but as a dispersed group, their opposition will
usually be far less effective than that of a more concentrated group of
property owners.279 If we consistently enforce the Compensation
Clause to shift the cost of government action from concentrated
groups of property owners to a dispersed group-taxpayers-we will
generally replace the more effective opposition of a concentrated
group with the less effective opposition of a dispersed group. By re-
ducing the effective opposition to the government action, providing
compensation to such concentrated groups of property owners can
ease the process of enacting desirable government restrictions on
property rights.28°
Admittedly, such a broadening of the compensation requirement
might surprise some state and local governments281 and force them to
scramble to adjust their policies to satisfy a broader compensation re-
quirement. Over the short run, a broader compensation requirement
may, therefore, occasionally prevent government from regulating a
land use it could otherwise have addressed. If government has al-
ready committed its resources to other, more important, programs,
and is, therefore, unable to free up resources to provide the necessary
compensation, requiring compensation would leave government un-
able to act. But this inability to act should fade as government adjusts,
either by raising taxes or reorganizing its spending priorities, to meet
the dictates of a broader compensation requirement. Once govern-
ment adjusts to the broader compensation requirement, government
must still face choices as to how best to spend its scarce resources.
Yet, there is little reason to believe that over the long run, (and pre-
sumably constitutional provisions are intended to address the long
run), a properly-defined broadening of the compensation requirement
would limit government's ability to advance the common good. In-
278. See Lunney, supra note 275, at 757-61.
279. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1954-55.
280. See id. at 1959 ("This analysis suggests that a compensation requirement that
focused on whether the government had taken the property of the very few to benefit
the very many would not significantly impede desirable government action. Rather,
this test would block government action that was either the result of fiscal illusion,
inefficient absent compensation because the measure's high enactment costs would
have exceeded any net benefit it created, or blocked by the concentrated group in any
event.").
281. The increasing willingness of the Court to protect private property against gov-
ernment regulation over the past ten years should have served as a warning to govern-
ments concerning their freedom to restrict property rights without compensation. But
I have seen few signs that governments have begun saving money in order to provide
the compensation the Court seems increasingly willing to require.
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deed, by placating the more effective opposition of a concentrated
group, a broader compensation requirement may enable government
to place more restrictions on private property rights in the event that
such restrictions are actually desirable.282
Thus, the fear of bankrupting government through an overbroad
reading of the compensation requirement, even if accepted at face
value, does not justify separating compensable government action
from noncompensable government action using the harm-benefit line.
If the compensation requirement interferes with attaining the com-
mon good, the Compensation Clause should be interpreted as preca-
tory in every instance, and leave the decision whether to compensate
completely in the legislature's hands. However, there is little reason
to believe that, properly interpreted, the compensation requirement
does283 or would interfere with government's attempts to advance the
public welfare. As a result, a need to protect the government's purse
cannot justify the harm-benefit line.
D. Conclusion: Factual Causation as Justification
This analysis suggests that of all the rationales courts have offered
in support of the harm-benefit line, factual causation provides the
most plausible justification for the line. The principle that one who
causes a problem should bear the responsibility of remedying that
problem seems difficult to dispute,28 and suggests that the harm-ben-
efit line provides an appropriate means of separating compensable
government action from noncompensable action.28 5 The following
282. I am distinguishing "actually desirable" government action from the "appar-
ently desirable" government action associated with fiscal illusion in a majoritarian
representative process. See Lunney, supra note 275, at 751-53.
283. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1956 ("After all, no one argues that we would
have more roads or post offices if government could simply appropriate individuals'
property for these purposes. Similarly, our roads would not likely be in better condi-
tion, nor our national defense more secure, if the government simply compelled the
individuals in those industries to provide their services without compensation. On the
contrary, more goods and services rather than fewer will almost certainly be forth-
coming if government pays for what it desires.").
284. Cf. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1201 ("This is, then, a limited indictment of
the harm-prevention/benefit-extraction test. We are not denying its strong intuitive
appeal, not even that it contains an important core of truth. At this point we assert
only that-no doubt because it is so captivating intuitively-the test invites improper
application.").
285. If one accepts a factual causation principle of responsibility as justification for
the harm-benefit line, then two central questions arise. First, what type of interfer-
ence with the public welfare constitutes cognizable harm that would justify uncom-
pensated government action? Second, are there any limits to the reach of the
causation principle? These are the questions the Court has attempted to answer in
continuing to apply the harm-benefit line. See text accompanying notes 140-80 supra.
These are also the questions commentators who expressly or implicitly adopt a correc-
tive justice notion of the Just Compensation Clause attempt to answer. See Robert C.
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 729 (1973) (separating harm-prevention from bene-
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section examines factual causation, and its associated principle of re-
sponsibility, more closely in an attempt to determine whether they can
justify applying the harm-benefit line to resolve the takings issue.
III. CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
As discussed, the harm-benefit line appears to rest on the principle
that if the harm would not have occurred but for the existence or exer-
cise of a particular individual's property rights, government may, with-
out providing compensation, limit or eliminate those property rights.
Such actions would merely force the individual to bear responsibility
for the harm that he or she would otherwise have caused. Yet, such a
principle of responsibility cannot justify separating compensable gov-
ernment action from noncompensable government action under the
harm-benefit line because it incorporates a flawed conception of cau-
sation. It suggests that we can identify the party whom we should
consider "responsible" for the harm by identifying who caused the
harm. But, as Professor Coase recognized in his seminal article, The
Problem of Social Cost,2 86 a but-for factual analysis alone will invaria-
bly identify more than one cause for any particular undesirable result.
For example, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway v. People of
the State of Illinois ex rel. Drainage Commissioners,287 the state sought
to force the railroad to bear responsibility for widening a river channel
over which the railroad had built a bridge. In resolving the takings
issue, the majority allowed the state to force the railroad to remove
the timbers and stones the railroad had placed in the river channel as
part of the construction of its original bridge.28 Because the railroad
had placed these obstructions into the river channel, the majority
viewed the railroad as causing the problem. As a result, the Court
held that the state could properly force the railroad to bear the ex-
pense of removing these obstructions. Justice Holmes, writing for
himself and two other Justices, disagreed on this issue, however. 289
While Justice Holmes agreed that the Court should use factual causa-
tion to determine who should bear responsibility for removing the
bridging materials, Justice Holmes believed that the need to improve
the river's drainage, not the need for rail travel, factually caused the
need to widen or deepen the river channel. 290 Because the need for
fit-extraction by examining "normalcy" of land-use government is seeking to control);
Kmiec, supra note 11, at 1638-40 (examining whether prohibited land-use was, or
would be, a nuisance at common law to determine whether government is preventing
harm); Sax, supra note 15, at 161-72 (examining whether the effects of the prohibited
land-use spilled-over onto neighboring land to determine whether government is
preventing harm).
286. Coase, supra note 25.
287. 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
288. Id at 594.
289. Id at 595 (Holmes, White, McKenna, JJ., concurring).
290. Id
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drainage caused the need to remove the bridging materials, he
thought that the Court should hold the public, not the railroad, re-
sponsible for the cost of removing those materials.2 9'
This dispute between the majority and the concurrence underscores
the difficulty of relying on factual cause alone to assign responsibility.
Neither the railroad's activities, nor the drainage needs of the state,
alone caused the need to remove the materials the railroad had placed
in the river channel. If there had not been a need for rail travel, the
railroad would never have placed the original bridge and its support-
ing materials in the channel, and so there would be no need to remove
them. In addition, because the original bridge and supporting materi-
als did not interfere with the natural flow of the river,292 if there had
not been a need to improve drainage, the materials could have re-
mained where they were without causing any problem. Thus, the
need for rail travel and the need for improved drainage, in combina-
tion, created the need to remove those materials.
Moreover, joint cause exists even in those cases in which the causal
connection between the landowner's actions and the harm seems most
clear. For example, if we apply a factual causation principle of re-
sponsibility to a case in which an individual named Lucas developed
his beachfront lots, Lucas' construction on his land seems to be the
cause of his land's development. If such development would be harm-
ful to a recognized societal interest, his construction would cause the
feared harm. As a result, a factual causation principle of responsibil-
ity would suggest that Lucas should be responsible for the conse-
quences of his actions-he caused the problem and should therefore
be responsible for redressing it. Moreover, if an after-the-fact remedy
would not adequately protect the societal interest at issue, we might
have to prohibit Lucas from developing his land altogether to prevent
the harm his actions would otherwise inflict. Under a factual causa-
tion principle of responsibility, such a development ban would never-
theless be justified given that Lucas' actions, if not prohibited, would
have caused the feared harm. Lucas should be responsible for
preventing the harm because his actions would have caused it.
Yet, despite appearances, Lucas' actions are not the sole factual
cause of his land's development. While viewing the harm as being
caused by the combination of Lucas' actions and society's desire that
the land remain undeveloped seems somewhat unsatisfactory,293 a
291. As Justice Holmes explained, the public should pay to widen and deepen the
channel, whether that required the removal of "the original earth or some other sub-
stance lawfully put in the place of the original earth." Id.
292. Id. at 594.
293. In his example, Professor Coase identified the combination of cattle and corn
in close proximity as the cause of the cattle's destruction of the crops. Coase, supra
note 25, at 2-6. A similar analysis would apply in many takings cases. Thus, it was the
combination of the apple trees in close proximity to the host cedar trees in Miller that
caused the undesirable result. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-78 (1928). And it
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brief examination will reveal any number of actors who played a
causal role in the land's development, including Justice Stevens. Put-
ting to one side his role as a dissenting Justice in the Lucas case, what
role did Justice Stevens play in causing the land's development? Sim-
ply this-Justice Stevens could have, but did not, purchase the land
before Lucas. If Justice Stevens had, in fact, purchased the land, he
could have set it aside voluntarily to preserve it in an undeveloped
state. In other words, but for Justice Stevens' failure to purchase the
land preemptively, the land would not have been developed. From
this, it appears that the action of Lucas and the inaction of Stevens
together caused the feared harm. If one tries to determine who
should bear responsibility for preventing the land's development by
determining who, as a factual matter, caused the land's development,
one cannot.
,Once one recognizes the situation as one of joint causation, one
must turn to some principle other than factual causation to assign re-
sponsibility for the undesirable result.294 One possibility would be to
assign responsibility by determining who could prevent the undesir-
able result at a lower cost.295 If one were to assign the responsibility
to the lower-cost preventer, one would, in a world without transaction
costs, probably assign responsibility for preserving the land in an un-
developed state to Justice Stevens, rather than Lucas. On average,
such an assignment would preserve the land in an undeveloped state
at a lower cost than would an assignment of responsibility to Lucas. If
one ignores for the moment the constitutional issue of compensation,
was the combination of the railroad bridge and the need for drainage that caused the
undesirable result in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex reL Drainage Comm'rs, 200
U.S. 561, 594-95 (1906). If we retain this perspective on how joint causation arises, we
would view the undesirable result in Lucas as a combination of Lucas's development
and society's desire that the land remain undeveloped.
294. See Coase, supra note 25, at 30-39. Alternatively, we can turn to a different
definition of causation. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) [hereinafter Epstein, Strict Liability]; see also H.L.A. HART
& A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 79-102 (1959). I will develop this point
further in a later section of the article. See infra text accompanying notes 319-35.
295. See Calabresi, supra note 34, at 26-31, 134-37; see also Frank I. Michelman,
Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J.
647, 667-74 (1971) (book review). Professor Calabresi has also suggested that society
place liability on the party who could most easily arrange to transfer liability if the
initial liability assignment is inefficient. See Calabresi, supra note 34, at 150-52. If we
applied such an approach, government would seem generally to be the "best briber."
It is a unitary actor, and so would not face significant collective action costs. More-
over, the availability of a forced sale through the power of eminent domain should
enable the government to shift the responsibility to another without undue risk of
hold-outs. Cf Michelman, supra, at 669-72 (suggesting that polluting factories would
be better bribers than average homeowner suffering effects of pollution from the fac-
tories under a regime where homeowner's rights are protected by a liability rule so
long as there are relatively few factories involved; if there are few factories involved,
the factories will face lower transaction and collective action costs in trying to shift the
responsibility than would a larger number of homeowners).
[Vol. VI
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the costs of ensuring that the land remains undeveloped in a world
without transaction costs would include: (i) the development value of
the land itself, which is lost when development is prohibited; (ii) the
cost of initially imposing a development ban; and (iii) the cost of re-
taining the development ban once it has been imposed.
If one assumes296 that the first cost is the same for either Lucas or
Justice Stevens, as reflected by the ability of either to acquire the land
for a given market price, one can determine which alternative pre-
vents development at a lower cost by comparing the relative costs of
imposing and retaining a development ban. Because he supports the
development ban,297 Justice Stevens might impose it on himself, or
alternatively, might not oppose, or oppose less vociferously than Lu-
cas, a government-imposed development ban. Therefore, imposing
the ban would be less expensive had Justice Stevens acted, than it
would be if government sought to impose the ban on Lucas. More-
over, because he wants the land to remain undeveloped, Justice Ste-
vens will not constantly petition the legislature to grant exceptions to
the development ban, as Lucas is likely to do.298 This suggests that
retaining the ban would likely prove less expensive if Justice Stevens
had acted than it would be if we tried to prohibit development by
Lucas. Since the costs of imposing and retaining the development ban
would be lower had Justice Stevens acted to purchase the land, a pre-
emptive purchase by Justice Stevens would preserve the land in an
296. In the compensation context, this assumption rests on the accuracy with which
a trier of fact can measure, after-the-fact, the loss suffered by a particular property
owner. If no compensation is awarded, or if the trier of fact awards compensation in
an amount equal to or less than the actual loss experienced by the landowner, then
society, as a whole, will "expend" the actual loss in value to achieve the desired rights
change. Either the landowner will bear that loss, if no compensation is provided, or
government will bear that loss if compensation is provided and the trier of fact deter-
mines the amount of the loss correctly. If the trier of fact underestimates the loss,
then government and the landowner will share the loss. However, if compensation is
awarded, and the trier of fact overestimates the landowner's loss, then society as a
whole will "expend" resources equal to the amount of the loss, and will transfer addi-
tional resources from government to the affected landowner. While this transfer is
not, in economic terms, an expense, systematic overcompensation may attract pri-
vately-owned resources that could have been more productively invested elsewhere. I
do not believe such systematic overcompensation is likely, however, either under the
Court's interpretation of the Just Compensation Clause, or under the interpretation I
have proposed. See Lunney, supra note 275, 757-61, 767-68.
297. Or at least Justice Stevens seemed to find the need to preserve the land in an
undeveloped state persuasive when Lucas was the one paying for it. See Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2925 (1992) (noting Act's "compel-
ling purpose").
298. See Lisa A. St. Amand, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands: Opportunities for
Peaceful Migration, in 1992 ZONING & PLAN. L. HANDBOOK 513, 528-32 (Kenneth H.
Young ed.) (political pressures from those in South Carolina directly affected by de-
velopment ban led legislature to grant exceptions to ban); see also David W. Dunlap,
Grand Central Owner Seeks Broader Use of Air Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at JI(reciting efforts by Penn Central to exercise its air-rights associated with the Grand
Central Terminal).
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undeveloped state at a lower cost than would an uncompensated re-
striction of Lucas's development rights. If one assigns responsibility
to the lower-cost avoider, Justice Stevens, not Lucas, should be the
one responsible for ensuring that the land remains undeveloped.
One response to this analysis of the responsibility issue is that there
are transaction costs in the real world, and it is patently unrealistic to
expect Justice Stevens, or any one individual no matter how sympa-
thetic to the government purpose, to identify every situation in which
a threatened harm requires a preemptive purchase of property
rights.2 99 Moreover, free-rider problems may prevent Justice Stevens
and other individuals who are interested in preserving undeveloped
beachfront land from acting effectively.3 °0 Yet, if one substitutes the
relevant government authority for Justice Stevens as the preemptive
purchaser, then both the concern for the transaction cost of identifica-
tion and the free-rider issue should disappear. After all, government
must have some sense of which property rights need to be limited to
protect historic structures, ensure the survival of endangered species,
or otherwise improve our lives before it can act legislatively or admin-
istratively to achieve such goals. Since the government would neces-
sarily know which property rights it was going to limit, it would
already have incurred the identification transaction costs that make it
so very difficult for individuals to act preemptively to prevent harm.
Moreover, because it can fund the purchase through uniform taxation,
government need not worry that free-riders will limit its ability to
raise the necessary funds.
If applying the least-cost, or here the lower-cost, avoider rule to the
government makes sense,301 one should attempt to determine whether
299. Cf. Wittman, supra note 251, at 62-65 (suggesting that negative commands are
less expensive administratively than affirmative commands); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Eco-
nomic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 120 (1978) ("But imposition
of liability ... has one attractive feature in comparison to compensation: no transfer
payment need be calculated or made in most cases because the threat of liability
should suffice to induce the cost-justified level of expenditures on rescue.").
300. See Calabresi, supra note 34, at 254 (suggesting that a polluting factory could
more easily arrange transfer of "pollution rights" if such rights were misassigned ini-
tially than could a homeowner; as a result, factory should bear responsibility for
pollution).
301. A colleague has suggested that there may be some reason to question whether
Professor Coase's rule developed in the context of a private party versus private party
dispute should apply to a private party versus government dispute. Some may argue
that government will always act appropriately, and so assigning liability to the govern-
ment is unnecessary, or at least raises materially different issues, than assigning liabil-
ity to a private party. I cannot accept either suggestion, as the Bill of Rights suggests
that government, as much as any private individual, needs constraints. See also Lun-
ney, supra note 4, at 1937-45 (need to regulate legislatures justifies constitutional right
to compensation). Some may argue that by compensating a disaffected property
owner, we have placed the decision on how to spend those resources in the hands of
the property owner, rather than in the hands of government, or perhaps ourselves
(through lower taxes). Building upon this transfer of control, some may argue that
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the government or the private landowner is the lower cost avoider of a
particular undesirable result. In essence, courts must determine
whether one can impose and maintain the desired property rights
change less expensively through an uncompensated regulation or
through a compensated taking. As a resolution to this question, I
would propose a "pure" theory of singling out.3"2 Under this theory, a
court should first ask whether government has changed or restricted
privately-held "property."3 3 In other words, has a taking occurred?
the property owner will choose to spend the resources in less desirable ways than
society would have. I see no reason to believe that this is likely to be true as a general
matter, and most economists would reject the notion that a mere transfer of wealth
reduces social welfare. There is also a pure selfishness component to this argument:
government is more likely than the compensated property owner to spend the money
in a way that benefits me. But I do not understand how such a possibility would
justify a refusal to provide compensation.
302. By referring to my theory of singling out as "pure," I mean to reject those
versions of singling out that continue to rely on some aspect of the harm-benefit line
in determining whether an individual has been singled out. Compare Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923-24 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(judging whether landowner was singled out based upon number of landowners who
experienced similar deprivation) with Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (not singling out if landowner had
caused the problem the government is trying to prevent).
303. Defining "property" is a difficult task, and one I do not have the time to ad-
dress fully here. I would make, however, two brief points. First, the Court has some-
times provided compensation when government destroys the value of a right without
changing the formal nature of the right. Typically, the Court requires compensation
for such consequential injuries when government has acted in a way -that would
render a private party liable under private law, but sovereign immunity prevents such
private law liability from attaching to the government. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding government's acquisition of ships, which rendered
materialmen's liens unenforceable because of government's sovereign immunity, to
constitute a taking); Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that noise
from government's adjoining land-use, which rendered Causby's land unusable, but
where the government was not liable in private nuisance action because of sovereign
immunity, to constitute a taking); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546,
550 (1914) (holding smoke and soot from government-authorized railroad, which in-
terfered with Richards' use of his land, but where the railroad was not liable in private
nuisance action because of sovereign immunity, to constitute a taking); Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (holding the flooding of land by govern-
ment project to constitute a taking although the government was not liable under
trespass law because of sovereign immunity). As a general matter, I agree with these
decisions, and might expand the principle somewhat further than the Court has. See
Lunney, supra note 275, at 763-65.
Second, on the other side of the coin, when government simply enforces the preex-
isting distribution of legal rights by, for example, evicting a trespasser, no property
right has been taken. See supra note 222. As a result, even if such government action
focuses on a single person, it would not constitute singling out as I conceive that term.
In separating those cases where government merely enforces the preexisting legal
scheme, from those where government is changing the scheme, the Court should fol-
low a relatively narrow view of enforcement, perhaps even narrower than the one
articulated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2900-01 (1992). Cf. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 171
(1993) (suggesting a view of enforcement which includes any government action taken
to harmonize the formal law with the informal norms of society).
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If it has, then the court should ask whether the government has taken
a property right of significant value only to a very few people to bene-
fit the very many.3 °4 In other words, does the government action sin-
gle out the very few to bear a burden in a way that benefits the very
many? For reasons that I have explained elsewhere,30 5 if the answer
to these two questions is yes, then that suggests that society can effect
the desired rights change at the lowest cost through a compensated
exercise of the power of eminent domain. To ensure that government
effects the rights change using the lowest-cost method, courts should
consistently require compensation for such government action. If the
answer to either question is no, then that suggests that society can
effect the desired rights change at the lowest cost through an uncom-
pensated police power regulation. As a result, courts should not re-
quire compensation for such government action.
I have sought to justify such a resolution to the takings issue else-
where, and do not want to revisit that issue here.30 6 Instead, I would
like to examine a second reason why Justice Stevens should not be
held responsible for the land's development. Rather than dispute the
transaction costs and free-rider issue, a second response would seek to
justify holding Lucas, rather than Justice Stevens, responsible on the
grounds that Justice Stevens has not done anything wrong with respect
to the development of the beachfront land at issue.30 7 Indeed, he has
not done anything at all with respect to the land.
As a starting point, this second response resonates strongly with a
parallel notion in tort law: one is liable for acting negligently, but not,
304. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1965; Lunney, supra note 275, at 751-56.
305. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1955-63; Lunney, supra note 275, at 750-56.
306. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1946-63; see also Lunney, supra note 275, at 750-
56. In essence, the argument runs as follows. With a few, easily identified claimants,
the transaction costs of providing compensation are likely to be low. On the other
hand, the affected group will usually be sufficiently concentrated to organize substan-
tial opposition to the measure. Given this capacity to organize, these landowners will,
in the absence of compensation, mount a persuasive and effective campaign against
the proposed government action. In the absence of compensation, such concentrated
groups will regularly block the enactment of desirable measures, or water-down those
measures that are enacted. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER,
CLEAN AiRIDIRTY COAL 44-54 (1981). Moreover, even if the government succeeds
in enacting a particular property rights restriction over the opposition of the affected
property owners, the property owners are likely to be back every year arguing for
exemptions, exceptions, or outright repeal of the land use restriction. Sooner or later,
as the fickle passions of the electorate drift on to other issues, the constant badgering
by the disaffected property owners will lead the legislature to grant special exceptions
to the land-use restriction. Thus, to ensure the initial enactment of desirable meas-
ures, and to ensure that such measures are not watered-down, or later repealed,
courts should require compensation for those rights changes that are concentrated on
the very few.
307. Lucas, on the other hand, has acted in a way that some would consider
"blameworthy." See Michelman, supra note 9, at 1188 n.47. Because his conduct is
blameworthy, Lucas cannot claim an entitlement to corrective justice should govern-
ment halt his conduct. See Radin, supra note 222, at 251-52.
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absent special circumstances, for failing to act. Indeed, tort law's mis-
feasance-nonfeasance line seems to parallel generally the harm-bene-
fit line in takings law. Thus, before we reject the harm-benefit line as
reflecting a pre-Coasean notion of causation, tort law should be ex-
amined to assess why it retains the misfeasance-nonfeasance line, and
to determine if the reasons for retaining such a line in tort law suggest
any reason to retain the harm-benefit line in takings jurisprudence.
IV. TORT LAW'S MISFEASANCE-NONFEASANCE LINE
Professors often introduce students to tort law's misfeasance-non-
feasance line by examining two hypothetical cases built upon a drown-
ing swimmer.30 In the first hypothetical, a person tries to rescue the
drowning swimmer. However, as a result of the rescuer's negligence
during the course of the rescue, the drowning swimmer dies. Is the
negligent rescuer liable? The classic answer is yes, because the negli-
gent rescuer has acted, and moreover acted in a manner that negli-
gently caused the drowning swimmer injury. As a result, the negligent
rescuer is liable. In the second hypothetical case, there is a potential
rescuer on the beach who could easily rescue the drowning swimmer,
but that potential rescuer makes no attempt to rescue. As a result of
the potential rescuer's refusal to attempt a rescue, the swimmer dies.
Is the potential rescuer liable? The classic answer is no, because the
potential rescuer has not acted, and even if that failure to act was, in
some sense, negligent, the potential rescuer is not liable.
30 9
If tort law has a valid reason to treat the negligent rescue and the
negligent failure to rescue differently, that reason may also justify the
parallel principle of responsibility reflected in the harm-benefit line.
Both seem to rest "on the law's distinction between the infliction of
harm and the failure to prevent it."31 0
As a starting point, the standard justification for tort law's differing
treatment of the two rescue situations is that the negligent rescuer, by
beginning a rescue, has worsened the situation for the drowning swim-
mer.31' Perceiving that a rescue attempt has begun, "other would-be
308. See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 111-13 (1908);
see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 77-78 (1991); Bender, supra note 30, at
33-35; Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294, at 189-90; Heyman, supra note 30, at
678-69; Landes & Posner, supra note 299, at 83-84.
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 & cmt. c (1965) ("The rule stated in
this Section is applicable irrespective of the gravity of the danger to which the other is
subjected and the insignificance of the trouble, effort, or expense of giving him aid or
protection.").
310. Weinrib, supra note 30, at 247; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 56, at
373 ("Hence there arose very early a difference, still deeply rooted in the law of negli-
gence, between 'misfeasance' and 'nonfeasance'-that is to say, between active mis-
conduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction or a failure to take
steps to protect them from harm.").
311. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 56, at 378, 381; see also 3 HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 29, § 18.6, at 722.
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rescuers will rest on their oars in the expectation that effective aid is
being rendered."31 The negligent potential rescuer, on the other
hand, has, if not improved the drowning swimmer's circumstance, at
least made it no worse.31 3
Even on a factual level, however, this distinction is not fully con-
vincing. Unless a certain course of conduct is perceived as pre-
ordained, a bystander's decision not to rescue affirmatively worsens a
drowning swimmer's situation. Immediately before the bystander
made the decision not to rescue, there was at least some chance that
the bystander would decide to attempt the rescue. After the by-
stander decided to not rescue, that chance disappeared. 314 The deci-
sion to not rescue, on its own, eliminated a chance of rescue otherwise
present, and has thereby worsened the drowning swimmer's plight.
More generally, other commentators have attacked the distinction be-
tween "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance," or between "action" and
"inaction," as anachronistic" 5 and immoral.31 6
While a complete examination of the views held by the supporters
and detractors of the misfeasance-nonfeasance line is beyond the
scope of this Article, the following sections will explore two justifica-
tions for the misfeasance-nonfeasance line, each of which details a
method for separating misfeasance from nonfeasance. First, we will
312. Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D. Mass. 1951).
313. See Weinrib, supra note 30, at 253-55 (refusing to toss a drowning swimmer an
easily available rope "is a case of real nonfeasance because the risk of drowning ex-
isted independent of the defendant's presence or absence").
314. Some commentators avoid this difficulty by asking whether the absence of the
bystander from the scene would have worsened the drowning swimmer's situation.
See Weinrib, supra note 30, at 254. Yet, this approach avoids the difficulty only by
adopting a counter-factual view of the events. While Professors Landes and Posner
do not directly address the issue, their economic analysis of the duty to rescue sug-
gests that the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction turns on how a person's absence
will affect another's situation. If a person's absence will increase the likelihood that
the undesirable result will occur, then we should hesitate to impose liability that might
encourage that person to go elsewhere. Thus, in the drowning swimmer hypothetical,
liability may lead potential rescuers to go elsewhere. By encouraging potential rescu-
ers to go elsewhere, imposing liability on potential rescuers would reduce the chance
that the drowning swimmer will be found, and thereby increase the chance of the
swimmer drowning. See Landes & Posner, supra note 299, at 123. If, on the other
hand, a person's absence will increase the likelihood that a desirable result will occur,
then we need not worry as much about the substitution response imposing liability
would engender. Liability for negligent automobile driving may lead others to substi-
tute some other way to get to work, such as walking or riding a bus, and that may
mean fewer cars on the road. However, fewer cars on the road would presumably
mean fewer chances for accidents, and increase the likelihood that fewer accidents
will occur. Thus, a substitution response in this instance would help achieve the result
we desire.
315. See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, § 18.6, at 718-19, 725; KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 29, § 56, at 373.
316. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cnt. c (1965); 3 HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 29, § 18.6, at 718-19; KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 56, at 376 ("Such
decisions are revolting to any moral sense."); Bender, supra note 30, at 36.
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examine Professor Richard Epstein's argument that the understanding
of causation reflected in ordinary language can support the misfea-
sance-nonfeasance line, and can adequately separate misfeasance
from nonfeasance. 17 Second, I will offer three "jurisprudential" prin-
ciples as an alternate justification for the line. These jurisprudential
principles can also serve as a means to separate misfeasance from non-
feasance. Having identified two plausible justifications for the misfea-
sance-nonfeasance line,318 I will then consider whether these
justifications can support takings jurisprudence's harm-benefit line.
A. Professor Epstein and "Ordinary" Causation
In his 1972 article, A Theory of Strict Liability,319 Professor Richard
Epstein argued that proof of the proposition "A caused harm to B"
should establish prima facie tort liability.320 While Professor Epstein
317. See Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294; see also Richard A. Epstein, Cau-
sation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979);
Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Nuisance Law]; Richard A. Epstein,
Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975) [hereinafter Epstein, Intentional
Harms]; Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Lia-
bility, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974) [hereinafter Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent
Pleas].
318. Three other possible justifications for the action-inaction line warrant brief
mention. First, the line, to a large extent, is the result of the historical development of
common law torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c; Frances H.
Hohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts, in STUDIES IN THE
LAW OF TORTS 33 (1926). Second, Professor Weinrib has argued that a formal defini-
tion of corrective justice can justify the action-inaction line. See Ernest Weinrib, Res-
cue and Restitution, 1 S'VARA 59 (1990); Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort
Law, 34 McGILL L.J. 403, 411 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Pri-
vate Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1283, 1286-93, 1297-1301 (1989) [hereinafter Right
and Advantage]; Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 978 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Rea-
son, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472, 489 (1987). Third, Professors Landes and Posner have
used economics to suggest a justification for the action-inaction line. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 299, at 119-24. While all of these are an important part of tort
law's debate over the action-inaction line, I do not believe any of these can support
takings jurisprudence's harm-benefit line. The history of tort law is entitled, in my
view, to little weight in deciding how we should interpret a constitutional provision
concerning property rights today. Professor Weinrib's formal approach shares the
weakness associated with the pre-Nebbia Court's definition of harm. Both require a
pre-existing assignment of rights in order to determine when one right interferes with
another. As a result, Professor Weinrib's approach will fare poorly if applied to tak-
ings jurisprudence in a post-Nebbia world. I shall address this issue further in discuss-
ing some of the troubling aspects of Professor Epstein's arguments. See text
accompanying notes 372-95 infra. The economic model Professors Landes and Posner
derive to support the action-inaction line is ultimately too specific to the issue they
are addressing to permit direct application to the costs and benefits associated with
the harm-benefit line in takings jurisprudence. To the extent their economic modeling
has some utility in suggesting how we should resolve legal issues, I hope that my
economic modeling has adequately captured the concerns they would have raised.
319. Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294.
320. Id. at 166-68.
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articulated a number of defenses that would enable a defendant to
avoid, in certain circumstances, responsibility for harm that he or she
had caused,32' proof of causation would, "prima facie, fasten[ ] re-
sponsibility upon the defendant. 3 22 In adopting this position, Profes-
sor Epstein rejected Professor Coase's interpretation of causation. It
is not enough, Professor Epstein argued, that A's conduct was a neces-
sary condition for B's injury, or that but for A's conduct B would not
have been injured.323 To establish that "A caused B harm," B must
show that people, using ordinary language, would describe the interac-
tion between plaintiff and defendant as one of A causing harm to B.324
To illustrate the difference between "but-for" causation and "ordi-
nary" causation, Professor Epstein examined a case in which A had
struck B's person.325 In such a case, B's presence is a necessary condi-
tion of B's injury-but for B's presence, B's injury would not have
occurred. Yet, in ordinary usage, people, including lawyers, would de-
scribe the incident as one in which "A hit B," not as one in which "B
failed to avoid A's fist." Moreover, if we examine the ordinary de-
scription of the event, "A hit B," the grammatical structure of that
description differentiates A and B into subject and object, and links
them through the use of a transitive verb.326 By differentiating the
two parties into subject and object, the ordinary language phrasing
demonstrates that, despite B's but-for role in causing his injury, peo-
ple would identify A as the cause of B's injury.327 As a result, the law
should attribute responsibility for B's injury to A, unless A had some
adequate excuse.328
Having defined responsibility in terms of this "ordinary" notion of
causation, Professor Epstein applied his theory of strict liability to
suggest a means to separate misfeasance from nonfeasance.329 If A
failed to rescue the drowning swimmer B, people using ordinary lan-
guage would not describe the situation as one in which "A caused B
harm. ' 33 ° As a result, tort law should label A's conduct "passive inac-
tion" or a failure "to protect others from harm," and find no liabil-
321. See id. at 168 n.49; see also Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note
317.
322. Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294, at 169.
323. Id at 160 ("The usual test to determine whether or not the plaintiff's injury
was in fact caused by the negligence of the defendant is to ask whether, 'but for the
negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff would not have been injured.' But this com-
plex proposition is not in any sense the semantic equivalent of the assertion that the
defendant caused the injury to the plaintiff.").
324. Id. at 167-68.
325. Id at 167.
326. Id; see also Richard A. Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEoAL
StUD. 457, 459 (1979).
327. Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294, at 161-64.
328. Id. at 168-69; see also Epstein, Intentional Harms, supra note 317, at 409-23.
329. Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294, at 189-204.
330. Id. at 190-91 ("No matter how the facts are manipulated, it is not possible to
argue that [the potential rescuer] caused [the drowning swimmer] harm in any of the
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ity.331 On the other hand, if A failed to apply his car's brakes to avoid
an accident with B, "the constant and inveterate use of the English
language" would lead ordinary people to describe the event as "A
drove his car into B."33 2 As a result, tort law should label A's conduct
"harm causing," and consider it sufficient to establish A's prima facie
liability to B.
Thus, in Professor Epstein's view, we should separate harm-causing
conduct from conduct that fails to prevent harm to others by examin-
ing how people would describe the event using ordinary language.
Moreover, we should use that separation to assign prima facie tort
liability. If a person using ordinary language would describe a defend-
ant's conduct as causing harm to the plaintiff,333 then the defendant
should be prima facie liable for the plaintiff's injuries. If a person
using ordinary language would not describe a defendant's conduct as
harming the plaintiff,334 then the defendant should not be liable for
the plaintiff's injuries, even if the defendant could have prevented the
plaintiff's injuries with minimal effort and no risk to herself.335
B. Jurisprudential Justifications for the Misfeasance-
Nonfeasance Line
As an alternate rationale for tort law's misfeasance-nonfeasance
line, I would like to suggest three "jurisprudential ' 336 principles that
can distinguish misfeasance from nonfeasance. These jurisprudential
principles are:
(1) the law should prefer a duty that can be enforced;
(2) the law should prefer a duty that can be consistently enforced
against those subject to it; and
(3) the law should prefer a duty that can be enforced correctly.
senses of causation which were developed in the earlier portions of this article when
he failed to render assistance to [the swimmer] in his time of need.").
331. Id.
332. Id. at 167-68.
333. Professor Epstein defined four instances that encompass the situations in
which people using ordinary language might describe an event as "A causes B harm":
(1) force; (2) fright and shock; (3) compulsion; and (4) dangerous conditions. Id. at
166-89.
334. Professor Epstein distinguished cases where the defendant both: (i) acted in a
way that harmed, or created a serious risk of harm to the plaintiff; and (ii) failed to act
to mitigate the harm caused, or to warn of the risks created. Defendant should be
liable for injuries caused by the failure to mitigate the harm already caused, or by the
failure to reduce the risks of harm defendant has created, because people using ordi-
nary language would describe defendant's initial conduct, in both instances, as harm-
ing plaintiff. Id. at 190-92.
335. Id. at 190.
336. While I have described these three justifications as "jurisprudential," they are
also substantive in the sense that they are costs that will vary as we consider assigning
responsibility to various persons for a particular result.
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Together these three jurisprudential principles establish whether the
law can, at reasonable expense, shift a loss from where it initially lies.
Attempting to impose a duty for which we cannot satisfy one or more
of these jurisprudential principles may entail undue costs. 337 First, if a
duty cannot be enforced, then imposing the duty will create a situation
in which some legal duties are enforced, while others are not. If peo-
ple do not have perfect information concerning which of its duties the
law will enforce, some people may mistakenly believe that a duty will
be enforced, and consequently place undue reliance on the correlative
right supposedly assured by the unenforced duty. Alternatively, some
people may mistakenly believe that a duty will not be enforced, act
contrary to the duty expressed, and force the law to the trouble and
expense of formal enforcement of the duty.338 Second, if a duty can-
not be enforced consistently, imposing the duty will lead to the judg-
ing of similarly situated individuals by differing standards.339 Such
inconsistent treatment will lead some individuals to unfavorable con-
clusions concerning fairness in the legal system, and may lead others
to reject law entirely as inevitably unfair. Third, if a duty cannot be
enforced correctly, imposing the duty will lead inevitably to injustice
in particular cases, and possibly a distrust for the law as a whole.
Taken collectively or individually, the costs associated with these juris-
prudential principles will be referred to as "jurisprudential" costs. Be-
cause they are a part of the costs of assigning responsibility to one
person rather than another for an undesirable result, they must be
considered, under an efficiency analysis, in determining to whom we
should assign responsibility. 34 °
As a general matter, satisfying each of these jurisprudential princi-
ples will prove more difficult if we attempt to shift liability to a party
who has failed to act than to a party who has acted.341 Assigning re-
sponsibility to someone who fails to act will, therefore, entail more
substantial jurisprudential costs than would assigning responsibility to
someone who acted. If we are trying to prevent or remedy a harm at
337. See Robert L. Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination and Non-Feasance, 46
COLUM. L. REV. 196,214 (1946) ("It would not always be easy to determine on whom
such duties [to rescue] should rest, or under what circumstances.").
338. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 299, at 120 (suggesting that liability rules are
efficient, in part, "because the threat of liability should suffice to induce the cost-
justified level of expenditures on [the imposed duty]").
339. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 337, at 214-15. The happenstance of a plaintiff's
successful identification of a particular potential rescuer does not seem a sufficient
basis to justify holding that individual to a different legal standard than other equally
capable, but unidentified, potential rescuers. Cf. Weinrib, supra note 30, at 254 (by
excavating hole, excavator distinguishes himself from all others and provides a suffi-
cient basis to treat him differently than others who may have prevented accident
caused by hole).
340. See Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 463, 465 (1980).
341. See id. at 475-85.
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the least cost, and the cost of preventing the undesirable result is
otherwise the same to either an acting party or one who failed to act,
the higher jurisprudential costs associated with assigning responsibility
to the party who failed to act suggest that we should assign responsi-
bility to the person who acted.342
For our purposes, these three jurisprudential principles can be uti-
lized to determine whether any given conduct deserves the label "mis-
feasance" or the label "nonfeasance" by turning them into three
corresponding questions. First, is the conduct at issue the sort of con-
duct that will enable us to identify a party who has engaged in the
conduct? Second, is it the sort of conduct that will enable us to iden-
tify every party who has engaged in the conduct? Third, is it the sort
of conduct that will enable us to evaluate accurately the conduct's
wrongful character and causal relationship to plaintiff's injuries
through an after-the-fact inquiry? If the answer to these three ques-
tions is yes, then we should be able to consistently and correctly en-
force a duty to "avoid" such conduct. As a result, we can label such
conduct "misfeasance" and impose liability if such conduct negligently
causes injury to another. On the other hand, if the answer to any one
of these three questions is no, we will not be able to enforce consist-
ently and correctly a duty to "avoid" such conduct. We should, there-
fore, hesitate to impose a duty with respect to such conduct to avoid
the heightened jurisprudential costs that imposing such a duty would
entail. If the jurisprudential costs are sufficiently high,343 we might
properly label such conduct "nonfeasance" or "a failure to prevent
harm," and refuse to impose any duty with respect to such conduct.
Using these three questions, we can, for instance, distinguish be-
tween cases in which A fails to attempt to rescue a drowning swim-
mer, and cases in which A begins a rescue attempt but negligently fails
to complete it. First, on the identification issue, the conduct at issue
will enable us to identify A more readily in the undertaken rescue
example than in the failure to rescue example. If B is drowning off a
crowded beach, it would be necessary to identify those who were ca-
pable of rescuing B, but failed to act, to enforce a duty to rescue. Yet,
in a crowd of people, it will not usually be apparent who was capable
of acting, but failed to do so. By remaining on the beach, A and other
potential rescuers, blend in with the crowd, making them difficult to
342. See Charles Fried, Right and Wrong-Preliminary Considerations, 5 J. LEGAL
STUD. 165, 181 (1976).
343. In a cost-benefit calculus, the jurisprudential costs become sufficiently high to
warrant a no duty result when the jurisprudential costs of shifting a loss experienced
by B to A, plus the costs of A preventing the undesirable result, exceed either the
costs to B of preventing the undesirable result or the loss.. See id. at 181-82; see also
Hale, supra note 337, at 215 ("Even were the requirement confined to making the
omission wrongful only when the act would cause less harm to the actor or to some-
one else than the omission causes to the plaintiff, it would be a requirement impracti-
cable to administer.").
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identify. On the other hand, it will usually be readily apparent who
began a rescue. 3" If A dives into the water and begins swimming
toward the drowning swimmer, that conduct will usually draw our at-
tention to A, making him or her more easily identifiable when it
comes time for the inevitable lawsuit. Thus, A's conduct ensures that
we will be able to identify A more readily in the undertaken rescue
example than in the failure to rescue example.345 As a result, as-
signing responsibility to A for the failed undertaken rescue will usu-
ally entail lower jurisprudential costs than assigning responsibility to
A for failing to rescue.
Second, on the consistency issue, the conduct at issue makes it more
likely that we will be able to identify A and all other persons similarly
situated with respect to B's injury in the undertaken rescue example
than in the failure to rescue example. Given that we can usually iden-
tify each and every person who leaves the beach to attempt a rescue,
the law can hold all such persons to the same standard of care. Each
person who undertook the rescue will be liable if her conduct falls
below the appropriate standard of care and caused B injury, or free
from liability if B cannot demonstrate these elements. Each person
who undertook the rescue would thus be treated consistently under
the law.346Extending a duty to rescue to anyone who is reasonably capable of
effecting the rescue would, however, create a risk of unequal treat-
ment among such potential rescuers.347 Because their conduct, re-
maining on the beach, does not draw our attention in any particular
way, it is unlikely that we will be able to identify everyone capable of
effecting the rescue who remained on the beach.348 As a result, some
capable rescuers, those whom the plaintiff had successfully identified,
would be held to one standard of care in determining their liability,
while others, those capable rescuers whom the plaintiff was unable to
identify, would be held to a different standard.349 Because we can
344. Of course, A may hit and run, and on occasion, escape without being identi-
fied. But, in designing a general legal rule, we ought to start with the typical case.
And as a typical case, we will usually be able to identify the A who crashed into B
more easily than the A who remained on the beach.
345. Cf Weinrib, supra note 30, at 254 (law can hold excavator of hole liable for
accident caused by failure to provide lighting that would have prevented the accident
because excavating the hole enables us to identify excavator).
346. See Fried, supra note 342, at 182.
347. Fried, supra note 342, at 181-82.
348. Because the conduct at issue will not usually bring these people to our atten-
tion, any given identified potential rescuer would have little more luck than the plain-
tiff at identifying other potential rescuers who remained on the beach. As a result,
such an identified rescuer, when made defendant, would be unable, as a practical
matter, to invoke the doctrine of contribution. But see Weinrib, supra note 30, at 262
(suggesting that device of contribution would prevent a particular defendant from
being singled out for her failure to rescue when many others failed to rescue as well).
349. See Fried, supra note 342, at 181-82; cf KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 56, at
376 ("Yet thus far the difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow
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more easily identify every A who undertook a rescue than we can
identify every capable A who remained on the beach, we can enforce
a duty in the undertaken rescue example more consistently than we
could enforce a duty to rescue. Consequently, assigning responsibility
to A, and people like A, in the undertaken rescue example will entail
lower jurisprudential costs than would assigning responsibility to A,
and people like A, in the failure to rescue example.
Third, on the correct enforcement issue, the conduct at issue makes
it more likely that we will be able to enforce a duty correctly in the
undertaken rescue example than in the failure to rescue example. °3 5
If we assume that the appropriate standard of care is negligence,35'
then correctly enforcing either duty requires that the trier of fact find
the defendant liable if, and only if, the defendant acted negligently
and thereby caused plaintiff injury. If the defendant did not act negli-
gently or if his or her actions did not cause plaintiff's injury, then the
defendant should be exonerated. Mistakes, or incorrect enforcement
of a duty, can arise either when the trier of fact exonerates a culpable
defendant, or when the trier of fact imposes liability on an innocent
defendant. While mistakes of either type are inevitable in any human
system of justice, there are likely to be more such mistakes in enforc-
ing a duty in the failure to rescue example than in the undertaken
rescue example.
To resolve the negligence or fault issue in the failure to rescue ex-
ample, the trier of fact would need to determine whether the defend-
ant was or should have been aware of plaintiff's need for rescue,35 2
whether the defendant was capable of undertaking the rescue success-
fully, and whether the defendant had some other justification for re-
maining on the beach.3"3 While these issues might be subject to proof
at trial, they are likely to be difficult to establish. For example, how
do you prove that someone was capable of effecting the rescue if he or
she chooses to deny any skill in life-saving-introduce a twenty-year-
old scouting badge for life-saving?
Moreover, the issue here is not really whether the evidentiary hur-
dles make it impossible for a trier of fact to resolve these issues in any
given case, but whether the evidentiary hurdles are likely to be signifi-
cantly higher in the failure to rescue example than in the undertaken
men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty people
might fail to rescue one.").
350. See Fried, supra note 342, at 180-82; David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in
Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 1336, 1341-44; Note, The Failure to Rescue:
A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631, 642 (1952).
351. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 56, at 377 ("Where the duty to rescue is
required, it is agreed that it calls for nothing more than reasonable care under the
circumstances.").
352. See id.
353. She might, for example, have needed to remain on the beach to watch her
children. See also Fried, supra note 342, at 181.
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rescue example. And this answer, I think, is clear. As a general mat-
ter, resolving the question of fault correctly will usually be much eas-
ier in the undertaken rescue example because the defendant, by
beginning the rescue, will have substantially answered many of the
most difficult questions of the fault determination. 4 Beginning the
rescue demonstrates defendant's awareness of plaintiff's need for res-
cue, and so the trier of fact would not need to speculate as to what the
defendant knew or should have known. In addition, beginning the
rescue establishes defendant's judgment both that he or she was capa-
ble of the rescue, and that he or she lacked a justification for remain-
ing on the beach. In contrast to the fault determination in the failure
to attempt a rescue context, the fault determination in the undertaken
rescue context is likely to focus on a specific action or omission by the
defendant. The plaintiff may argue, for example, that the defendant
failed to use the proper grip or technique when he or she reached the
plaintiff, or that the defendant failed to carry a readily-available life-
preserver. Whatever faith we may have in the jury system and the
adversary process, these more specific inquiries associated with a duty
to exercise reasonable care in an undertaken rescue are both more
susceptible to proof, and more likely to be resolved accurately by the
trier of fact, than the issues in the failure to rescue example. 355
The issue of causation will also usually present a less difficult, and
therefore less error-prone, inquiry in the undertaken rescue example.
Once the defendant has begun the rescue, the causal relation between
the defendant's negligence and the harm to the plaintiff will usually
require fewer inferential steps to establish than it would in the failure
to rescue context. If a defendant failed to exercise proper care, for
example, by using an improper grip on the drowning swimmer or by
failing to carry along a readily available life-preserver, the causal rela-
tionship between such negligent conduct and the harm to the plaintiff
will usually be readily apparent. Because the rescue attempt was
otherwise successful, the trier of fact would not need to speculate on
the defendant's ability to reach the plaintiff in a timely fashion, or on
the possibility that some unforeseen event might have prevented a
successful rescue. These factual uncertainties would have been re-
solved by the otherwise successful nature of the attempt.
The only question for the trier of fact would be defining the rela-
tively specific relationship between the improper grip, or the failure to
carry the life-preserver, and the plaintiff's injuries. Because there is
less potential for intervening events that might cloud the causal tie
between the specific negligent act and the harm to the plaintiff, the
trier of fact will seldom need to resort to speculation to resolve causa-
354. See id.
355. See id at 181; Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM.
L. REv. 631, 643-45 (1952) (recognizing the difference but downplaying it as a differ-
ence "only of degree").
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tion in cases in which an undertaken rescue has gone awry. Enforcing
a duty to rescue, on the other hand, would require the trier of fact to
determine whether any number of potentially intervening events
would have prevented a successful rescue. As the defendant will no
doubt testify, it is a long way from the beach to the plaintiff and back
again, and a lot could happen along the way. Again, this is not to
suggest that a trier of fact would be incapable, in every case, of decid-
ing whether a defendant who remained on the beach could have suc-
cessfully rescued the plaintiff. However, the causation issue, like the
fault issue, will present more difficulty, and hence more opportunity
for error, on average, in the failure to rescue example than in the un-
dertaken rescue example.
Thus, because fault and causation would, on average, present more
difficult inquiries in the duty to rescue example than they would in the
undertaken rescue example, triers of fact would likely make fewer
mistakes enforcing a duty in the undertaken rescue example than they
would in the failure to rescue example. As a result, enforcing a duty
to rescue will entail higher jurisprudential costs than would enforcing
a duty to exercise reasonable care in an undertaken rescue.
This analysis suggests that a duty to rescue would be more difficult
to (i) enforce (ii) consistently and (iii) correctly than would a duty to
exercise reasonable care in an undertaken rescue. Note that these
three "jurisprudential" concerns do not establish that enforcing a duty
to rescue would necessarily be improper. As a society, we may be
willing to tolerate a duty that is difficult to enforce, that holds simi-
larly situated people to different standards of liability, and that leads
to a higher than average number of mistaken liability findings, either
to encourage people to undertake rescues356 or as an expression of
our moral judgment on undertaking rescues.35 7 Whatever our ulti-
mate decision on the appropriateness of such a duty, however, these
three jurisprudential concerns do suggest that tort law may appropri-
ately treat liability for misfeasance differently than liability for non-
356. Properly speaking, the law cannot encourage desirable conduct; it can only
discourage undesirable conduct. Thus, I should have said "in order to discourage
people from not undertaking rescues."
357. See Bender, supra note 30, at 33-36 (suggesting that we adopt duty to rescue as
recognition of a "feminist ethic based upon notions of caring, responsibility, intercon-
nectedness, and cooperation"). As previously discussed, tort law cannot promote
"caring,". "responsibility," "interconnectedness," or "cooperation." It can only punish
for the lack of those things. While some may see the difference between promoting
good behavior and deterring bad behavior as a matter of semantics, I see a clear
moral distinction between the person who supports her children out of love and re-
spect for them, and the person who provides child-support payments to avoid legal
sanction. While either behavior may ensure that the children receive food, clothing,
and shelter, the underlying motive for the behaviors distinguishes them into altruism
and selfishness. Cf Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294, at 200-01 (defining two
systems of Western ethics, one depends on intention behind act, the other depends on
desirability of act without regard to motive).
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feasance.358 If we define "nonfeasance" to include those situations in
which the difficulties associated with (i) enforcing (ii) consistently and
(iii) correctly a given duty render the enforcement of that duty unde-
sirable, tort law may properly refuse to find liability on the basis of
such conduct, even if it were otherwise negligent.
C. A Brief Examination of the Exceptions to the Misfeasance-
Nonfeasance Line
We can confirm that these three jurisprudential considerations play
a substantial part in retaining the misfeasance-nonfeasance line by ex-
amining some of the exceptions to the failure to rescue doctrine that
commentators have proposed and courts have applied. For example,
Dean James Barr Ames proposed, in his classic lecture on Law and
Morals, his version of the drowning swimmer hypothetical.359 In his
version, Dean Ames was careful to address each of the three jurispru-
dential concerns I have identified. He assumed that we had somehow
identified the potential rescuer, so that the duty could be enforced.360
He limited the number of potential rescuers to one, and thereby ad-
dressed the risk of potentially unequal treatment. And he assumed
that the rescue could be undertaken at exceedingly small cost and with
an exceedingly high chance of success, and thereby ensured that we
could readily determine negligence and causation.36'
Yet, the real world is not as tidy as a law professor's hypothetical.
Even if Dean Ames's hypothetical of a lone potential rescuer facing
an easy rescue would define a situation in which we could enforce the
duty to rescue without risking unequal treatment or an undue chance
of mistaken liability findings, identifying the person who walked by
such an easy rescue may prove difficult. 362 A law professor can ignore
this difficulty by simply assuming that we know the person's identity,
but that option is not usually available in the real world. Moreover,
even if we could define, as Dean Ames attempted to, a situation in
which we could enforce a duty to rescue without implicating any of
the three jurisprudential concerns, once such a duty was recognized,
358. See Fried, supra note 342, at 181-82.
359. See Ames, supra note 308, at 111-13.
360. I have trouble understanding how we would be able to identify someone who
walked by and left the swimmer to drown. The swimmer, having drowned, would be
unable to identify her potential rescuer. And if there was only one person walking
by-a necessary assumption to avoid choosing who among many should have under-
taken the rescue attempt-that person is unlikely to identify herself in order to ex-
pose herself to society's moral condemnation and a tort suit.
361. See also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 293 (J. Bums & H. Hart eds., 1970) (suggesting that law
adopt duty to undertake easy rescue).
362. See supra note 360.
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we would face considerable costs keeping it confined to such precise
facts.363
As a result, courts have been reluctant to adopt a general duty to
rescue, and have enforced a duty to rescue only when some special
relationship of the parties has supplied a justification for imposing
such a duty.36 The special relationship between the parties generally
ensures that we can identify the specific individual who should have
acted, distinguish that individual's conduct from those around her, and
resolve the negligence and causation issues without an undue likeli-
hood of error.365 Thus, enforcing a duty to "rescue" in such cases does
not risk undue jurisprudential costs, and is consistent with a need to
consider such costs in assigning responsibility.
D. Do Either of These Justifications Support Takings
Jurisprudence's Harm-Benefit Line?
Both Professor Epstein's notion of ordinary causation and the three
jurisprudential principles provide a means to separate misfeasance
from nonfeasance, and might also therefore provide a means to sepa-
rate government action that prevents harm from government action
that extracts a benefit.366 The following sections discuss each of these
justifications to determine whether either one can support takings ju-
risprudence's harm-benefit line. I begin by examining whether the
three jurisprudential principles can provide a means to separate com-
pensable and noncompensable government action.
363. See Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294, at 199.
364. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965); 3 HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 29, § 18.6, at 722; KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 56, at 376.
365. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts has recognized such special
relationships: (1) between a common carrier and its passengers; (2) between an inn-
keeper and her guests; (3) between a possessor of land opened to the public and
invitees; (4) between a guardian and her ward, where the guardianship effectively
prevents the ward from protecting himself; and (5) between employer and employee.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 314B (1965). In each of these cases, the
relationship between the parties ensures that we will readily be able to identify the
particular party who bears the duty to "rescue," and distinguishes the party forced to
bear that duty from all other potential rescuers. Moreover, the Restatement limits
the duty to cases where "the risk of harm, or of further harm, arises in the course of
that relation." Id. § 314A cmt. c. By tying the risk of harm to the relationship, the
Restatement attempts to ensure that questions concerning the party's liability will not
require undue speculation.
366. Specifically, if we would consider the property holder's conduct to have caused
the undesirable result in ordinary language, or if the conduct is the type that would
enable us to (i) enforce (ii) consistently and (iii) correctly a duty against such conduct,
then we should consider the property holder's conduct to be misfeasance. As a result,
government action designed to prevent such conduct would "prevent a harm," and
not require compensation. On the other hand, if neither the ordinary causation test,
nor the three jurisprudential principles were satisfied with respect to the property
holder's conduct, then her conduct should be considered "nonfeasance." Govern-
ment action that would require a property holder to move from her position of non-
feasance would "extract a benefit," and would require compensation.
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1. Takings and the Three Jurisprudential Principles
If we apply the three jurisprudential principles to determine
whether we should assign responsibility to Justice Stevens or Lucas for
the development of Lucas's land, we can begin to articulate some of
the reasons we felt discomfort at holding Justice Stevens, rather than
Lucas, responsible for the land's development. First, Justice Stevens'
conduct-not preemptively purchasing the land-is not likely to draw
our attention in any particular way. As a result, if we attempted to
enforce a duty that required Justice Stevens to "preemptively
purchase" the land, his conduct with respect to the land would not
enable us to identify him readily. (Indeed, the only reason we could
identify Justice Stevens as a potential preventer is because of the
strong support he expressed for the government's actions in his
dissent.)
Second, even if we happened to identify Justice Stevens as a poten-
tial preventer, he is certainly not the only person who both shares a
desire to preserve undeveloped beachfront and enjoys a financial posi-
tion that would enable him to ensure that the land remained undevel-
oped. There are likely to be many such potential preventers.
However, their conduct, not purchasing the land, would make identi-
fying all of them extremely difficult, and would inevitably lead to
some unequal treatment among the potential preventers.
Third, enforcing a duty that required Justice Stevens to purchase
the land preemptively when he was a lower cost avoider of the harm
would be tricky to enforce. We found Justice Stevens to be the lower
cost avoider because of his expressed support for the government's
action. Because he supported the measure, we could be relatively cer-
tain that the demoralization and opposition costs associated with im-
posing an uncompensated duty on Justice Stevens to leave the land
undeveloped would be less than these costs would have been for a
duty imposed on Lucas. However, if we use such expressions of sup-
port as a basis for identifying who can prevent an undesirable result at
a lower cost, people will learn to conceal their preferences.367 Once
people learned to conceal their preferences, we would face considera-
ble difficulty in determining whether any given potential preventer 368
367. A person identified as a potential preventer would simply assert: "I'm not a
least cost avoider. I would have developed the land just like Lucas, so government
would have had to force me to leave the land undeveloped, over my kicking and
screaming objections. You should, therefore, pick someone else as your preventer."
Unless the potential preventer has otherwise clearly revealed her support for the gov-
ernment's action, as Justice Stevens has done with respect to preservation of beach-
front land, she should be able to conceal her preference, making it difficult to
recognize her as a potential preventer.
368. Cf. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1215 (arguing against the use of the subjective
expression of demoralization costs because, among other reasons, a property owner
"for strategic reasons, would not reveal the true answer even if he knew it.").
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supported the government's action in a way that would have made
him or her a lower cost preventer.
Thus, the three jurisprudential considerations that justify the mis-
feasance-nonfeasance line in tort law also suggest that we should hesi-
tate to impose a duty on Justice Stevens to prevent the land's
development, even if he were otherwise the least-cost preventer. Such
a duty would likely be impracticable to enforce consistently and cor-
rectly in the real world, and its imposition would, therefore, entail ex-
cessive jurisprudential costs.
Yet, the choice we face in takings jurisprudence is not between as-
signing liability to Lucas or Justice Stevens, but between assigning lia-
bility to Lucas or the government and taxpayers of South Carolina.
When we switch from a situation in which we are assigning responsi-
bility as between two private parties to a situation in which we are
assigning responsibility between a regulated property holder and the
regulating government, we ensure that the three jurisprudential con-
cerns will be satisfied however we assign liability. First, if we choose
to assign responsibility to the regulating government, the identifica-
tion issue should not present any difficulties. As with a party who
bears a 5pecial relationship to the person in need of rescue, the gov-
ernment's relationship to the property restriction enables us to iden-
tify it readily as someone to whom we could shift liability.
Second, on the consistent enforcement issue, the regulating govern-
ment, by imposing the land-use regulation, distinguishes itself from
every other party who wanted the land to remain undeveloped.369 We
can, therefore, treat its conduct differently than that of other potential
preventers and impose responsibility on the regulating government
without violating the consistent treatment principle.
Third, on the correct enforcement issue, assuming we can define the
scope of the government's compensation duty, there is little reason to
expect that courts would face any unusual difficulty in enforcing that
duty. For example, under present law, the government must provide
compensation when its actions result in physical invasion, a denial of
all reasonable economic use of the land, or acquire resources for a
uniquely governmental function. 371 While precise definition of some
aspects of this duty has so far eluded the Court,371 none of these is-
sues, once legally defined, presents unusually difficult factual issues.
As a result, there is little reason to suspect that a trier of fact would be
unlikely to resolve these factual issues correctly.
369. Cf. Weinrib, supra note 30, at 254 (the excavator of a hole distinguishes him-
self from others and justifies the law in treating him differently than others who might
have prevented an accident that hole caused).
370. See supra text accompanying note 183.
371. One of the key doctrinal difficulties is defining the property interest with re-
spect to which a court should measure diminution in value. See Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
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Because an assignment of liability to the regulating government
would satisfy all three jurisprudential concerns, these concerns should
not prevent us from assigning responsibility to the government should
such an assignment prove otherwise appropriate. Unlike an attempt
to enforce such a liability against a random bystander who could, in
theory, have prevented the harm at a lower cost, enforcing such liabil-
ity against the regulating government will not prove impracticable.
Once jurisprudential costs no longer play a substantial role in dictat-
ing to whom we assign liability, we should assign liability to the lower
cost preventer, whether that be the regulating government or the reg-
ulated property holder.
2. "Ordinary" Causation and Takings
Similar concerns suggest that we should not rely on "ordinary" cau-
sation to resolve the takings issue. When Professor Epstein argued for
prima facie tort liability based on a finding that "A caused B harm,"
he implicitly adopted causation, as that term is understood in ordinary
life, as reflecting an appropriate judgment as to who should bear re-
sponsibility for the undesirable result. In adopting such a standard,
Professor Epstein implicitly suggested that we should not take the lan-
guage people ordinarily use to describe particular events as simply an
incomplete factual assertion of who caused, in a but-for sense, an un-
desirable result. Instead, we should recognize that the ordinary de-
scription of an event contains an implicit value judgment as to which
of the many but-for causes is the one we should consider responsible
for the undesirable result.372
As a normative tool, ordinary causation seems most persuasive in
which A physically strikes B's person. To deter A from striking B,
and to compensate B for his injury, we assign liability to A.373 This
paradigm would seem to apply equally well to cases such as
Hadacheck v. Sebastian,374 in which one landowner is using his land in
a manner that "injures" a neighboring landowner. Because people us-
ing ordinary language would likely describe Hadacheck's operation of
his brickyard as ruining his neighbors' land for residential use, we
should hold Hadacheck responsible for the harm he is "causing" his
372. See Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 294, at 163, 164 ("[T]he major premise
of most legal systems (until perhaps the recent past) is that causation provides, as a
matter of policy, the reason to decide cases in one way rather than the other.... The
concept [of causation] is dominant in the law because it is dominant in the language
that people, including lawyers, use to describe conduct and to determine responsibil-
ity."). Cf John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 432-40
(1979) (we identify one necessary condition as the "cause" of a particular undesirable
result based upon underlying moral sense of responsibility).
373. Note that because the conduct of both A and B is of a type that will enable us
to identify A and B readily. Thus, the assignment of liability to either party will likely
impose jurisprudential costs of similar magnitude.
374. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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neighbors.375 Because his actions "caused," in ordinary language, the
harm at issue, government may act without providing compensation to
prohibit Hadacheck's conduct. 376
Yet, attempting to apply ordinary causation to resolve the takings
issue introduces three complications not present in the paradigmatic
case of A causing B personal injury. First, in the personal injury case,
the law prohibiting the intentional act of physically striking another
was in place before the defendant struck the plaintiff's person. Con-
sistent enforcement of that prohibition provides a clear statement that
can deter others from engaging in similarly unlawful behavior. In con-
trast, the takings issue arises only when the law changes in a way that
makes a previously lawful activity or land use unlawful. Because the
activity had previously been lawful,377 forcing uncompensated obedi-
ence to the new law may not desirably deter similar "improper" be-
havior in the future.
In terms of deterrence, unless one knows in advance which property
rights the government will change in the future, and can do nothing to
affect how and whether those changes occur,378 an individual cannot
conform his or her conduct to a law that is yet to be. An individual
will either be unaware of the need to avoid certain actions, or, if aware
that government is considering making a given activity unlawful, will
seek to convince government that it ought not prohibit his or her
"harmful" behavior. As a result, forcing uncompensated obedience to
one new law will not necessarily deter similar "improper" behavior in
the future. In any event, even if a property holder is aware of an
impending change in the law and can do nothing to prevent it, until
government acts, it is not clear that we would want to deter the previ-
ously lawful activity. For example, the federal government will even-
tually need to construct additional post offices, as shifts in population
density increase the demand for postal services in areas that are pres-
375. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 118-21.
376. Id. at 120-21.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 211-20.
378. Some argue that Just Compensation is simply a form of insurance, and like
other forms of insurance, may lead individuals to "overinvest" in certain property
rights on the assurance of recompense that the Just Compensation Clause provides.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 279, 285 (1992); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 272-74 (1988); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 529 (1986); Thompson, supra note 7, at 142. While
I disagree that moral hazard is a serious risk in any event, see Lunney, supra note 275,
at 768, these analyses implicitly treat government as some sort of immovable natural
force. This is wrong. Government is a political force, and unlike hurricanes and
earthquakes, lobbying and other influencing efforts can redirect government's course.
See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1955 ("The essential insight of the proposed interpreta-
tion is that what the legislature will decide in any particular situation is not set in
stone."); Robert D. Tollison, A Comment on Economic Analysis and Just Compensa-
tion, 12 Ir'r'L REV. L. & ECON. 139, 139-40 (1992).
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ently rural. Yet, no one has argued that we should allow a govern-
ment to acquire the land it needs for such post offices without
providing compensation to deter uses of the land, such as residential
housing, that will become "improper" when the government needs the
land for these new post offices.
Second, unlike the liability choice in the personal injury context, the
liability choice in the takings issue is not between two private parties,
but between the regulating government and the regulated landowner.
Because the Just Compensation Clause provides an additional party to
whom we may assign liability, our moral sense of culpability, forged in
the crucible of private party conflicts, may prove unreliable. If we
were to apply ordinary causation to resolve the question whether Lu-
cas or Justice Stevens should be responsible for preventing the land's
development, we could rely with reasonable comfort upon the out-
come it would suggest because of the private party nature of the con-
flict. Ordinary causation implicitly recognizes the serious practical
difficulties associated with attempting to assign responsibility to Jus-
tice Stevens and other potential preventers.379 In theory, even if Jus-
tice Stevens could prevent the land's development at a lower cost than
Lucas, the difficulties associated with forcing him to shoulder the re-
sponsibility would make this option impracticable. 380 As a result, peo-
ple using ordinary language would undoubtedly describe Lucas's
action, rather than Justice Stevens's inaction, as causing the land's de-
velopment. Our ordinary understanding of causation, therefore, sug-
gests that Lucas, not Justice Stevens, should bear responsibility for
preventing the land's development.
Yet, if we simply transfer those moral intuitions unexamined to the
takings realm, we will fail to require compensation in many instances
in which such compensation would prove desirable, in terms of both
fairness and efficiency. For example, if we retain our intuitive conclu-
sion that Lucas is the culpable party, then we are likely to assign re-
sponsibility for preventing the land's development to Lucas. Yet, the
demoralization and opposition costs attending an attempt to assign
liability to Lucas are likely to be substantial. When he learns that the
legislature of South Carolina is considering such a liability assignment,
Lucas is not likely to stand idly by while the legislature destroys his
million-dollar investment. Lucas and other similarly affected land-
owners are likely to organize and expend considerable resources op-
posing the proposed action.381 Even if a majority can rise up, as they
did in South Carolina in 1988, and force through a beachfront devel-
opment ban despite the opposition of the affected property owners,
379. See Weinrib, supra note 191, at 414 ("Causation is the element in this relation-
ship that functions to particularize the former as the victim of the latter's
wrongdoing.").
380. See also supra text accompanying notes 367-71.
381. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1948-55.
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such prohibitions are unlikely to remain politically enforceable over
time. Should the fickle passions of the majority shift to some other
issue, while the hostile feelings of the restricted landowners remain,
sooner or later we will reach a point where the waning interest of the
general public on this issue no longer outweighs the substantial inter-
est of the landowners in developing their land. Soon after that cross-
over point is reached, the landowners will usually convince the
legislature to begin granting exceptions to the development ban, as
the legislature of South Carolina did in 1990.382
We can avoid these opposition costs, however, by exercising the
power of eminent domain and forcing Lucas to sell his development
rights. Such a forced sale would require society to bear the additional
expense of determining and transferring just compensation to Lu-
cas. 383 However, if courts award such compensation only when gov-
ernment restricts the property rights of the very few in a manner that
benefits the very many, these transaction costs will generally be less
than the opposition costs that would result in the absence of compen-
sation.3" This suggests that by providing compensation, society will
generally be able to effect a desired rights change that takes from the
very few to benefit the very many less expensively than by attempting
to force through and maintain an uncompensated transfer. Unfortu-
nately, if we rely too heavily on our moral intuitions drawn from pri-
vate-party conflicts, we may overlook the advantages this forced sale
option provides.
Third, as Professor Epstein recognized,385 once we leave the per-
sonal injury case,386 ordinary causation alone may not provide an ade-
quate vehicle for properly resolving cases that involve disadvantage to
382. See St. Amand, supra note 298, at 528-32. While Penn Central has not yet
succeeded in exercising its air rights associated with the Grand Central Terminal, it
remains determined to do so. See Dunlap, supra note 264, at J1 (" 'The city and com-
munity should not misunderstand Penn Central's resolve.... and that is to realize the
value of the air rights, which value has been denied it for so long.' ") (quoting a Penn
Central corporate spokesman). Moreover, equally troubling to me, when the state
government inevitably decides to grant exceptions to its beachfront development ban,
it will likely permit development of land owned by the politically well-connected, but
not permit development by the ordinary, apolitical beachfront landowners. As a re-
sult, in addition to its general failure to preserve undeveloped beachfront over the
long-run, an attempt to impose an uncompensated development ban would inevitably
lead to disparate treatment of landowners according to their political connections.
383. The actual amount of the just compensation award is not a net loss to society
because it simply transfers an existing loss from one party, the affected landowner, to
another, the regulating government. See also supra note 296.
384. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 1955-59.
385. See Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 317, at 90-91; Epstein, Intentional
Harms, supra note 317, at 424-33; Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas, supra note
317, at 197-98.
386. Even in the personal injury case, where A physically strikes B, Professor Ep-
stein has assumed that B had a legal right to be free from physical contact by A,
absent his consent to the contact. Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 311, at 50. As
Professor Posner has pointed out, Professor Epstein has not adequately explained
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another's property or economic interests. If A opens a business that
competes with B, A's actions may impose severe financial losses on B,
perhaps even drive B out of business. Moreover, many people would
describe such an event, in ordinary language, as "A ruined B's busi-
ness." Finding liability on the basis of such ordinary causation would,
however, substantially threaten our ability to maintain a competitive
marketplace.387 To avoid that result, Professor Epstein suggested two
strategies. He first denied that people would describe the event as
one in which "A drove B out of business. ' 388 His arguments on that
score are not entirely persuasive, however, and so he also advanced a
second proposition. He asserted that A's actions, while they may have
ruined B's business, did not interfere with any legal right held by B.389
Because B did not hold the legal right to be free from this sort of
competition, B cannot recover from A for the losses A's actions
caused B. 3 ° Thus, for a plaintiff to recover for a loss sustained with
respect to a property or economic interest, Professor Epstein would
require a showing of ordinary causation and a showing that A's ac-
tions interfered with a legal right held by B before he would find A
prima facie liable for B's lOSS. 3 9 1
Given this additional element, we must first determine whether B
held a legal right with respect to A's actions before we can determine
to whom we shall assign liability for any particular loss. 392 This analy-
why B's right should extend to such contact without regard to the fault of A. See
Posner, supra note 326, at 467; see also Weinrib, supra note 191, at 423-25 & n.31.
387. See Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 317, at 50-53.
388. Professor Epstein rejected this characterization of events, however.
On strict causal terms, the necessary presence of these possible customers
[who faced a choice of doing business with A or B] means that the case does
not involve the simple two-party situation implied by the phrase "defendant
drove plaintiff out of business." The case, therefore, presents no parallel
whatsoever to the straightforward trespass case of "A hit B" even though
the plaintiff may speak, however earnestly, of what the defendant has done
to him.
Epstein, Intentional Harms, supra note 317, at 431.
389. Id. at 431.
390. Id; see also Weinrib, Right and Advantage, supra note 318, at 1284 ("At the
heart of this example is the relationship between a right or a wrong, on the one hand,
and an advantage or a disadvantage, on the other. An advantage is something that
contributes affirmatively to the contingent level of welfare that someone enjoys at a
relevant time, and a disadvantage is something that diminishes that level.... Having
an advantage, however, is not the same as having a right, nor is suffering a wrong
identical with suffering a disadvantage. I can infringe your rights without thereby
disadvantaging you, as where a court would award nominal damages. I can disadvan-
tage you without infringing your rights, for instance, by starting a business that com-
petes with yours.").
391. Epstein, Intentional Harms, supra note 317, at 424-33; see also EPSTmIN, TAK-
INGS, supra note 4, at 130-31 (sales of alcohol do not cause harm); Epstein, Nuisance
Law, supra note 317, at 90-91; Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Mis-
representations, 12 GA. L. REv. 455, 456-57 & n.5 (1978).
392. See also Coleman, A Mixed Conception, supra note 244, at 429 n.11; Weinrib,
supra note 191, at 423-25.
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sis eerily parallels the pre-Nebbia Court's analysis of the Just Com-
pensation issue, in that both look for action that not only injures
another, but injures another's rights. Both approaches suffer from the
same telling weakness: How do you define B's initial bundle of
rights?393 While Professor Epstein has suggested a means for defining
B's initial bundle of rights, 394 his argument, at that point, loses its
connection to ordinary causation and breaks down into little more
than an assertion about the supposed efficiency of some idealized set
of common-law rights.3 95
Thus, Professor Epstein's justification of the misfeasance-nonfea-
sance line cannot support use of the harm-benefit line to separate
compensable from noncompensable government action. His notion of
ordinary causation, while intuitively attractive, derives from the con-
text of private-party disputes, and is inappropriate for direct applica-
tion to resolve the takings issue. Moreover, when he adds the
requirement that B demonstrate an interference with a legal right
before B can recover, his analysis returns us to the problems that
Nebbia's redefinition of rights created.
3. Conclusion: Causation, Responsibility, and Takings
This analysis suggests that the reasons behind tort law's misfea-
sance-nonfeasance line cannot support application of the harm-benefit
line to resolve the takings issue. Our examination of the misfeasance-
nonfeasance doctrine has not proven fruitless, however, as it has sug-
gested the basis for the harm-benefit line's intuitive attraction. Be-
cause we have formed our moral compass from the sorts of disputes
we regularly encounter at home, at work, and in everyday life, we
have built our intuitions about responsibility and causation on a foun-
dation of private-party conflicts. In such conflicts, we consistently as-
sign responsibility to the "misbehaving" party because such an
assignment ensures a practicable resolution of the conflict and serves
to deter undesirable behavior in the future.396 Such an assignment of
responsibility is, therefore, not only convenient and practical, but also
likely to be desirable from a least-cost avoider point of view. Out of
this assignment of responsibility, we have formed a relatively coherent
393. See Hale, supra note 337, at 198-201.
394. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 111-12 (define scope of police power
according to "precise private law analogues").
395. See Proceedings of the Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitution,
41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 49, 72, 96, 98-99, 102, 110-11 (1986) (idealized set of natural
rights measured principly by land's physical boundaries is most efficient because it
minimizes situations where negotiating over property rights will take place in bilateral
monopoly context, and opportunities for rent-seeking) (statements of Professor
Epstein).
396. See Fischer, supra note 350, at 1337 (noting philosopher David Hume's propo-
sition that "human knowledge of causation is derived from observing invariable se-
quence of events, such as A always following B").
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and shared conception of "harm-causing" conduct to which we attach
moral culpability."'
Having created, or been socialized to accept, such a framework for
assigning liability for undesirable results, our willingness to apply that
framework in other contexts is perhaps inevitable. 398 After all, the
utility of such a decisional framework rests in large part on its ability
to produce accurate results in a variety of situations. Because it usu-
ally works, we need not constantly and consciously reevaluate the
framework when we apply it to a new situation. If the framework
works, we can stop thinking about it, and allow it to become part of
our subconscious process of perceiving the world. As such, the frame-
work of cause and responsibility we have developed based upon our
experiences in private-party disputes shapes how we frame the events
we experience. As a result, it will always exert a substantial influence
on our judgments concerning moral culpability and wrongdoing.
Yet, while we cannot avoid its pull, we must be careful not to adopt
its conclusions in determining the proper resolution of the takings is-
sue. The takings issue, because it involves a choice of assigning liabil-
ity to either a private party or the regulating government, presents
circumstances that are materially different than those that a conflict
between private parties presents. In contrast to private-party dis-
putes, jurisprudential costs will seldom present a serious problem in
the takings area, and our ability and desire to deter "undesirable" be-
havior through uncompensated takings are, at best, questionable. To
resolve the takings issue on its own merits, we must create a decisional
framework that responds to the circumstances associated with the lia-
bility choice that the Just Compensation Clause presents, rather than
rely on a framework drawn from materially different circumstances.
Thus, we should reject the harm-benefit line as one manifestation of a
framework we have created based upon, and to address, a lifetime of
private-party conflicts.
V. TAKINGS AND THE LOWER-COST AVOIDER: A PURE THEORY
OF SINGLING OUT
If, as this analysis suggests, we should not rely on the harm-benefit
line to separate compensable government action from noncompensa-
ble action, courts should shift their focus away from any given actor's
relationship to, or apparent responsibility for, an undesirable result.
The private-party conflicts that have largely shaped our perceptions
of, and intuitions concerning, responsibility are inapposite to the pub-
lic party-private party conflict at issue in the takings jurisprudence.
As a result, relying on our intuitions concerning, and our ordinary per-
397. See, e.g., Elickson, supra note 285, at 729; Fischer, supra note 350, at 1337-38;
Peterson, supra note 20, at 91.
398. See RADIN, supra note 303, at 5.
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ceptions of, harm, causation, and responsibility will often lead us
astray if applied directly to resolve the compensation question. Partic-
ularly, our intuitions from private-party conflicts are likely to lead us
to leave a particular individual to bear a disproportionate govern-
ment-imposed burden, even though the desired rights change could
have been achieved at a lower cost through a compensated taking of
the property at issue.
The Court has said that the purpose of the compensation require-
ment is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens, which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole."3 99 Perhaps, it is time that the Court began to
do exactly that. If government deprives the very few of their property
to benefit the very many, the Court should require compensation.
399. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 714 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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